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Introduction: mapping the terrain 
There is not much written about hope these days. Perhaps it is 
not an attitude that there is much call for in an age of constant 
war, global poverty and threatening environmental catastrophe. 
When the future seems to promise nothing but disaster it is resil-
ience rather than hope that is the virtue most needed in our time. 
However, in this book I shall argue that hope is not only an essential 
existential attitude for all of us but also, if it is realistic, an impor-
tant virtue. 
To speak of virtue is to speak of character traits and dispositions 
that help us to live life well. The person of courage, for example, is 
able to face difficulties that inspire fear in her and so to succeed in 
her projects. The generous person is able to overcome his tendency<I 
to selfishness and so helps those in need and wins the gratitude and 
respect of others. In these and many other ways a virtuous person 
is able to succeed in life in a way that a vicious person will not. Of 
course, this understanding of virtue ignores the ethical or moral 
norms that are often associated with that concept. Most people 
think of being virtuous as an ethical requirement whose value 
resides in moral goodness as such. One should not act generously 
in order to win the favour of others but because being generous 
is a good thing in itself. These people will say that my account is 
too pragmatic: too concerned with making a success of life and 
not concerned enough about being morally good. Ancient Greek 
philosophers solved this problem by suggesting that if we are 
morally virtuous, we will go on to make a success of our lives. In 
Hope 
this way virtue and successful living would inevitably go together. 
But there are too many successful rogues in the world today to 
give much encouragement to this way of thinking. Perhaps a better 
approach is to say that, if it is true that being virtuous makes you 
successful in life, then we might have to define success differently 
from the wealth and social power that the rogues I am referring to 
seem to enjoy. Perhaps being virtuous will make us happy, where 
being happy is to be understood in deeper terms than just mate-
rial wealth and sensual pleasure. In this book I shall suggest that 
the virtue of hope is indeed important for making a success of life, 
but that we should understand the relevant notion of success as 
involving happiness in a deep sense that I shall explain presently. 
In order to understand hope as a virtue, and in order to lay out 
the themes that I shall discuss in this book, it will be of interest to 
review what a range of authors have said about it. 
Aristotle 
The most notable ancient philosophical discussion of virtue comes 
from the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE). He suggests 
that our basic aim in life is to achieve happiness, which he under-
stands as the fulfilment of our capacities and abilities as human 
beings. It does not consist just in the satisfaction of our desires -
especially our material and sensuous desires - but in doing things 
that are worth doing and doing them as well as we can. It follows 
from this that a virtue is any character trait, ability or disposition 
that helps us to act nobly and well. Notice that the word "well" here 
speaks to being effective and successful in what we do, while the 
word "nobly" speaks to the ethical values of acting honourably and 
in accordance with the moral norms that prevail in our society. 
So the ethical and pragmatic values that we thought might be in 
conflict are combined here in the notion of virtue. 
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But what does Aristotle say about hope? Unfortunately, he says 
very little. However, he does offer us a framework for understanding 
it. When Aristotle thinks of virtues that involve the emotions or 
desires, he suggests that a virtue is located in an appropriate, usually 
middle, position between two extremes: an extreme of too little or 
an extreme of too much of the relevant emotion. So in the case of 
courage, which is a virtue that involves the emotion of fear, he says 
that courage lies between the extremes of foolhardiness (not feeling 
enough fear in the face of danger) and cowardliness (feeling too 
much fear in the face of danger). Being courageous is feeling the 
appropriate amount of fear in the face of danger: an amount that 
allows you to face up to the danger and act decisively without being 
unmindful of the risks you face. I shall apply this schema to hope 
and hopefulness in the chapters that follow. 
But Aristotle does not confine himself to virtues that relate to our 
emotions, desires and attitudes. He also speaks of virtues that relate 
to our thinking and to our knowledge. There are not only virtues that 
set standards for our emotional lives, but also virtues that set stand-
ards for our rationality. Chief among the latter is wisdom. But this 
group also includes understanding and practical ability, along with 
the habit of mind that does not accept ideas or proposals without 
considering relevant evidence and reasons. Anyone who believes 
something simply because someone else has told him to - espe-
cially if that someone else has little or no expertise on the matter 
- is showing a lack of intellectual virtue of this kind. Once again, 
Aristotle himself does not discuss hope as an intellectual virtue. 
However, I will be suggesting in this book that hope should be real-
istic, and this invites us to understand hope in Aristotelian terms 
as an intellectual virtue or skill. If hope needs to be realistic then 
there must be an appropriate assessment of the facts of the matter. 
Is what is hoped for possible? Is it attainable? What are the chances 
of success? How much luck will be involved in the outcome? What 
do I need to do to achieve what I am hoping for? All these questions 
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require intelligent answers and thus require intellectual virtue. We 
must exercise judgement that is sensitive to the realities and risks 
of the situation and also to the values inherent in what is hoped for. 
We must balance the risks against those values and act decisively. 
Hope inspires such a stance and in this way constitutes an intellec-
tual virtue linked to sound judgement. 
Hope requires one to imagine and foresee various scenarios and 
to assess risk factors. It requires one to acknowledge the values that 
are involved in a situation. If I am taking risks or facing dangers, 
driven by the hope of an outcome, is the value of that outcome 
commensurate with the risks and dangers? Does that value make 
facing the risks and dangers worthwhile? If hope is a motivation or 
a spur to action, then it requires the kind of sensitive judgement 
and prudence that Aristotle identified as the most important of 
the virtues. 
Thomas Aquinas 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74 CE) was one of the greatest philosophers 
and Christian theologians of the medieval period in Europe and it 
will be of interest to explore his ideas on hope. Aquinas has two 
discussions of hope in his monumental work, Summa Theologica: 
one as an emotion that motivates action and the other as a virtue. 
Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of "passions" or emotions. First, 
there are those that express our desire for, or aversion to, things: 
emotions such as love, joy, sorrow and hatred. These are reactions 
to what causes us pleasure or pain. And, second, there are those 
that respond to the difficulties facing us that stand in the way of 
our attaining what we desire: such as daring, fear, hope and the like. 
These latter emotions play a motivational role in our attitudes and 
actions and are therefore more active than the first group. These 
emotions fire us up to overcome the difficulties that stand in the 
Introduction: mapping the terrain 
way of what we desire, or to flee from them. They spur us on to 
action. 
Aquinas says that hope presupposes desire - we hope just for 
those things that we desire - and he distinguishes hopes from 
desires and wishes by noting that hope must fulfil four conditions. 
First, it must be for something good (as opposed to fear, which is of 
something bad). Second, its object is in the future. Third, its object 
must be something arduous and difficult to obtain (which is how 
it differs from a desire or a wish). And fourth, this difficult thing 
must be something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for 
that which one cannot get at all. Accordingly, Aquinas defines hope 
as a movement of the appetitive power (that is, of desire) ensuing 
from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to 
obtain. What causes hope is thinking that the desired future good is 
obtainable - which may be because one has the requisite resources, 
ability or strength, or because the circumstances are propitious -
and what prevents hope is thinking that that good is unobtainable. 
One's experience of events in the past that make one think that the 
goal is possible can lead to hope, just as experience that suggests it 
is impossible will snuff it out. 
Aquinas also discusses the opposites of hope. Hope comes into 
being when we think that a desired object is difficult but possible 
to obtain. Accordingly, when we think a desired object is unobtain-
able, we are not spurred to action to obtain it and we suffer despair, 
which is, in that sense, the opposite of hope. Another opposite of 
hope is fear. But fear is the opposite of hope in the sense that its 
object - something bad - is the opposite of the object of hope -
which is something good. 
Aquinas gives us a hint that there is an ethical dimension to 
hope when he says that young people and drunkards can be more 
hopeful than older or sober folk. He says this is true of young people 
because they have more of a future in front of them and they live 
more in the future than in the past. Moreover, they are full of spirit 
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and easily spurred on to undertake arduous projects. As well, they 
are less experienced in life. They have not suffered many defeats and 
so their experience tells them that many things are possible. People 
under the influence of alcohol think in the same way. They are easily 
spurred on despite the difficulties that confront them, and they 
are unmindful of experiences that should warn them of the risks. 
Aquinas's observations here could be taken as an ethical warning. 
The conditions of youth and inebriation apply also to foolish and 
thoughtless people in that they attempt everything and are full of 
hope. It is for this reason that the Aristotelian structure of virtue 
should apply to this emotion. One should not be excessive in hope 
just as one should not be deficient. If one were deficient one would 
not be motivated to take any action in pursuit of an arduous goal, 
but if one were excessive one would rush in like a drunkard and fail. 
These observations stem from Aquinas's discussion of hope as 
an emotion linked to action. But when he addresses the question 
of whether hope is a virtue, he does so in a theological context. His 
first point is that hope, considered as a virtue, is not a passion, but a 
habit of mind. As a passion, the object of hope is a future good, diffi-
cult but possible to obtain. This form of hope is a movement of the 
appetites: a desire or wish. But Aquinas is now speaking of hope as 
a habit of mind or, as later elaborations would have it, an act of will. 
What he means by this is that it is a disposition or a commitment 
based in our thinking. It is not an emotion but a rational stance. 
Aquinas defines a virtue as a person's habit of mind that helps that 
person attain his or her good. As a religious believer, he then asserts 
that God is a person's ultimate good. From these premises Aquinas 
concludes that, in so far as hope helps us attain God through God's 
assistance, it is indeed a virtue. 
This introduction of God into the discussion may be a little 
surprising, but it can be understood in the context of Aquinas's 
profound religious beliefs. For example, Aquinas asserts that the 
proper and principle object of hope is eternal happiness. But 
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because that happiness consists in our union with God, God 
becomes the object that hope seeks to attain. Aquinas even argues 
that people should not place hope (in his special theological sense) 
in each other. It is only God who can help us attain our final end: 
that of eternal happiness in heaven. We can, however, rely on each 
other and place trust in others as possible helpers in our quest for 
salvation. But the proper object of the virtue of hope is our salva-
tion with God. It follows that hope, as Aquinas understands it, is 
inextricable from religious faith. 
Aquinas goes on to distinguish religious faith from hope by 
saying that faith gives us the truth about God and is in that sense 
cognitive, while hope allows us to trust in God's help in attaining 
eternal happiness and is therefore more like an attitude. Faith must 
come first since we must believe in God before we can hope to 
come to his presence in eternal salvation. Having argued earlier 
that hope must be for something possible but difficult to obtain, he 
now applies this to salvation and says that we must first believe the 
object of hope - our salvation in God - to be possible before we 
can hope for it. In this way faith comes before hope and is neces-
sary for it. 
Immanuel Kant 
Jumping ahead a few hundred years, we come to the father of 
modern Western philosophy, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who 
writes: 
The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, 
is centred in the three following questions: 
1. What can I know? 
2. What ought I to do? 
3. What may I hope? (Critique A805/B833) 
Hope 
The first question gave rise to his major work, The Critique of Pure 
Reason, while the second generated as many as three important 
publications: The Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, Ihe 
Critique of Practical Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals. But the 
third question generated no major exploration except a number of 
speculations about morality and religion. Indeed, in the text from 
which this quotation comes, Kant immediately turns the third ques-
tion into a moral issue by suggesting that it should be understood as: 
"If I act as I ought to do, what may I then hope?" In this way, what we 
hope for is seen as a reward for being good: a reward that may come 
to us in this life or that we may be given in an eternal life after death. 
Kant says that while we all hope to be happy, the real issue is that 
we should be worthy of being happy. It is not enough to hope to 
enjoy the fruits of happiness; we should also deserve the happiness 
we enjoy. In this way our hope for happiness is tied to our moral 
standing and to our sense of justice. Hope is seen as the motivation 
for our moral quest for being worthy of happiness, whether in this 
life or in the next. 
Positive psychology 
Modern psychology seems to understand virtue - and, more 
specifically, the virtue of hope - in less moralistic terms and as 
tied to success in life. For example, Christopher Peterson and 
Martin Seligman, the creators of what is today known as "posi-
tive psychology1: understand virtue as what they call "character 
strengths" that enable us to live our lives effectively and happily. 
They define hope as, "Expecting the best in the future and working 
to achieve it; believing that a good future is something that can be 
brought about" (Peterson & Seligman 2004: 30). This suggests that 
they see hope as a form of action as well as an expectation or a belief. 
But it is as a mindset that hope is most important. They understand 
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hope as "a cognitive, emotional, and motivational stance toward 
the future': thereby embracing both the way we see the world and 
the way we feel about it. However, they do make some distinctions 
between the cognitive dimensions of hope - which relate to our 
beliefs and knowledge - and the emotional dimensions of hope 
- which relate to our feelings and desires - when they say "Hope 
seems more emotional than its cousins and optimism more purely 
expectational. Future-mindedness andfuture orientation imply an 
articulate theory about what the individual needs to do to get from 
here to there (from the present to the desired future)" (ibid.). This 
focus on action and on hope as a motivation makes their account 
very pragmatic. There is no hint of any moral values and the focus 
is almost exclusively on making a success of life's everyday projects. 
Future mindedness, for example, is displayed by planning and 
making provision for what lies ahead. As Peterson and Seligman 
put it, "People high in this character strength make 'to do' lists, use 
day planners, and wear wristwatches; they also balance their check-
books - all these activities imply an orientation to the future" (ibid.: 
570). There is not much reference to moral values here. This is more 
a matter of prudence than of ethics. 
Peterson and Seligman also make much of the way that hope is 
tied to action as a motivation. They argue that "optimism leads to 
continued efforts to attain the goal, whereas pessimism leads to 
giving up': They also note a problem; namely, "an optimistic bias 
in risk perception" (ibid.: 577). What they mean by this is that a 
hopeful or optimistic person will be less likely to apprehend risks to 
their projects or, if they do apprehend them, to take them seriously. 
This means that they are less realistic and will engage in activities 
even in the face of evidence that the enterprise is risky or prone 
to failure, or will persist in those activities even when they seem 
to be unsuccessful. In the long term, such an attitude is clearly 
not conducive to success in life, although in cases where luck has 
favoured the bold, such people are often regarded as heroes. 
Hope 
My plan for this book 
It is not my intention in this book to pursue the theological or 
moralistic paths opened up by Aquinas and Kant. I do not see hope 
as a fundamentally theological virtue or as an intrinsically moral 
motivation. What I will do is use an Aristotelian framework to add 
depth to the positive psychology account. I want to explore what 
hope is and what role it plays in our everyday lives as human beings. 
What can we learn about ourselves as human beings given that 
we are beings who hope? I shall claim that hope is a fundamental 
structure of the way we live our lives. It is a way of shaping how 
we view ourselves and the world in which we live. It is a structure 
of our identity. Whether we hope for a life after death or for good 
weather tomorrow - whether our hopes are grand or humble -
hoping is part of our outlook on life. What we hope for defines 
who we are. This will have some ethical implications - some of our 
hopes might be silly or unrealistic and should therefore be put aside 
- but the most important reason for exploring hope is to under-
stand ourselves better as human beings. 
In this book I shall embark on this exploration by enquiring into 
what the concept of hope means in our everyday uses of the term. I 
shall then investigate the Aristotelian suggestion that being hopeful 
is part of a well-lived life: that is, that hope is a worldly virtue. After 
that I shall apply what we have learnt to three very different situ-
ations. The first of these is the medical clinic where a patient who 
is dying might be sustained by hope. I shall then turn to society 
and explore the role that hope plays in political engagement. Last, 
I shall return to the assumptions made by Aquinas and Kant and 
explore the connection between hope and religious faith, but it will 
be to suggest that our hopefulness creates such faith rather than 
that our faith sustains our hope. I shall end by espousing a realistic 
kind of hope that will be conducive to living a meaningful life and 
to attaining a fragile happiness. 
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What do we mean by "hope"? Hope seems to be a psycholog-
ical state that we experience as part of our inner, subjective lives. 
However, not all usages of the word designate a state of mind in 
this way. We sometimes say of someone that "he does not have a 
hope': Suppose a goal kicker of average ability is taking a penalty 
kick against a team and a goalkeeper who are very skilled at foot-
ball. As he is about to take his kick we might say of him that he has 
no hope of scoring the goal. We do not mean by this that he does 
not hope to score the goal. Indeed, we assume that he does hope 
to. But we are not referring to his psychological condition or to 
any mental states he might be in. We are referring to the objective 
fact that he has but a very slim chance of scoring a goal: so slim, 
in fact, that we think there is no likelihood at all that he will score 
a goal. We express this by saying that he has no hope of doing so. 
This statement is a description of the physical or factual likelihood 
of the outcome taking place. It is an assessment of the objective 
circumstances rather than of the internal psychological state of the 
footballer. 
But the meaning that we are more interested in is when the word 
is being used to refer to the way someone feels or thinks about a 




John has to go out to attend a lecture at his university and he doesn't 
have an umbrella. Moreover, he is moving house and so most of his 
clothes are in boxes and relatively inaccessible. The weather fore-
cast says there is a chance of rain and John does not want to get 
wet. Not only would getting wet be uncomfortable, but if his clothes 
get wet he will have nothing to wear the next day. As he is about to 
leave his house the sky is clear, but he can see dark clouds forming 
in the distance. John hopes that it will not rain. 
What conditions have to obtain for it to make sense for John to 
hope that it will not rain? What are the thoughts and feelings that 
John needs to have for it to be appropriate for us to use the word 
"hope" in describing his state of mind? 
The first thing that seems to be necessary is that he has a 
relevant desire. Indeed, he has a number of relevant desires. He 
desires to get to his university and he desires to do so at a certain 
time (with the consequence that he cannot wait for the weather to 
clear up). These desires flow from his commitment to his univer-
sity studies. But his most relevant desire is the desire not to get 
wet. He would not enjoy walking to his destination in the rain. 
Indeed, in this case it is an unusually urgent desire since he does 
not have a change of clothes readily available to him. Accordingly, 
getting his clothes wet would not only be uncomfortable but 
would also be a serious inconvenience. John desires not to suffer 
this inconvenience. Moreover, not only does he need to have a 
desire that it not rain, but he has to be worried about the effect 
that the rain would have on him if it should come. He has to give 
thought to the unfortunate consequences to him of getting wet. 
Unlike Gene Kelly in the famous scene from the film Singin' in 
the Rain, John is anxious not to get wet. It is a matter of concern 
to him that his clothes stay dry so that he can wear them again 
the next day. The weather forecast, along with his seeing the dark 
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clouds in the distance, only increases his anxiety about the possi-
bility of getting wet. 
A second condition is a consequence of the first. This is that 
John must consider it to be a good thing for him if it does not rain. 
It might not be good for farmers or gardeners who need rain, but 
given John's needs and concerns, he will judge it to be a good thing 
if it does not rain. 
A third condition that needs to obtain for it to make sense for 
John to hope that it will not rain is that he has to consider it to 
be possible that it will rain. If John were convinced that it would 
not rain, there would be no point in his hoping that it would not. 
This condition is fulfilled in the example because he has heard a 
weather forecast that predicts that it will rain and because he has 
seen the dark clouds gathering in the distance. Notice that this is 
a psychological matter. It is not the objective possibility that it will 
rain that is important but the fact that he considers it possible. 
There are meteorological conditions that make it more or less 
likely that it will rain, and a certain set of meteorological condi-
tions obtains on that day. According to the weather report those 
actual conditions are such as to make it likely that it will rain. On 
other days they might have been such as to make it very unlikely, 
if not impossible, that it would rain. These are objective conditions 
that are as they are irrespective of what John or anyone else thinks 
about them. What we are considering in the example, however, is 
what John considers possible or likely. One could imagine that if 
John were going out on a day when rain was extremely unlikely, 
he might still hope that it does not rain. But if he does have such 
a hope it will be because he thinks that rain is possible. If he were 
convinced that it was impossible that it would rain, then it would 
make no sense for him to hope that it would not. He would then 
not need to have such a hope because he already knows that it will 
not. But in this example he is envisaging an unwelcome possibility, 
that it will rain, and hoping that it will not eventuate. For him to 
13 
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hope that it will not happen he must consider it to be possible that 
it will. 
A fourth condition for its making sense for John to hope that 
it will not rain is that it is possible that it will not rain. What this 
means is that if John knew that the meteorological conditions 
were such that rain was inevitable, then it would make no sense to 
describe John as hoping that it would not rain. If he hopes that it 
does not rain he must consider it possible that it does not rain. It 
follows that he must not think that rain is inevitable. If the condi-
tions and indications were such as to induce in John the belief that 
rain was inevitable, it would make no sense for him to hope that 
it does not rain. This would be especially clear if we imagine John 
leaving the house when it is already raining. It certainly would not 
make sense for him then to hope that it does not rain. The technical 
term to describe the third and fourth conditions together - that the 
hoped-for event is possible but not inevitable - is the word "contin-
gent''. An occurrence is contingent if it might or might not have 
happened: that is, if it was not necessary, inevitable or impossible 
that it should happen. An occurrence is contingent if luck - in the 
form of unknown or unexpected causal influences ~ can intervene 
to make it happen or to stop it from happening. 
The role of time in these conditions leads me to propose a fifth. 
As we have just noted, if John were to step outside and feel the rain 
on his skin it would make no sense for him to say "I hope it does 
not rain': It would be even stranger for him to say "I hope it is not 
raining''. If it manifestly is raining, to say such a thing would be to 
misuse the word "hope''. He might say "I wish it were not raining': 
but he could not say "I hope it were not raining''. John's thought "I 
hope it does not rain" refers to the future. It might be more accurate 
to convey its content by saying "I hope it will not rain" and in this 
way make the future reference of the hope more explicit. But it is 
interesting to reflect that, from John's own point of view, anything 
is possible in the future. Even if the meteorological conditions were 
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such that rain was completely inevitable, the fact that the rain is 
not yet actual gives John the psychological possibility of thinking 
that it might not come and hence of hoping that it will not. On 
the other hand, if time has passed so that that envisaged future is 
already settled, what was in John's future has become the present 
or the past. Accordingly, it will no longer be considered possible 
for things to turn out differently from the way they have. If the rain 
has started, it is no longer possible that it not be raining. It follows 
that it would make no sense for John to hope that it will not rain. 
If it ever does make sense to say "I hope it is not raining" when it 
actually is raining, we could imagine it doing so when] ohn does not 
know whether it is raining as he is about to leave the house. In this 
case his hope is future oriented in his thinking if not in fact. What 
is objectively the case in the present is indeed the case. It is either 
raining or it is not. But John does not know whether it is. He will 
find out as soon as he steps outside. His stepping outside is still in 
the future, however, and so it makes sense for him to hope that it is 
not raining. In this case, he is hoping that what he finds out about 
the weather when he steps outside is that it is not raining. 
What we have learnt from this example is that hopes are oriented 
toward the future. Suppose it had rained yesterday and that John 
had been out in the rain and his clothes had become wet. This 
had been a discomfort and inconvenience to him. Would it make 
sense for him now to hope that it had not rained yesterday? No, it 
would not. If it happened yesterday then he cannot now hope that 
the circumstances had been different. We saw above that it only 
makes sense to speak of hope if what is hoped for is possible. But 
yesterday's weather cannot be different now from what it was. It has 
happened in the past and cannot now be changed. That it did not 
rain yesterday is therefore impossible now. And if it is impossible, 
John cannot be said to hope for it. 
This is not to say, however, that ] ohn cannot have some kind of 
feeling towards yesterday's weather that is, perhaps, similar to hope. 
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He can wish that it had not rained yesterday, just as he can wish 
that it were not raining now when it actually is. The conditions for 
making sense of this are similar to the conditions that make sense 
of hope. He has a desire that it does not rain and that he does not 
get his clothes wet. And, in light of the science of meteorology, it 
is objectively possible that it might not have rained yesterday, even 
though, in fact, it did. But it is not now possible that it will not have 
rained yesterday because, in fact, it did. The feeling that John can 
have today that is similar to hope but different from it, is that he 
can wish that it had not rained yesterday. 
A wish is a psychological state that is similar to a hope in inter-
esting ways. Both are expressions of what John wants and of what 
he is anxious about. John wants to walk outside without getting 
wet and is anxious about ruining his clothes. He expresses this by 
feeling and articulating various wishes and hopes. With reference 
to the future he hopes that it will not rain, while with reference to 
the past he wishes that it had not rained. Hope refers to the future 
while, in this case, John's wish refers to the past. As I noted above, 
he could also wish that it were not raining in the present. If it is 
actually raining now, he could wish that it were not. But he cannot 
be said to hope that it not raining when it actually is raining since 
that would be hoping for something that, given present meteoro-
logical conditions, is never going to happen. Hopes can only refer 
to what is possible in the future. 
Of course, wishes can refer to the future also. Let us imagine 
that when John steps outside and sees the dark clouds gathering 
he becomes convinced that rain is inevitable. He now considers it 
impossible that it will not rain. Accordingly, the fourth condition 
for its making sense for him to hope that it will not rain is not met. 
If he is completely convinced that it will rain, he cannot hope that 
it will not. Nevertheless, it would make sense to say of him that he 
wishes it would not rain. Even if he were to feel the first drops of 
rain on his clothes, he could go on wishing that it would not rain. 
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His wishes can extend into the future and embrace any scenario. 
His hopes, however, are limited to what is possible, and if it is actu-
ally raining then it is no longer possible that it is not raining now. 
Accordingly, he cannot hope that it does not rain. 
We can describe this difference between hopes and wishes in 
more general terms. We could say that wishes do not need to be 
realistic while hopes do. Just how realistic hopes should be is a 
matter we shall explore later. For the moment it is important to see 
that wishes need not be realistic at all. Not only can John wish that 
it not rain even when it manifestly is raining, but he can also wish 
that it had not rained yesterday when it clearly did. More generally, 
John can wish that the tooth fairy will stop it from raining or that 
the Easter bunny will bring him good luck. He can wish that global 
warming was not a reality or that dire poverty in the developing 
world was not the cause of millions of avoidable deaths every year. 
He can wish that he was rich or a champion footballer. In short, he 
can wish for the realization of any of his fantasies, the alleviation of 
all his anxieties, the satisfaction of all his desires and the fulfilment 
of all his ideals. But he can only hope for what he considers possible. 
A sixth condition is implicit in what we have seen already. 
Given that it might or might not rain and that John does not know 
whether it will, we could say that he is uncertain about whether it 
will rain. Whether it will rain or not is an objective matter. Given 
the meteorological conditions and the laws of nature, it will either 
rain or it will not. The occurrence of rain is objectively contin-
gent. But corresponding to this objective state of affairs there is the 
subjective state of John's not knowing whether it will rain or not. 
He is uncertain about the weather. It is this uncertainty, together 
with his anxiety about not getting wet, that leads him to hope that 
it will not rain. 
There is also a seventh condition. Suppose John had an umbrella. 
We have already noted that he wants to keep dry when he goes 
outside and that he is anxious about getting his clothes wet. Let us 
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qualify this a little by saying that he wants to keep relatively dry, 
or as dry as using an umbrella would make him. If this were what 
he wanted and if he had an umbrella, then it would be within his 
power to secure what he wants and allay his concerns when he 
goes outside in the rain. He just needs to put up his umbrella. In 
this circumstance, does it make sense for him to hope that it will 
not rain? Perhaps this question will gain more focus if we reformu-
late it as: would he hope that he will not get wet? (It was, after all, 
because he did not want to get wet that he hoped it would not rain 
in the original scenario.) I think it would not make very much sense 
for him to hope that he would not get wet because he has it within 
his power to ensure that he does not get wet. He only has to put up 
his umbrella. If he can control his circumstances in such a way as 
to avoid an unpleasant outcome or to secure a pleasant outcome, 
then it makes little sense for John to merely hope for that outcome. 
Rather, his mental state should be that of intending to secure that 
outcome. He could just go ahead and do what was necessary. To 
say that he hopes for that outcome implies that he cannot control 
all the parameters of the situation so as to secure the outcome he 
wants. To say that John hopes that he will not get wet implies that 
he cannot control whether or not he gets wet. If he can control it 
by using his umbrella, then it would be redundant for him to also 
hope not to get wet. (Once again, however, he could still wish that 
he not get wet, even as he is putting up his umbrella. The notion of 
a wish seems much more accommodating.) 
To return to the original example in which John did not have 
an umbrella, we can apply this point by suggesting that a further 
condition for its making sense for John to hope that it would not 
rain is that he has no control over whether it rains or not. This point 
is easily missed in this example because no one has any signifi-
cant control over meteorological conditions. The forces of nature 
that are involved here are too great and amorphous to admit of 
human control (although climate scientists do hope that there are 
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things human beings can do to reduce the effects of global climate 
change). It is certainly true that no one can control whether it will 
rain today, least of all John himself. It is because he knows that he 
cannot control whether it rains or not that it makes sense for him to 
hope that it will not rain. If he were to be able to control the weather 
he would not need to hope for that outcome: he could just do what 
was necessary to secure it. 
Let us summarize, then, the conditions that make it appropriate 
for John to hope that it does not rain in the circumstances I have 
described. 
1. John has to be concerned about the effect of rain on him. This 
applies because he has a desire not to get wet. 
2. John has to consider that it would be a good thing for him if it 
did not rain. (This follows from the first condition.) 
3. He has to consider that it is possible that it will rain. 
4. He has to consider that it is possible that it will not rain: that is, 
that rain is not inevitable. 
5. The hope is directed towards weather conditions that lie in John's 
future. 
6. John is uncertain about whether it will rain. 
7. John is not able to control the meteorological forces that would 
stop it from raining. 
Do these conditions allow us to offer a definition of what hope is? 
They certainly give us some clues as to what clauses should appear 
in such a definition. 
Hopes and wishes 
While discussing our example we had occasion to contrast hopes 
and wishes. Let us therefore begin our task of defining hope by 
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specifying what features hopes have that wishes do not have. What 
we discovered earlier is that a hope is a wish that differs from other 
wishes in that its object needs to be considered to be in the future 
of the person who is hoping for it, that the person who is hoping 
for it cannot bring it about entirely by her own efforts and that it 
is possible that what is hoped for could occur or could not occur. 
While some of these features apply to wishes as well, not all of them 
do. Most notably, a wish can be for something that is not possible, 
either because it is in the past or because the laws of nature will not 
allow it to happen. I would suggest that this is a definitive differ-
ence between hopes and wishes. A hope should be for something 
that is possible. 
What other differences might there be between wishes and 
hopes? It is sometimes suggested in popular films for children that 
if you wish for something hard enough it will come to you. This 
point suggests that wishes admit of degrees: that you can wish 
in a more or less intense manner. Does hope admit of degrees in 
this way? If it did then hope would share this property with other 
emotions. You can be more or less angry and you can be more or 
less sad. While it might be naive to say that if you just hope hard 
enough what you hope for will happen, it does seem to make sense 
to speak of hoping more or less intensely. One way in which this 
would make sense is that one can desire what one hopes for more 
or less intensely. John's desire that his clothes not get wet is fairly 
intense because getting them wet would be seriously inconvenient 
for him. He is worried about getting his clothes wet. However, it 
is not a life or death matter. His hope is intense to the degree that 
his desire and his concern not to get wet are intense. Moreover, it 
seems we could say that the intensity of hope is inversely propor-
tional to the likelihood of the hoped-for event occurring. If John 
thinks that it is very unlikely that it will rain, then he does not have 
to hope so intensely that it will not. His hope will be tempered by 
his expectation. In contrast, if he notes the dark clouds and the 
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weather report and thus thinks that rain is very probable, his hope 
that it will not rain will possibly be more intense. 
However, before we accept the idea that hope admits of degrees, 
we should notice that it is not easy to imagine what a more intense 
hope would feel like in contrast to a less intense hope. There do 
not seem to be qualitative, experiential features in hopes that 
allows us to measure their intensity in the way that there is with 
anger or sadness. One can feel more or less angry, but can one 
feel hope more or less intensely? It would seem not. Perhaps this 
shows that hope is not an emotion in any simple sense. If we do 
speak of John hoping more or less intensely, we might be speaking 
obliquely about his desire that it will not rain and his anxiety about 
the consequences of the rain for him and suggesting that they can 
be more or less intense. The desire, the anxiety and the hope are 
inextricable from each other and so the intensity of the former rubs 
off on the latter. 
There might also be further ways in which hopes differ from 
wishes. We might, for example, suggest that hopes differ from 
wishes in that they are more serious. The wish that Santa Claus 
brings me a Christmas present might be thought to lack serious-
ness in this sense. Not only is this a wish for something impossible 
in that it refers to a person who does not exist, but it also seems 
somewhat childish or frivolous, rather than reflecting a serious 
engagement with life and its challenges. It might help to use a more 
serious example to make this point. One of my students - let us call 
her Fatima - is a mother who has had the heart-wrenching experi-
ence of having one of her children go missing. The child was found 
soon after and was unharmed, but while it was lost Fatima suffered 
considerable anxiety. She hoped that her child would be found. It 
would sound too weak and inappropriate to say that she wished that 
her child would be found. The word "wish" lacks the seriousness, 
urgency and engagement with reality that this situation calls for. This 
suggests that wishes are indeed less serious than hopes. 
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However, I am not sure that this is a characteristic that would 
not also be found in hopes. In the less serious case, it still makes 
sense to describe a person as hoping that they will be given a 
present. Even if they do not refer to Santa Claus or any other unre-
alistic entity so that what is wished for becomes impossible, the 
hope might still be essentially flippant. If I hope to receive a new 
shaving kit for my birthday, or a newly reissued Miles Davis CD 
for Christmas, such a hope may be described as lacking in serious-
ness no matter how much I want those things or, as in the case of 
the shaving kit, need them. While it will not be easy to judge which 
things are serious and which are not, and thus which wishes are 
serious and which are not, it does seem possible to hope for things 
that are either serious or not. If this is so, seriousness - however we 
define it - will not be a feature that can serve to distinguish hopes 
from wishes. It does not seem inappropriate to describe someone 
as hoping for something flippant. 
And yet there might be an important idea hiding within this 
suggestion. We noted in the first example that John had a concern 
about the weather. He was worried about his clothes getting wet 
and this anxiety, although it was mild, constituted a context that 
allowed us to understand his psychological state as one of hope. 
While it might not be a difference that distinguishes hopes sharply 
from wishes, it might be suggested that whereas hopes arise from 
concerns in this way and share in their intensity, wishes arise only 
from desires and fantasies. My wish that I receive a present is not 
driven so much by any concerns or worries that I might have as by 
my yearning for the things that I want. Not having the things I crave 
may be a source of some form of disquiet in me, but it would seem 
inappropriate to think of this as anxiety. I am not worried about 
some potential harm that might befall me, but just vaguely discon-
tented or in a state of longing. It remains true, however, that I could 
respond to this longing either by hoping that I receive what I want 
or by wishing for what I want. The broader notion of a wish would 
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seem to apply just as readily as the narrower notion of a hope. What 
would make the notion of hope appropriate so that I could describe 
myself as hoping for the present rather than as merely wishing for it, 
is if I feel an increased intensity of yearning marked by a degree of 
anxiety about not receiving it. Just wishing to receive it can be light-
hearted, while hoping to receive it seems somewhat more urgent. 
If I hope to receive it, I am displaying some degree of anxiety about 
not receiving it. 
The role of anxiety is more evident in the more serious case of 
Fatima and her lost child. This case suggests a link between hope 
and dread: that hope is the positive side, as it were, of anxiety. If we 
fear some bad outcome we can express that fear by dreading the 
bad outcome, by hoping for a good outcome, or both. Anxiety is 
fear that the worst can happen, while hope is a stance taken in the 
face of the fear that the worst can happen. Fatima hopes to find her 
lost child because she fears the alternative possibility: that the child 
is never found. Moreover, it is the uncertainty that pervades such 
times of crisis that generates both the anxiety and the hope. If there 
were no doubt that the child would be found, Fatima would feel but 
little anxiety and would not need to hope for that outcome. She 
would simply expect it. In this case there might be some impatience 
but there would not be nearly so much anxiety. It is when there is 
anxiety present that we speak of hope rather than a mere wish. And 
when we speak of hope as being intense we are suggesting that it is 
motivated by intense anxiety. Fatima knows this only too well. As 
we noted earlier, it would be too weak to say that she wishes to find 
her child since, while it is true that she desires to find her child, she 
also feels a high level of distress and fear about the child's welfare. 
Hopes differ from wishes, then, in that they are generated by a rela-
tively high degree of anxiety or concern. 
Wishes and hopes seem to have slightly different objects as well. 
Consider the locution "I wish I had a Miles Davis CD; I hope I'll get 
one soon': Here the two words "wish" and "hope" differ in that the 
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wish seems to be a desire for a specific object, while the hope seems 
to be looking forward to an event that involves the fulfilment of the 
wish. The wish is for an object while the hope is that something 
will happen. Once again, however, I doubt that this distinction is 
sharp enough to be definitive. The broader notion of a wish could 
be used to describe what I hope will happen as well as what I desire 
to obtain, as in "I wish my wife would give me a Miles Davis CD''. 
Nevertheless, wishes seem not to need specific events or occur-
rences as their objects. I may wish I were a millionaire but I hope 
to win the lottery. The wish is for a state of affairs, while the hope is 
that something will happen. Moreover, because hopes are for some-
thing that is possible, I must have purchased a lottery ticket if I am 
to be described as hoping to win. But I can wish I were a winner 
even without buying such a ticket and so without having any hope 
of winning. My wish has no foundation other than desire while my 
hope has some grounding in reality. 
This suggests that another difference between a hope and a wish 
is the level of attainability of what is desired and the associated 
anticipation levels that result. Bob buys a lottery ticket and wishes 
that he would win. This wish has an element of frivolity to it because 
Bob knows that the chances of winning a major prize are vanish-
ingly small. His wish loosens the grip of reality on him and allows 
him to dream a little. Perhaps the reason we have such wishes is that 
they allow us to escape from the pressures of daily life and to relax 
the harsh grip of reality. This may be psychologically important in 
allowing us to function in an otherwise uncompromising world. In 
buying a lottery ticket Bob is taking an easy - although unlikely -
way out. Whereas he could work hard to gain the financial secu-
rity he desires, he chooses to buy the lottery ticket instead. Rather 
than acting decisively and rationally, he relies on a slim chance of 
winning a fortune. The reason that we might think of this as frivo-
lous is not only that the chances of winning are so small or that a 
fortune is not, in itself, such an important thing, but because Bob 
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has chosen an easy option. He has not chosen to work harder but 
to gamble. It is the lack of a connection between appropriate action 
and the desired outcome that is characteristic of his wish. 
This, in turn, suggests that a distinguishing characteristic that 
would mark off hopes from wishes is that there is a link between 
hope and appropriate action. A hope would be something we are 
willing to invest effort into. Such a connection between hope and 
action may be absent in the case of wishes. When we hope for 
something, it may be that we can do something to achieve it, no 
matter how effective it might be, whereas when we wish for some-
thing we simply wait to see if what we wish for comes about. A wish 
is often for something less attainable and as a result is accompanied 
by a feeling that there is nothing we can do to fulfil it. It is often 
based on circumstances out of our control, and so we put less, little 
or no effort into attaining it. With a hope, we are more likely to act 
on it, as it is closer to our grasp, and we invest more into it. Hope is 
appropriate for those who have some degree of control, and wishing 
is appropriate for those who do not. This explains why I can wish I 
would win the lottery even if I have not bought a ticket while I could 
not be described as hoping to win without a ticket. 
Interestingly we can describe a situation as hopeless but we 
cannot describe it as wishless. Wishing is always an option. When 
we have no control over the situation at all, we are left only with 
wishing. If we are merely wishing for something, we are not actively 
pursuing whatever it is. We may even feel that it is unrealistic to do 
so. We may not be so fanciful as to expect Santa Claus to grant our 
wish, but we are not doing anything about it either. When we hope, 
there is an inclination to do whatever we can to attain the desired 
outcome, such as searching for the lost child, but we do so with the 
realization that we cannot control everything ourselves. Although 
hope implies some degree of control, it also implies limits to that 
control, as we noted earlier. At some stage we have to say that we 
have done all we can do and hope that the rest falls into place. We 
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can only speak of hope when we are still holding on to some possi-
bility, however slim, that what we want will happen. 
Take the case of Christine Collins, the heroine in the film 
Changeling, played by Angelina Jolie. Her son, Walter, goes missing 
and is never found. It transpires that a depraved murderer has 
been kidnapping young boys and killing them on a remote farm. 
After some seven years one of the missing boys appears, but he 
is not Walter. He is David, who had known Walter on that farm. 
Although he did not see Walter being killed, everything he reports 
indicates that Walter is dead. Nevertheless, Christine, having 
seen David alive and having heard his story, says that she now has 
something that she did not have before: hope. When the odds of 
a good outcome in a situation become slimmer and slimmer we 
normally talk of "losing hope': or even of "all hope being lost': and 
yet Christine goes on hoping. Is this an admirable determination to 
never give up hope, or is this a case of "wishful thinking"? If there 
is nothing more that Christine can do, the link between hope and 
action is lost and it would seem more appropriate to describe her 
as wishing that her child be found. But if there is still something 
she can do, even if it is so minimal an action as scrutinizing boys 
she sees in the street, then she could truthfully say that she still 
hopes to find her child. 
This last point seems to have added a new condition to the seven 
we found to be definitive of when it is appropriate for John to hope. 
John hopes that it would not rain but was not able to do anything 
that would secure that outcome. Yet we described him as hoping. 
On the other hand we have now suggested that using the word 
"hope" implies that the hoping person is doing, or is at least inclined 
to do, something to realize that hope. Perhaps it matters how we 
describe Christine Collins's hope. If she hopes that her child be 
found then she is hoping for an outcome of which she is not the 
agent. It is other people who will find the child or not. It is out of 
her hands. Nevertheless, this is a genuine case of hope because it 
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fulfils the seven conditions and is more than just a wish. But if we 
describe her as hoping that she will find her child, we are implying 
that she is herself trying to find her child and that her hope is a 
function of her effort in doing so. If, after such a time that, objec-
tively, all hope is lost, we can still say that she has not given up 
hope, we are suggesting that she has not given up trying. And we 
find this admirable. 
Hope and action 
Our attempts at distinguishing hopes from wishes have suggested a 
close link between hope and action, a link that is absent in the case 
of mere wishes. It is through action that we change the world so 
that it fits with our desires and hopes. If we want something we are 
motivated to do something to obtain it. Is it also the case that if we 
hope for something we are motivated to do something to obtain it? 
We have seen that if we wish for something we are not necessarily 
motivated to do something to obtain it because we may be engaged 
only in wishful thinking. So what about hope? We have discussed 
two examples that speak differently to this issue. John hoped that it 
would not rain. In his case there was nothing he could do to bring 
that eventuality about and so his hope did not lead to the kind 
of action that would stop it from raining. Christine Collins hoped 
that she might find her son. In her case there was something -
albeit a very minimal something - she could do: be on the lookout 
for him. In the film she pursued this course of action even at the 
cost of missing social and possible romantic opportunities that 
came her way. In both cases it seemed appropriate to describe the 
relevant psychological state as one of hope. Is it, then, an essential 
element in hope that it leads to action or is a hope where no action 
is possible also a genuine case of hope? It seems that the relations 
between hope and action are complex. 
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One contemporary philosopher, Patrick Shade, defines hope 
as "the active commitment to the desirability and realizability of a 
certain end" (Shade 2001: 70). The first point inherent in this defi-
nition is that every action has an end or a goal. The second point 
is that the end or goal that we pursue must seem desirable to us. 
This does not entail that it must be pleasant, but we must see it 
as something that we want to achieve for some reason or other. It 
may be important or frivolous, morally required or morally neutral, 
pleasant or unpleasant, but we must have some cogent reason for 
pursuing it. We engage in an action in order to attain that goal. In 
cases where the goal is not impossible but difficult to reach because 
of some difficulty or obstruction we need strong motivation so that 
we are prepared to make the needed effort. We need commitment 
to our goal. According to Shade, hope is the form that this commit-
ment takes. As he puts it, ''hope has as its object an end (whether 
a thing or an event) whose realization lies beyond our present 
agency; that end may be remote or directly obstructed, yet insofar 
as we hope for it, we nevertheless remain committed to pursuing 
its realization" (ibid.: 3). He argues that our hopes sustain us when 
our ends do not seem realizable and that they are in that sense 
productive and expansive. This stress on commitment suggests that 
hope is an attitude towards the course of action that the agent is 
embarking on when that course of action includes difficulties and 
challenges. But Shade also speaks of "active" commitment. This 
suggests, in turn, that it is not just the attitude that is important 
but also the way we put that attitude into effect. Indeed, Shade 
goes so far as to define hope as an activity. As he puts it, "Hope 
is pragmatically conceived not as a private mental state, but as an 
activity belonging to an organism in dynamic relation with its envi-
ronment. Hope, then, should be treated as an activity, as hoping' 
(ibid.: 14). 
But this account of hope as commitment and activity is problem-
atic in John's example. John hopes that it will not rain, but there is 
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nothing he can do to bring that state of affairs about. The problem 
here is that its not raining is not a goal of John's action. His goal is 
to get to university without getting wet. It not raining is a state of 
affairs that he is concerned should obtain, but it is not a goal that 
he can pursue. Not only can he not do anything to prevent it from 
raining, but he cannot conceive of it not raining as a goal or an end 
that he could pursue. It is not up to him whether it rains or not. 
Christine Collins, on the other hand, does have a goal: finding her 
son. This is an exceedingly difficult goal to achieve and all the indi-
cations are that it is unattainable. Nevertheless, she maintains her 
commitment to it and does what little she can to attain it. Hers is a 
paradigm example of what Shade understands hope to be. 
Shade was not the first philosopher to see hope as closely 
connected to action. As we saw in the Introduction, Aquinas 
defined hope as the desire to act in pursuit of a future good that 
is arduous and difficult - but nevertheless possible - to obtain. If 
what is hoped for is conceived as the goal of an action that differs 
from others goals of action in that it is arduous and difficult but 
possible to obtain then there seems to be an inextricable link 
between hope and action. While this conception of hope is different 
from the one I have been developing, it seems to have some plau-
sibility. It seems intuitively clear that whenever we act we hope for 
the outcome our action pursues. If I am walking to the university, 
then it could be said that I hope to get there. If I am putting on my 
socks, then it could be said that I hope to be wearing my socks. The 
reason these examples do not sound immediately apt is that these 
are actions the goals of which are very easy to achieve. I set about 
the task and I achieve it as a matter of course. I do not have to over-
come any obstructions. While it is obvious that I intend to get to 
university or to put on my socks, respectively, I would not normally 
describe myself as hoping to achieve these things. This is because 
there is no difficulty in achieving them. There seems to be no gap, 
no uncertainty or no hindrance between forming the intention to 
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do such things and actually doing them and achieving the intended 
outcome. The element of arduousness or difficulty that Aquinas 
points to is absent. On the other hand, if I take on something diffi-
cult - lifting a heavy load in the gymnasium, for example - I might 
indeed be self-consciously hoping that I achieve the goal. I form the 
intention but my agency does not just flow through to the action to 
put that intention immediately into effect. My action does not flow 
through smoothly to the attainment of my goal. There is a difficulty 
that I am aware of and I respond to that difficulty by hoping that I 
succeed. I should also respond to that difficulty by making an effort 
to succeed. If there are steps I could take to make success more 
likely - by using the correct lifting techniques, for example - then 
I should take them. But I am aware that the task is a challenging one 
and that my efforts may not be adequate to the task. Accordingly, I 
do not only intend to lift the weight or make the strenuous effort; I 
also find myself hoping that I will succeed. 
Shade and Aquinas have captured an important point: that hope 
accompanies action, especially in cases where there is some diffi-
culty in achieving what one intends to achieve. There are many 
examples where intending to do something and beginning to do it 
do not guarantee success. One must make an effort or be persistent. 
One must continue on despite setbacks. One must face dangers or 
difficulties with courage or determination. One must be resourceful 
or strategic. In all such cases one will do more than just intend to 
achieve the outcome and set about the task. One will also hope to 
succeed. Hope will be necessary here as a motivator for the effort 
required to attain the goal. 
But there is a sense in which this applies to all actions, even 
ones that are not difficult. Even when I am putting on my socks it 
is possible - although extremely unlikely - that I will hurt my back 
in such a way that I am not able to bend down enough to complete 
the task. Even when I am walking to university it is possible -
although very unlikely - that I will be hit by a car and prevented 
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from completing my journey. Although these mishaps are unlikely, 
they are possible, and that possibility introduces an element of 
uncertainty or even risk into my life as an agent. Every action that 
I set out to perform is accompanied by an element of anxiety -
however small - as to whether I shall be able to achieve what I set 
out to achieve. This anxiety may be vanishingly mild in the case of 
putting on my socks, but it will be more present to me in the case 
of lifting the weight. In more complex actions or courses of action, 
such as working towards a university degree or bringing up my chil-
dren, this anxiety will be an ever-present element of doubt, concern 
and uncertainty that will both enliven and darken my involvement 
in those courses of action. I can never be sure of success. There is a 
multitude of circumstances or events that could frustrate my efforts 
and undermine my achievements. In the face of all this I will need 
determination, courage, commitment and endurance. What will 
motivate these stances if not hope for success? 
When discussing the psychological states that accompany action 
most philosophers concentrate on the intentions that lead us to act. 
According to their account, every deliberate action is directed, as it 
were, by an intention that I have. I might not always be conscious 
of this intention, but if I were asked why I am putting on my socks, 
for example, I would have an answer. My actions have goals which 
I can bring to mind if I need to. It is this which defines these events 
as actions, as opposed to reactions or reflex movements. If what I 
am doing is performing an action then, by definition, I am pursuing 
a goal, and I have the intention of attaining that goal. In this way 
intentions are inextricable from actions. However, my suggestion 
is that there is at least one more element involved: hope. I not only 
intend to achieve my goal but I also hope to. This hope will be 
more present to my self-awareness when the action or course of 
action is difficult or risky, but I would suggest that it is present in 
a non-explicit way even in simple actions that are easy to perform. 
Between the intention and the successful completion of the action 
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there is always room for bad luck to intervene. I may put my back 
out reaching down to put on my socks. I may have my studies 
interrupted by a death in my family. My children may suffer illness. 
There is always a gap between our intentions and the achievement 
of what we intend, which our efforts may not overcome. There is 
always the possibility of failure. Our intentions cannot bridge this 
gap. We do not have complete control over our circumstances. 
Accordingly, our hoping bridges the gap. This will be clear and 
apparent in cases where the gap looms large - as when the task is 
arduous and difficult - but it is also the case even when the action 
is easy and routine. Fate can always intervene and frustrate our 
intentions. Deep down we know this and, accordingly, deep down 
we supplement our intentions with hope. 
As Aquinas suggests, when we set out on an arduous or difficult 
course of action, we hope to achieve our goal. This hope accompa-
nies our intention and our agency. In so far as we cannot be sure 
of success, we hope for it. My suggestion is that, at an implicit and 
deep level of our consciousness, this structure of hope accompa-
nies all our actions because of our implicit and deep awareness of 
our vulnerability to bad luck and mishap. Hope is our existential 
response to the contingency that is a mark of all our actions and of 
the world we live in. 
Of course we can also respond to this contingency by taking 
care when we act, by making the required effort and by planning. 
Planning is often required in a course of action. By ensuring that 
we have prepared for our action by, for example, acquiring the right 
tools, engaging in the right training, or dividing up the task into its 
constituent parts we can be more assured of success. In this way 
planning is an important preparation for action and, in so far as 
it gives us some assurance of success, lessens the need for hope. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that planning is similar to hope 
in that it is directed towards the future and what is possible but 
contingent. Moreover, it is motivated by a desire for success and, 
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sometimes, by anxiety about failure. Yet it differs from hope in that 
it is an attempt to control the circumstances of one's action and 
the means at one's disposal so as to ensure a successful outcome, 
while hope becomes relevant when we recognize that our control 
has limits. It is when we see that, despite our planning and prepa-
ration, success is not certain that we find ourselves hoping for it. 
John's situation is an extreme example of this. In his case, there is 
nothing he can do to control the weather. Accordingly, the only 
psychological state that is available to him when he does not want 
to get wet is to hope that it does not rain. 
So far we have been discussing how hope contributes to our 
agency: how it accompanies our actions because we intuitively 
know that our efforts may not be effective enough to realize our 
intentions and goals. But there is also another question that has 
arisen for us in the example of Christine Collins: is it necessary for 
hope to be expressed in action? Is hope that does not lead to action 
somehow incomplete and, as such, not a genuine case of hope? 
Perhaps we should consider a further example here. Tony is a 
young man studying at the university who describes himself as 
hoping to go to South America to teach English there after he 
graduates. But at this present time he is doing nothing to realize 
this hope. He is studying, certainly, and this can contribute to the 
attainment of what he hopes for, but he has formed no specific 
plan to go to South America at any specific time and his course of 
study is not directly or deliberately designed to give him the quali-
fications needed to teach English in a Spanish-speaking country. In 
the absence of a purposeful course of action designed to realize his 
hope, we might be tempted to say that he merely wishes to go to 
South America: that he is engaged in wishful thinking. If he genu-
inely hopes to go, we would expect to see - if not now, then in the 
near future - some activity on his part designed to realize that goal. 
Can Tony hope for that goal without also intending to achieve it 
and acting to bring it about? Is hope a psychological state that is 
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distinct from action or are we inclined to say that if Tony hopes for 
something that he could achieve by setting out on a course of action 
to achieve it, then his hope is empty or inauthentic if he does not 
set out on that course of action? We would not say that he hoped 
to go to South America if he were just waiting for a chance event 
to occur, such as winning the lottery so that he could pay the costs 
of going. Perhaps it is enough if he thinks that, at some future time, 
he will set about doing what he needs to do in order to travel to 
South America. For the moment he is concentrating on his studies 
and not forming any plans. But he has a vague and non-specific 
intention to do something about it in due course. And this vague 
idea that he has about his future could be described as his hoping 
that he will go. He is not unaware that he will need to do something 
about it at some time, but he does not feel ready to do so yet. For the 
moment he only hopes that he will go to South America. 
The concept of hope has a slightly different meaning here. In this 
context, it is not the case that Tony hopes for an outcome because 
he knows that his efforts to attain that outcome are vulnerable to 
failure. Rather, he hopes for the outcome because he is not yet ready 
to embark on that project. At this stage going to South America 
is only a hope. It is not yet a plan or a project and it is not yet a 
specific intention. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that it is not very 
different from a wish and it may be that he has used the word in a 
misleading way when he described himself as hoping that he would 
go to South America. We could say that he wants to go to South 
America or that he wishes to but, in so far as he is not yet ready to 
take any action in order to achieve what he wants, we might not 
describe him as hoping that he will go. On the other hand, perhaps 
what he is hoping for is that circumstances will arise that will allow 
him to go. Some of these circumstances might be achievements 
of his, such as obtaining his university degree, while others will be 
due to others or to luck, such as his aunt giving him the money to 
go or his winning the lottery. The last two will be circumstances 
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that are necessary for his going but are not under his control. Tony 
can only hope that, like the weather in John's case, these circum-
stances will come about. There are some things he can do to attain 
his goal, and he ought to set about doing them, but there are other 
circumstances that he can only hope will come about because they 
are not up to him. 
These reflections lead me to disagree with Shade and Aquinas. 
For them, hopes, goals and actions are inextricably linked. Hope 
without action would be inauthentic. While there is some truth 
in this, I have argued that hope arises at precisely the point where 
agency leaves off. We entertain hope in respect of those conditions 
that are necessary for our achieving our goals but which we cannot 
bring about ourselves. Hope covers the gap between effort and 
outcome and where that gap is extremely small no hope is needed, 
while where it is huge hope is all we have. So in a case where we 
embark on an action that is simple to perform and of which the 
outcome is easily achieved, we have no need to hope that we will 
achieve that outcome, while in John's case, where there is nothing 
that he can do to achieve what he wants - that it will not rain - all 
he can do is hope for that eventuality. 
Hoping and praying 
In cases where there is nothing we can do to achieve our goal, our 
hoping may well be an appeal to powers other than our own. We 
often hear people say, especially in cases such as that of Fatima or 
Christine Collins, that they "hope and pray" that their child will be 
found. Perhaps in such cases the words "hope" and "pray" are linked 
simply to heighten the rhetorical effect and convey the urgency 
of the situation. At other times the word "prayer" seems to be a 
synonym for "hope': as when we say that the hapless goal-kicker 
who has no hope of kicking the goal "doesn't have a prayer'~ And 
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yet hoping and praying do seem to be two different psychological 
states. John would have to be an ardent believer in an interventionist 
God ifhe prayed that it would not rain. But suppose he did. In what 
might the difference between such a prayer and a hope consist? 
The nature of prayer is a deep and complex theological issue. It 
has to do with a person's relationship with their god and the forms 
that their communication with that god might take. It involves 
attitudes of adoration and worship, of reverence and gratitude, 
and of contemplation and meditation. It takes a person out of the 
humdrum existence of daily life and into a transcendent realm of 
ultimate realities. But the aspect that I am interested in here is that 
of supplication. Even if many theologians argue that God does 
not intervene in human affairs in any direct and specific way and 
does not respond to human intercessions, most religious believers 
address their gods in order to petition them for favours or for help 
with the problems of life. Some people pray for rain or for boun-
teous harvests, while others pray for help in times of trouble. Even 
if such people also accept their god's will, manifested through what 
actually happens, as definitive of what should happen, they will pray 
for the outcome they hope for. We could imagine that if Christine 
Collins were religious in this way, she would pray that her child 
be found. How would such a prayer differ from her hope that her 
child be found? 
However much you accept the finality of God's will, to pray is to 
suppose that you do have some control over the outcome in that 
you can invoke higher powers to assist you. While you may not be 
able to secure the desired outcome yourself, your god may come 
to your aid and secure it for you. This is both an acknowledgement 
of the limitations of your own powers and an attempt to overcome 
them. This suggests that prayer is a religious form of hope. It may be 
tempered by the humble realization that your god has better things 
to worry about than your puny problems, but it is nevertheless an 
attempt to invoke the divine powers and bring them into alignment 
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with your hopes. For a non-religious person this will seem like 
wishful thinking, but for a religious believer it expresses a belief in 
a correspondence between the will of their gods and the wishes of 
mere mortals. If such an alignment is believed in strongly, it would 
turn hope into faith. That is a matter we shall explore later. For the 
moment I want to argue that the differences between hoping and 
praying are very subtle. 
In the form of supplication, prayers are communications directed 
towards a higher power. Even in the form of worship or contempla-
tion, they are understood as forms of communion with such powers. 
Prayers address a divine being. This is a clear and obvious differ-
ence between prayers and hopes. Hopes are directed upon positive 
outcomes, while prayers are addressed to a being who the suppli-
cant imagines can bring the positive outcome about. Sometimes this 
may be an implicit address in which the person praying does not 
explicitly address herself to her god but feels a more inchoate wish 
for that outcome and an unspoken surrender to what will be. And 
yet, in so far as this is expressive of desire and anxiety as well as of a 
recognition of the limitation of her own powers to bring the positive 
outcome about, it is very similar to hope. In hope one is appealing 
to fate rather than a god and hoping that fate will deliver the desired 
outcome. It may be that in a subtle way John's hope that it does not 
rain is an appeal that he sends out to the cosmos that the forces of 
nature will not produce rain. As the French existentialist philos-
opher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) has put it, "Hope consists in 
asserting that there is at the heart of being, beyond all data, beyond 
all inventories and all calculations, a mysterious principle which is in 
connivance with me" (1995: 28). In hope one asks the cosmic powers 
to take one's interests to heart. One places one's trust in something 
that will respond to one's anxieties. One appeals to the beneficence 
of a superhuman power. In hope, one recognizes the limitations of 
what one can achieve by oneself and so makes an appeal to some-
thing beyond oneself. As with prayer, hope involves humility in 
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admitting the limitations of one's control over the situation. Because 
one knows that bad luck can always intervene or that nothing that 
one could do will ensure that the desired outcome comes about, one 
throws oneself on the mercy of fate and appeals to vaguely under-
stood cosmic powers to produce it. If this is right then the element 
of supplication that is definitive of prayer is present even in hope. 
The Catholic philosopher Peter Geach has argued that any rational 
hope must be grounded in Christian hope, saying that if "there is not 
this hope, then all hope is in vain" (1977: 48). As Christian hope is 
directed towards God, this claim makes the element of supplication 
in hope very explicit. 
Not everyone will agree that hope involves supplication because 
it does not accord with the way that they feel when they hope. 
People with no religious faith, especially, will not be inclined to think 
that they are appealing to supernatural powers when they hope. I 
would not deny this. However, I would suggest that the structure 
of one's attitudes is similar when one prays and when one hopes. 
When one prays for help one is appealing to supernatural powers 
such as spirits, saints or a god by addressing them in supplication. 
The structure of this frame of mind includes an implicit acknowl-
edgement of one's need for assistance and an explicit address to 
those powers that can provide it. One feels humble and powerless 
in comparison to the cosmos and one addresses the gods in pursuit 
of help. The structure of one's attitude includes a feeling of relative 
powerlessness and a space into which one inserts the saint, angel, 
god or supernatural agency that one can address and appeal to. 
When one hopes one does not make such an address and one does 
not explicitly appeal to supernatural forces. But there is still this 
space that one would like to fill with a power that will accord help 
- into which one would like to insert Marcel's "mysterious principle 
which is in connivance with me': Even without a god to appeal to, 
one's sense of relative powerlessness still obtains. Consequently, 
the inclination to make an unspoken appeal to forces greater than 
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oneself is still latently present. Because an element of supplication 
is present in both, hoping and praying are not as different as secular 
thinkers would like to believe. 
In many cases, however, the object of this supplication will not 
be a supernatural agency, however vaguely conceived, but another 
person or group of persons. Very often when we hope for some-
thing we send out an implicit or explicit appeal to someone else 
to help us achieve what we hope for. Or we might hope that our 
community or our government will help us achieve what we hope 
for. Even when such appeals are not explicit they can be present 
in the very psychological make-up of our hopes. The person or 
community that we appeal to will be specified by the nature of 
the hope that we are entertaining. Sometimes our supplication is 
directed at clinicians, sometimes at family members, and some-
times at politicians or community leaders. We may even address it 
in a playful way to imaginary figures such as Santa Claus. We shall 
explore these ideas further in later chapters. 
The ethics of hope 
If we summarize what we have discovered thus far we will see that 
there are elements of ethical significance in hope. I have suggested 
that hopes are a subcategory of wishes for outcomes judged to be 
good, which differ from other wishes in that they are motivated by 
a degree of anxiety or concern about specific circumstances in the 
world and in that they are limited to what the person who hopes 
considers both possible and contingent. Oriented to an uncertain 
future that we cannot completely control, our hopes express our 
acknowledgement that whatever happens is limited by our finite 
and fallible capacities and by the laws of physics. There may be a 
prayer-like element of supplication in our hope but the risk that 
what we hope for might not happen is something we have to live 
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with. That we have to live within such limitations is what makes 
hope a virtue. To live within our limitations is of ethical value in 
that it is conducive to living life happily. 
Moreover, there are further ethical or normative elements in 
hope. It is a wish that differs from other wishes in that it should 
motivate us to appropriate action when that is possible. While 
wishes can stay in the realm of fantasy or daydream, hopes should 
lead us to take whatever action is available in order to pursue what 
we hope for. Taken together, the characteristics of hope that distin-
guish it from wishing show that hope involves an engagement with 
reality that wishing lacks. This engagement takes the form not only 
of being committed to any relevant actions that are available, but 
also of understanding what possibilities there are in the world for 
actions that would help us to realize our goals and what the like-
lihood is that we shall be able to do so. Unlike hoping, wishful 
thinking does not need to have regard for how the world is or for 
what is likely to occur in it. Hope needs to combine our desires, 
emotions, feelings and anxieties with beliefs about, and under-
standings of, the world. There is a cognitive dimension to hope that 
makes this psychological state amenable to rational appraisal. To 
hope for something requires that we make some assessment as to 
whether what we hope for is possible, likely or inevitable. We need 
to have an understanding of the world, of our place in it and of our 
social relationships. We need to understand and respect the laws of 
nature that science has disclosed to us. Accordingly, it is an ethical 
requirement that when we hope we ought to be realistic. If we are 
not realistic, we are likely to slip into wishful thinking. 
Hope and reason 
While there is probably some cognitive aspect to most emotions, 
this point shows that hope is not an emotion in any simple or 
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purely reactive manner. It involves a relatively high degree of 
understanding of the world intermingled with the concerns and 
desires that we have. If placing hope into the broader category of 
wishes suggested that it was an emotion, we should now modify 
that suggestion by adding that it also involves knowledge, belief and 
understanding. This, in turn, suggests that the distinction philoso-
phers are fond of making between cognitive states such as belief 
and knowledge on the one hand, and emotional or motivational 
states such as desires and wishes on the other, is not as sharp as 
traditional thinking would suggest. 
The reason that this distinction was made at all was that it 
allowed us to understand the internal struggles we often find 
ourselves with and to articulate the ethical problems we face in 
daily life. We often find ourselves not doing what we think we 
ought to do. We often find ourselves succumbing to temptations 
or shying away from our obligations. One way of understanding 
this is to suppose that, inside us, there is a struggle between reason 
and responsible thought on the one hand and unruly emotions 
and desires on the other. The paradigm case of an emotion in this 
model is anger. Anger seems to come over us like a turbulent storm 
and it causes us to lose our self-control and our ability to think 
clearly or act responsibly. Desire, too, can overwhelm us in this 
way. Accordingly, ancient thinkers such as Plato (c.428-c.348 BCE), 
Christian moral theologians and modern philosophers such as 
Kant have taught that we should seek to control our emotions and 
allow reason to rule our lives. The emotions were not to be trusted, 
while reason was infallible if used correctly and without interfer-
ence from the unruly passions. Reason was to be the motivator of 
our actions, while emotional reactions were to be controlled or 
suppressed. The distinction between reason and cognitive states on 
one side, and emotions and desires on the other side, ties in with 
this moralistic conception of human existence. Accordingly, it is of 
considerable interest to note that hope straddles the distinction. It 
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is both cognitive and motivational, rational and emotional, active 
and reactive. 
This being the case, it is appropriate to ask whether hoping can 
be rational. If it were purely emotional or reactive and if the distinc-
tion between reason and emotion were a sharp one, then it would 
not be. But if it has a cognitive dimension it can be. We can explore 
whether it is appropriate for a person to hope for something by 
asking whether the understanding of the world and what is possible 
or likely in it that is implicit in the hope is correct or rationally 
justifiable. Accordingly, hope as a virtue has a further normative 
feature. We have already seen that it should lead to appropriate 
action when such actions are available. We can now add that it 
should be rational rather than naive. 
However, some argue that hopes do not need to be rational: that 
it is valid to "hope against hope': The Christine Collins example 
shows that hope can be valid as an emotional anchor: something 
that we cling to regardless of circumstances, regardless of what our 
reason tells us is happening or going to happen, and regardless of 
whether our hope is rational or irrational. Christine is hoping for 
something that she knows is extremely unlikely: finding her lost son 
after many years. And yet it may not be irrational to want such an 
outcome and thus to hope for it, no matter how unlikely it is. The 
finding of the other missing boy, David, has shown Christine that it 
is possible that her Walter is still alive. In this way her finding him 
still seems possible, however unlikely it is, and her psychological 
state can be, by our definition, one of hope. But if the hope is unre-
alistic or misguided, the actions it inspires will be futile or even 
damaging. Christine shows a kind of sad nobility in never giving up, 
but after a certain amount of time - five, ten, or twenty years - that 
sort of active pursuit would cease to be rational. One could imagine 
a family being torn apart through not accepting that the search has 
at some point become futile: so much potential going into point-
less actions, perhaps siblings living in the missing child's shadow. 
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Sometimes, against all odds, the seemingly impossible happens, 
and the hope may turn out to be justified. But that is not an argu-
ment for the rationality of the hope. 
So far we have agreed that it would be irrational to hope for 
something impossible since to do so would not be to hope but to 
engage in wishful thinking. On this view the less possible some-
thing is, the less rational it is to hope for it. But this does not seem 
to tell the whole story. Perhaps a rational assessment of possibility 
should not be the only criterion. After all, on those grounds it 
would seem irrational to hope for world peace or global justice. 
Christine Collins, whose child seems irrevocably lost but who goes 
on hoping, seems admirable even if not rational. 
Perhaps the question of whether it is rational or irrational does 
not apply to the hope itself, but to the actions that hope inspires. 
Whether it is rational or irrational to hope that the child will be 
found, it will certainly be irrational to leave a place at the table for 
him each evening. In relation to Bob's lottery ticket, his hope that 
he wins is fairly irrational given the odds, but to spend the money 
he has not yet won would be an even more irrational action based 
on an irrational assessment of his chance of winning. On this view, 
although you cannot have an irrational hope, you can have an irra-
tional assessment of your chances, and take irrational actions in 
response to the resulting expectations. 
Nevertheless, to think of hope as a phenomenon that is outside 
the boundaries of rationality and as based on something distinct 
from rationality would be very problematic. On such a view, hope 
would be a specific form of wish while reasoning about the likeli-
hood of the hoped-for outcome or about appropriate courses of 
action is a separate matter. On this view hope would be nothing 
more than an emotional anchor that can give us a break from our 
reason and rationality. I shall argue in later chapters that this view 
contains many dangers. 
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Hope as a virtue 
We saw in the Introduction that Aristotle gives us a structure for 
thinking about virtues that might help us to understand hope 
further. We have just been exploring the cognitive and rational 
aspects of hope, which are relevant to seeing it as what Aristotle 
called an "intellectual virtue1: But in the Introduction we also saw 
the way in which Aristotle understood the virtues that relate to 
our desires and emotions as states of mind that could be under-
stood as occupying an appropriately moderate position between 
two relevant extremes. Given that hope also relates to our desires, 
emotions and anxieties, can this model be used to further explicate 
hope as a virtue? I would suggest that it can. Although I suggested 
that hope is not itself felt in differing degrees, it can make sense to 
describe it as being more or less intense depending on the other 
psychological states that contribute to it. Accordingly, hope can 
be situated in the middle of a spectrum of psychological states, at 
one end of which are states of excess and at the other end of which 
are states of deficiency. On this model, I would suggest that the 
extremes that virtuous hope avoids are presumption, resignation 
and despair. 
Presumption is an excess of hope. It consists in being overconfi-
dent that the good outcome for which one hopes will come about. 
Presumption lacks the sense of uncertainty that is a defining char-
acteristic of hope. This may lead the presumptuous person to make 
inadequate efforts in securing the desired good outcome on the 
grounds that he believes that things will turn out well whether or 
not he makes such efforts. Moreover, we can understand presump-
tion as an excessive expression of the element of supplication that is 
inherent in hope. The presumptuous person is one who feels overly 
confident that whatever cosmic powers are out there are indeed on 
his side and are indeed in connivance with him, as Marcel had put 
it. Accordingly, those powers can be relied on to ensure that the 
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desired outcome will occur. Indeed, an even more extreme form 
of such presumption is the feeling that one is entitled to the good 
outcome or deserves it in some way, either because one has been 
good or because one has placed trust in those powers or gods. 
Authentic hope would never go so far. 
At the other end of the spectrum is despair: a deficiency of hope. 
Despair consists in not being able to hope because one has lost 
all confidence that things could turn out well. Not only does one 
feel certain that things will turn out for the worst, but, even more 
deeply, one is unable to commit to any judgement that a future 
state might be good for one. Nothing seems worth doing and no 
prospects of success seem to be on offer. Despair is the absence of 
hope. But if despair is the most deficient state in the spectrum of 
variations of hope, there is another state that could be identified on 
the deficient side of that spectrum, although it does not stand at 
its extreme end. This state is resignation. Resignation is an attitude 
that accepts that the desired good outcome that one had hoped for 
will not come about. It is an acceptance that things are not going to 
go one's way. One begins to think that the outcome is not possible 
and so hope fades. One no longer approaches the relevant circum-
stances in one's life with expectation and one no longer seeks -
whether through supplication directed at others or through one's 
own efforts - the goods that one had hoped for. Accordingly, one 
gives up making an effort and the scope of one's world contracts a 
little. Life has less to offer and hope lies defeated. 
As we move from the excess of presumption, through appro-
priate hope, and on to resignation and despair, we may suppose 
that the final state would be depression. However, I think of 
depression more as a psychological pathology than as an attitude 
that could be appraised in ethical terms. Depression is not a vice, 




We can now add to what we learnt from the earlier example of John 
and summarize our exploration of the differences between hopes 
and wishes so as to offer a definition of hope. A hope is a wish that 
differs from other wishes in that: 
• it is motivated by felt needs or some degree of anxiety or concern, 
as opposed to fantasy or wishful thinking; 
• it implies a judgement that what is hoped for is something good; 
• its object is an occurrence that is considered to be possible; 
• its object is an occurrence that is considered to be not inevitable; 
• it is directed towards the future as conceived by the person who 
hopes; 
• the person hoping is uncertain as to whether what is hoped for 
will happen; 
• it is directed to circumstances over which the person hoping 
does not have complete control; 
• it ought to lead to appropriate action on the part of the person 
who hopes when such action is available; 
• it has the psychological structure of supplication; and 
• it ought to be rational and realistic. 
Even though I have called these defining features of hope, it must 
not be thought that I am being prescriptive about how the word 
"hope" should be used in ordinary English. I am not legislating that 
if someone says that they hope that it does not rain when they are 
firmly convinced that it will, or that if they say that they hope for 
a good outcome but are not prepared to do anything to secure it, 
they are misusing the word and that they should have said that 
they are entertaining a wish. People will understand their meaning 
either way. However, I am suggesting that for a hope to be rational, 
admirable or genuine - for it to play the existential role in our lives 
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of grounding our commitments and courses of action - it should 
fulfil these ten conditions. Any expressed hope that does not do so 
is an inauthentic hope. If hope is to be regarded as a virtue, then we 
must have reason to admire it and to regard it as a positive char-
acter trait. As a virtue it stands in an appropriate median position 
between the extremes of presumption and despair. The ten condi-
tions I have identified give us ways of understanding and evaluating 
how hope might be admirable as a virtue. 
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So far we have been considering examples in which the hope being 
discussed is more or less episodic. What I mean by this is that there 
was a definite and relatively short period during which the hope 
was entertained. John hoped that it would not rain on the day that 
he needed to go to university and was at risk of getting wet. When 
the circumstances change, the hope is no longer apposite and so 
disappears. My hope that I receive a CD for Christmas will cease -
either with satisfaction or disappointment - at Christmas. Fatima 
hoped that her child would be found for as long as it was not found. 
However, Christine Collins's hope continued indefinitely and raised 
the difficult questions we have noted about how such hopes are 
related to action and whether such hopes could be rational. It will 
be interesting to explore why such cases of temporally open-ended 
hopes raise such difficult questions. 
One way of approaching this issue is by noting a technical feature 
of hopes. Hopes are directed upon objects. One hopes that some 
event will occur, that one will obtain some item or that one attains 
some goal. John hopes that it will not rain; I hope to receive a Miles 
Davis CD; Bob hopes to become rich; Fatima hopes that her child 
is found; Tony hopes to go to South America. These are all hopes 
for something. In technical philosophical terms we describe this by 
saying that hopes are "intentional" psychological states. This usage 
of the word differs from that usage where we describe actions as 
"intentional" when they are engaged in to achieve a goal. Our more 
technical usage derives from the Latin words "in': meaning "in': and 
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"teneo': meaning "to hold': It means that one holds something in 
one's thoughts or that one has an object in mind. To say that hoping 
is an intentional state is to say that it is directed upon an "object" 
in this technical sense. More specifically one hopes to attain that 
object, whether it be its not raining, the present of a CD, becoming 
rich, the finding of a child, or having the opportunity to travel to 
South America. Accordingly, a hope lasts only as long as the object 
is not attained. When John completes his journey without its having 
rained, when I receive the CD I had hoped for, when Bob wins the 
lottery, when Fatima has her child returned to her, and when Tony 
flies off to Rio, the hopes in question cease to exist. In this way the 
temporality of hopes is tied to the intentionality of hopes. 
What makes this rather technical point interesting is that there 
are also relevant psychological states that are not intentional and 
therefore not so temporally constrained. We sometimes speak of a 
person as being optimistic or as having a hopeful outlook on life. 
Let us call this person Lynne. Lynne has a sunny disposition, always 
sees the good in people and constantly believes that things will 
turn out for the best. While she may hope for this or that specific 
outcome from time to time, the most notable feature of her person-
ality is that she is hopeful in a general way. This hopefulness is not 
a specific hope for a concrete outcome, but a general mood that 
she has or a general attitude that she displays towards the world 
and her life in it. In this way, her hopefulness is not intentional. 
It is not directed upon a specific object or outcome. It is rather 
like wearing rose-coloured glasses, which lead her to see the whole 
world in a rosy manner. Of course, her experiences of the world 
are intentional in the sense that they are experiences of specific 
objects and things in the world. But the rosiness of her experience 
is not the object of her experience. It is the way in which she expe-
riences those objects. She does not see her rose-coloured glasses. 
She sees the world through those glasses. She always sees the good 
side of people and always believes that things will turn out well. 
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The anxieties she feels and the things she worries about are met 
with confidence and a preparedness to take the necessary risks. 
Her hopefulness is not constituted as a set of hopes directed upon 
specific outcomes, but is a way in which she apprehends the whole 
world and everything that happens in it. For her, hopefulness is a 
way of being. 
But if Lynne's hopefulness is a way of being in this way and is 
not evoked by being directed upon specific objects, then it is not 
subject to the temporal constraints that hopes are. Whereas a hope 
only lasts as long as the period during which the relevant situation 
that is the object and context of the hope is not resolved, hopeful-
ness has no such temporal limits. It passes from one situation to 
the next indefinitely and continues to colour the world in which 
Lynne lives. Hopefulness is not an intentional psychological state 
and, as a result, it is not temporally constrained. It can last a life-
time. Of course, if Lynne were to suffer constant disappointments 
and rebuffs, her disposition might change and she may cease being 
a hopeful person, but this will be a gradual change and one that 
affects the whole of her personality. 
It is clear that hope and hopefulness are concepts that are closely 
related. But hope is more episodic. This becomes clearer when we 
consider the word as a verb rather than a noun. There are specific 
times or periods of time during which a person hopes for some-
thing. In contrast, hopefulness is a character trait that marks a 
person's way of being for significant lengths of time, if not their 
whole life. Again, to hope for something is to direct one's attention 
to that something in particular, but to be hopeful is to be inclined 
to see everything in optimistic terms. 
Hopefulness can be understood not only as a character trait, 
but also as a quality of experience. If Lynne sees the world through 
rose-coloured glasses, then her experience of the world is qualita-
tively different from that of a person who has a less optimistic view. 
Hopefulness makes every moment in life a new beginning. If every 
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situation is seen through hopefulness then it contains a promise of 
something new and exciting. That most hopeful of philosophers 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) said that the noble and free-
spirited person knows how to forget. Rather than carry the slights, 
disappointments and resentments of the past into the future, such a 
person enters every situation with the hope of a new beginning and 
a new birth of possibilities. This disposition could not arise from 
what one has learnt in a troublesome and vicious world: it arises 
from the mysterious depths of one's being. One is hopeful for the 
future despite the past rather than because of it. It is the person who 
can look forward to new and exciting things in the future despite 
having suffered disappointments and hardships in the past who is 
truly hopeful. Such a person is less inclined to let fears about the 
future or resentments about the past influence their present dispo-
sitions. It would take the science of psychology to explain why some 
people are more hopeful than others. For philosophy it is enough to 
observe that hopefulness is the fragile strength of personality that 
inclines Lynne to embrace the world and her life in it with such a 
positive outlook. 
This is especially relevant when we consider interpersonal rela-
tionships. Whenever Lynne meets a new person she is generous 
and warm towards them. If there is anything untrustworthy 
about them, she gives them the benefit of the doubt. If they are 
well disposed towards her, her warmth will lead them to be even 
better. Her hopefulness is an encouragement to them and she 
herself gains from the greater depth and trust that exists between 
them. The future orientation of hope means that every friend and 
acquaintance holds the promise of shared enrichment and enjoy-
ment. When she comes home from work and greets her partner 
the joy she feels at seeing him, and which she spreads to him with 
her greeting, is enlivened with a hopefulness that they can both 




Hopefulness is an essential ingredient in joyfulness. To live life 
with joy is to be able to project the promise of a hopeful future for 
oneself and for others. Life is full of surprises. The hopeful person 
sees this as a source of joy while the pessimist sees it as a threat. The 
pessimist fears the new and the strange, while the hopeful person 
accepts and delights in it. In this way, hopefulness becomes a 
constituent of courage, trust and tolerance as well as of joy and love. 
These points about hopefulness as a way of being and of seeing 
the world allow me to return to the observations I made about the 
cognitive dimension of hope. In the preceding chapter I argued 
that hope involves beliefs and cognitive judgements that ought to 
be realistic and rational. Yet, my classifying it as a specific form 
of wish tended to stress the emotional and desirous side of hope. 
If this had led me to ignore the cognitive aspects of hope I would 
have become trapped in the philosophers' distinction between 
beliefs and desires, reason and emotion, and cognitive and moti-
vational psychological states. The concept of hopefulness allows 
us to understand further how hope is a state that straddles these 
distinctions. Hope is a cognitive stance marked by the emotional 
quality of hopefulness, while hopefulness is a future-oriented way 
of seeing and understanding the world that is trusting, confident 
and optimistic. 
I should not create the impression that hopefulness and optimism 
are the same. They are clearly related and have similar features, but 
there is a crucial difference between them. The optimistic person 
is one who believes that everything will turn out well. Optimism is 
predominantly a cognitive state. It is a framework of belief through 
which the world is seen as orderly, controllable, prone to good 
outcomes and free of dire risks. The optimist believes that things 
will turn out well and that her projects will succeed. The hopeful 
person, on the other hand, has a more practical orientation. Her 
hopefulness is constituted by a willingness to act in pursuit of her 
goals, to accept the risks, to make the required efforts and to accept 
52 
Being hopeful 
the outcomes even if they are disappointing. It is a practical stance 
rather than a cognitive belief. Patrick Shade defines hopefulness 
as "an attitude of energetic openness and readiness to promising 
possibilities" (2001: 135), although he recognizes that this attitude 
is vulnerable to life's disappointments. This describes an action-
oriented character trait in which a person is prepared to see diffi-
culties and obstructions as challenges to be overcome rather than 
as risks to be avoided. Hopefulness is the willingness to grasp the 
nettle and act in the pursuit of one's goals in the face of the hurdles 
that need to be overcome or risks that need to be borne. In this 
respect it is more akin to confidence or courage than it is to opti-
mism. But, just like hope, courage and confidence, it needs to be 
realistic and rational. 
Subjectivity 
Now that we have begun talking about character traits rather than 
episodic psychological states such as hopes and desires, we need 
to delve more deeply into the categories we use to describe our 
inner lives. If we were psychologists trying to understand char-
acter traits, we would speak of dispositions, which are manifested 
in what people say or do. Dispositions and the actions that they 
lead to are the outward manifestations of peoples' inner states. 
However, as philosophers we ought to try to understand these 
inner states in their own terms by reflecting on how we experi-
ence them. Reflection on our experiences and on the way we react 
to the world and to other people reveals many hidden depths. We 
often don't fully understand why we do things and why we react 
to others and to challenges in the world in the way that we do. 
When it comes to such intense experiences as love, fear and joy 
we find ourselves experiencing depths that we can barely fathom. 
What goes on inside us - what I call our "subjectivity" - is myste-
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rious to us. We know that it is difficult to understand other people 
and what makes them tick, but it is even more difficult to under-
stand ourselves, even when reflection gives us a large amount of 
data. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was the most famous thinker 
of the recent past to make the point that we are often motivated 
or driven to action by inner forces that we neither understand nor 
easily accept. For Freud, our subjectivity is hidden, complex and 
perhaps even dangerous. Many novelists recognize this also and 
portray it powerfully in their stories. 
The lesson I want to draw from these observations is that 
the distinction philosophers make between beliefs and desires, 
however useful it might be in mapping our various psycholog-
ical states, is relatively superficial. Beliefs and desires are states of 
which we can be reflectively aware. They are states we can become 
aware of through introspection. This is especially true if they are 
intentional states. If I have a definite belief about something - that 
it is raining outside, for example - I will also be aware that I have 
that belief. If someone asks me whether it is raining, I will be able 
to answer them. If I have a desire for a slice of cheesecake, I will 
be aware that I have that desire, especially if I am confronted with 
such a slice. These are psychological states that lie close to the 
surface of my subjectivity, as it were, and of which I can be readily 
aware through reflection. But there are also deeper currents in my 
psychological make-up. There are fundamental drives, appetites, 
instincts, insecurities, convictions and commitments of which I 
might not be fully aware but that influence the way I live my life 
and motivate me to do the things that I do. But we should not think 
of this only in the negative terms that Freud suggests. We don't 
only do things that we might come to regret; we also draw on deep 
wells of creativity, determination and love, which drive us to posi-
tive actions that may surprise us. Who can understand the courage 
of the person who places himself at risk to save another? Who can 
really understand why they love the person they love? Almost any 
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form of explanation will fail to capture the depth and wonder of 
such phenomena. 
I would propose that hopefulness is a trait that belongs to this 
deeper stratum of human subjectivity. Intentional psycholog-
ical states are directed towards objects and are thus available to 
self-awareness and reflection. But non-intentional psychological 
states are not so directed and are thus not readily available to self-
awareness. These are states of which we are not easily conscious. 
Hope is an intentional state that lies near the surface of our subjec-
tivity and can thus be readily brought to awareness, while hopeful-
ness is a deeper structure of our subjectivity that is largely hidden 
from introspective view. Just as the rose-coloured glasses through 
which Lynne sees the world are not directly seen by her as an object 
of her vision, so what the hopeful person is aware of is not her 
hopefulness but rather the world seen as a place filled with posi-
tive possibilities. And if these deeper strata of our being are hidden 
from our consciousness, they will not be readily scrutinized for 
their rationality either. 
Philosophers have speculated about what the deepest springs 
of our motivations are and have formulated theories about these 
hidden strata of our subjectivity for thousands of years. Aristotle, 
as we saw in the Introduction, argued that all human beings have 
an inherent tendency to pursue happiness and that this tendency 
is the hidden basis of all their reasons for action. If you asked John, 
for example, why he was going to the university, he might answer 
that it was to attend his class. If you asked why he was attending 
his class, he might answer that it was to obtain a high grade in his 
course of study. If you persisted and asked why he wanted that, he 
might answer that he needed to get a good job. If you continued 
asking why, he might say that he wanted to live comfortably and 
be able to support a family. Eventually, though, he would run out 
of answers and he would be pressed to say something vague such 
as that he pursued these goals in order to be happy. He might not 
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know what this means exactly, but he would have reached a point 
where he has given an answer such that it is no longer rational to 
ask for a reason for pursuing that goal. The conversation would 
have reached a point where it can only be assumed that both John 
and his interviewer understand the answer because both share - at 
an implicit level - some understanding of what the ultimate goal of 
everyone's striving is. The point is not that they both have an articu-
late theory about what happiness is, but that they both recognize 
that once that answer has been given, it makes no further sense 
to ask why anyone would pursue that goal. In this way Aristotle 
argues that happiness is our ultimate goal in life. He then goes on 
to describe what it is that would make people happy. But his main 
point is that it is in the nature of human beings to seek happiness 
- whatever that turns out to be - and that all the specific and day-
to-day goals that they pursue at particular times take their meaning 
and significance from being expressions of that fundamental quest. 
It seems to me that it follows from this rather abstract point -
abstract because it does not explicate what happiness consists in -
that hopefulness is a fundamental structure of human existence. At 
a deep, constant and inarticulate level of our subjectivity we hope 
to be happy. This hope motivates all our intentional actions and 
provides the backdrop against which they can be seen as ration-
ally chosen episodes in a human life. The quotations from Aquinas 
and Kant in the Introduction assume the same point, although they 
presuppose differing views on what happiness is. 
Before exploring this matter further, I should waylay a possible 
objection. It might seem to follow from the idea that we all inher-
ently pursue our happiness that we are all inherently selfish. On this 
view, whatever our surface intentions might be - whether to help a 
friend or to perform a socially valuable task - our more deep-seated 
motivation will always be to satisfy our longing for happiness. But 
my interpretation of Aristotle's idea does not imply this. It may 
well be that when we explore what happiness is, we find it can only 
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be attained by looking after the needs of others, especially those 
whom we love, and by contributing to the lives of our communi-
ties. Our hopefulness in relation to happiness would then come to 
expression in acts of generosity and concern for those others and by 
living our lives within our community's norms. The notion of "self-
ishness11 does not mean that we are motivated by our own deepest 
hopes and concerns. It means that we consciously pursue our own 
interests at the expense of the interests of others. There are very 
few philosophers who think that happiness can be attained in that 
way. Acting from love for, or caring about, others may very well be a 
path to happiness. The key point is that, even if my deep and hidden 
motivation for helping others is my hope for happiness, this does 
not negate the fact that my surface and conscious motivation is 
the desire to help those others. And the moral quality of my action 
arises from my conscious intention rather than from my hidden 
motivations. It is because my reason for action is to help others that 
it is an ethical and selfless act. That this leads to my being happy is 
a fortunate but unconscious and unintended by-product. 
Indeed, there is a modern Aristotelian philosopher, the late Paul 
Ricoeur (1913-2005), who interprets Aristotle's claim that it is a 
basic tendency in all human beings to seek and hope for happiness 
by positing what he calls an "ethical aim" for all human beings. His 
suggestion is that what we all seek and hope for at a deep and inar-
ticulate level of our being is "to live well, with and for others, in just 
institutions': What Ricoeur is doing here is filling out what happi-
ness means in terms that are not centred just on the individual and 
his or her desires. The happiness we hope for does not consist just 
in our getting what we want. It also includes our having meaningful 
and loving relationships with others. Giving is just as constitutive 
of happiness as receiving. Our social lives and our lives of intimate 
rapport with those we love are just as much a part of our hope for 
happiness as are our pursuit of comfort and pleasure for ourselves. 
Moreover, Ricoeur is suggesting that our deepest hopefulness 
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includes hopes for forms of social life that guarantee justice. We 
feel not only pity and anguish when we see other people suffer but 
also anger when we think their suffering is the result of exploitation, 
cheating, theft or any of the many other departures from the fair 
social and economic arrangements with which we seek to struc-
ture our lives. This is a very big thesis and much has been written 
to fill out the details, but the central point is that this ethical aim is 
an attempt to articulate what it is that we all hope for at a deep and 
inchoate level of our subjectivity. 
I should add that to hope for something is, inevitably, also to fear 
the non-realization of our hope. Not only do we hope for happiness 
for ourselves, with others, and in a just society, but we also worry 
about our hopes being frustrated. When we love someone we not 
only wish good things for them but we also fear losing them or 
their suffering unhappiness. Our hopes have two sides: hopes for 
the good and fear of the bad. As Aquinas noted, the opposite of the 
good that we hope for is the bad that we fear. Accordingly, the deep 
and hidden levels of our subjectivity contain fears and concerns as 
well as hopes. Indeed, many of our hatreds stem from this level of 
our being. If we hope for justice we also hate injustice; if we love 
our communities we also hate those who would harm or attack 
those communities. 
The problem of evil 
This mention of fear and hatred reminds us that the world contains 
much evil. Human beings do terrible things to one another, ranging 
from theft, rape and murder to all-out war. Human beings seem 
driven by greed, lust and the quest for self-glorification to perpe-
trate crimes on an often horrific scale. Even if we do not actively 
commit such crimes, we may neglect the needs of millions who are 
starving or oppressed. The world is marked by suffering, starvation 
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and injustice. If we were driven only by the hope for happiness 
and for social harmony and justice, how could things have gone so 
terribly wrong? Perhaps we are driven by deep and inchoate evil 
inclinations as well as good ones. Many hold the view, for example, 
that war cannot be eliminated from human history because human 
beings - and especially men - are inherently aggressive. While we 
should not ignore this possibility, one way of escaping the apparent 
logical link between evil in the world and evil inescapably present 
in the hearts of all human beings is to say that the evil that men 
do arises not from the intention to do evil, but from a misguided 
intention to do good. 
Having suggested that our hope is to be happy, we need to say 
what happiness is. Having suggested that our ethical aim is to live 
well, with and for others, in just institutions, we need to say what 
living well is, which others we should live with and for, and what 
justice consists in. The unfortunate fact is that human beings have 
given different and conflicting answers to these questions over the 
ages. We live in a world marked by "values pluralism" in which the 
conceptions that people have of what it is to live a good life differ 
and come into conflict. If we form the view that we need to change, 
punish or even wipe out those people who disagree with us about 
such values, or about morality or religion, or who are of a different 
skin colour, or have a different sexual preference from us, then we 
may well end up doing what others regard as evil. But in our own 
hearts we will think that we are pursuing our ethical aim. What 
is needed to overcome this difficulty is rational discussion about 
what it is good to do in life and what forms of life are valid expres-
sions of our hope for happiness or of our ethical aims. The history 
of philosophies, religions and political ideologies around the world 
is the history of such discussions, while the history of war, oppres-
sion and hatred is the history of their failure. 
Another difficulty that might be raised is that the idea that we all 
entertain a fundamental hope for happiness in the deeper recesses 
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of our subjectivity and that a minimal articulation of what such 
happiness might consist in - to live well, with and for others, in 
just institutions - is being offered without any factual evidence. 
Indeed, much of the evidence that might be cited actually counts 
against it. We have already noted that world history - a valid source 
of evidence on this question if ever there was one - does not seem 
to support the theory. There is too much evil in the world to bear 
it out. War, persecution, ethnic cleansing and terrorism seem to 
suggest that evil motivations occupy an equally fundamental place 
in our souls. It would seem that, while there is much good that 
takes place in the world, human history is at best equivocal on the 
question. But there is an even deeper problem. The fact is that no 
evidence that would settle the question of whether human beings 
are fundamentally good or evil is possible. I have said that we are 
talking about levels of our subjectivity that are not available to 
our reflection or scrutiny. How is it, then, that I can make claims 
about its content? Where could we find the evidence that we all 
have these fundamentally good motivations? If this deep level of 
our subjectivity is hidden and unarticulated, then what is the basis 
of my confidence that human beings are fundamentally good and 
hope for good things? 
My answer is to say that I am not making a claim of the sort that 
requires factual or empirical evidence. I am not making a scientific, 
sociological, historical or psychological claim. To use a technical 
term, I am making a "hermeneutic" claim. What this means is that 
I am proposing a framework through which we interpret the human 
condition and human history rather than a thesis about funda-
mental and hidden human motivations that might be supported 
by empirical evidence. I am not saying that we should study human 
history and then conclude by some form of logical inference that 
human beings are good (or bad). Rather, I am suggesting that we 
might see human beings in this optimistic way because it is expres-
sive of our own hopefulness about human beings. I am not making 
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a factual claim, but asking us to see human beings in a hopeful way. 
Indeed, you might say that I am asking us to see human beings 
through rose-coloured glasses. If this is a rational way of seeing 
human beings it will be so, not because there is historical evidence 
for it, but because interpreting the human condition in this way is 
conducive to social solidarity and human happiness. 
However, there is no denying that the evil that is caused by 
human beings - as opposed to the harm that comes from natural 
calamities - is a troublesome phenomenon. In the past and in many 
cultural traditions around the world, it was explained as being 
introduced into the world by a supernatural agency in the form 
of the devil or Satan. In the Christian tradition the devil is seen 
as a fallen angel created by God and allowed by him to engage in 
his evil ways upon this earth. Other cultural traditions also speak 
of evil spirits or agencies that wreak havoc in the world. It is part 
of this set of views that human beings are fundamentally weak 
and sinful and are vulnerable to the seductive overtures of such 
spirits. Indeed, Christianity teaches that original sin has tainted 
us and given us ineradicable inclinations to do evil. I have already 
mentioned the more secular philosophical view that we are divided 
internally between the good influences of reason and the bad influ-
ences of emotion and desire. Notice, by the way, that there is no 
scientific evidence for any of these views either. The only empirical 
evidence to which these views are a response is that human beings 
do things that others disapprove of and call evil. My point is this. 
Most accounts of human frailty, fallibility and fractiousness are 
invitations to see human events in a certain way; namely, through 
dark-coloured glasses rather than rose-coloured glasses. They urge 
us to adopt a negative hermeneutics of human reality rather than a 
positive one. The doctrine of original sin, for example, encourages 
us to see human beings as inherently evil and our deepest inclina-
tions as morally problematic. But we are not forced by the evidence 
to take one view or another. We can choose the theory that best 
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fits with our outlook and our hopes. Accordingly, it is a coherent 
explanation of the phenomenon of human-caused evil to suggest 
that while our fundamental drives are good, our understandings 
of how to pursue our fundamental hopes are often flawed. It is not 
that we are fundamentally evil or that we have fundamentally evil 
inclinations. Rather, we all want to live well, with and for others, in 
just institutions, but our ideas of what this amounts to or of what 
it requires of us in practical terms can lead us to do terrible things. 
Nor does this deny that there may be some people whose 
upbringing has been such that they are motivated by anger, hatred, 
resentment or fear. Such people have little room in their lives for 
thinking about what they should do and often express themselves 
in ways that are harmful to others. My hopeful view does not seek 
to obscure such problems but it urges us to be generous-minded in 
our understanding of them. 
Hopefulness as a virtue 
In so far as hopefulness is conducive to living life well we can 
understand it as a virtue in Aristotle's non-moralistic sense of that 
term. Accordingly, how might Aristotle's analytical structuring of 
the virtues as situated between inappropriate extremes help us in 
understanding hopefulness? 
Perhaps the extreme of too much hopefulness doesn't have 
a single word to describe it, but we can think of it as a form of 
naivety. If hopefulness is a tendency to see the world through rose-
coloured glasses, then the glasses of a person who is naive in the 
relevant sense are too rosy. Such a form of naivety is a disposition 
to expect the best outcomes, see the best in others and remain 
positive despite disappointments. It is an excessive optimism and a 
naive confidence and trust in others. It is a deep inclination to eval-
uate risks too optimistically. The degree of hopefulness inherent 
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in naivety is immune to any realistic appraisal of how the world is 
and how likely good outcomes are. It involves an irrational faith in 
the willingness of the gods to ensure that things will turn out well. 
But in so far as we are describing a deep and inchoate stratum 
of our subjectivity that is largely hidden from self-reflection, we 
can posit a further form of excess of hopefulness, one that may 
have a deeper and causal relation to naivety. I am thinking of 
fantasy, understood as a kind of pre-intentional wishful thinking. 
We are all inclined to imagine ourselves as highly successful, or 
as happily cosseted in trouble-free relationships, or as rock stars, 
or as champion chefs. In this way, fantasy is a retreat from reality. 
But at a deeper and less articulate level, fantasy is not just thinking 
consciously about specific wonderful things that we would like to 
have happen to us. Rather, it is feeling so confident and powerful 
within ourselves that we take on any challenge and fail to look 
out for how things might go wrong. The deepest reaches of our 
being include inclinations to daydream and to embellish ourselves 
and our circumstances in ways that enhance the sense of our own 
capacities. This is a form of self-indulgence in which one imag-
ines that one can do anything, be loved by everyone and right all 
wrongs. And this could motivate that form of wishful thinking 
that fails to take intelligent and measured action in the pursuit of 
what is wished for because it imagines itself capable of achieving 
it with ease. Fantasy comprises an excessive confidence in oneself. 
In short, whether in the form of naivety or fantasy, the excesses of 
hopefulness are pre-conscious dispositions that lead to the vice of 
presumption. 
I further suggest that the extreme of too little hopefulness is 
cynicism. It might be thought that I would slot pessimism into 
Aristotle's structure here, but I don't think of pessimism as a pre-
conscious emotional state or attitude. It is a belief about how things 
will turn out; namely, badly. It is a cognitive state that rates the 
probability of good outcomes as being very low. A pessimist thinks 
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that success is too unlikely to be worth striving for and that our 
desires are too difficult to satisfy. But what we need in Aristotle's 
schema is a pre-intentional attitude or way of interpreting the world 
through our emotions and feelings. Cynicism is such a state. Its 
basic stance is that nothing is worth hoping for. Nothing is valuable 
enough to be bothered about. No goals have enough value for us 
to link our happiness to them. This is a lack of hopefulness because 
it refuses to give itself any objects of hope. For a cynic nothing 
matters. A cynic doesn't even strive to be happy. 
Conclusion 
Hopefulness, then, is a virtuous, deep structure of our subjectivity. 
It is a disposition through which we relate to life and to the world 
around us in a way that is conducive to our happiness. Our human 
subjectivity is defined and established by our hopefulness. Our 
deepest drive is to realize our hopes for happiness, for social exist-
ence and for justice. Although there can be no argument to show 
that such an attitude is empirically warranted, it can be justified by 
the warmth, generosity and courage with which it allows us to live 
our lives. 
But there are two sides to this element in our deepest being. The 
deep structure of our subjectivity that I have identified as hopeful-
ness has an obverse side: that of anxiety. If we hope for happiness, 
sociability and justice, we are also anxious about the possibility that 
these goals will be denied us. We are concerned for our happiness 
and worried that we may not attain it. We love others and worry 
that they will suffer hardship or disappointment. We are committed 
to social justice and are distressed when we see it so often denied. 
Hopefulness is not just a sunny disposition. It is the positive side 
of a host of deep concerns and anxieties. The hopeful person is the 
one who stresses the.-positive side while the less hopeful person is 
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preoccupied with the anxieties. Hopefulness is an unarticulated but 
reasonable way of being in which we acknowledge the precarious-
ness of our projects and the vulnerability of our existence and yet 
commit ourselves joyfully to the living of our lives. 
This presence of anxiety in the deep subjectivity of the hopeful 
person indicates that the ten features of hope that I identified at 
the conclusion of the previous chapter apply to hopefulness also. 
The first of those features was that hope, and now hopefulness, are 
responses to anxieties either consciously entertained or inchoately 
felt in the very depths of our being. It is this duality in our existential 
make-up, along with the other features of hope and hopefulness on 
that list, that I shall explore and illustrate in the following chapters. 
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By "hope in the clinic" I refer to a domain of life in which we deal 
with illness, injury and death. What role does hope play in this 
domain so that we can attain the kind of fulfilment that is specific 
to it? This is a question not only for those who suffer illness, 
injury or death and their families, but also for those who care for 
them, whether they be doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, psychia-
trists or any of the many other healthcare professionals who look 
after people who are ill or dying. It has been established scien-
tifically that patients with even the most dire injuries or serious 
medical conditions will enjoy better outcomes if they hope for 
such outcomes. There are said to be neuropsychiatric dimensions 
to hope and they can have therapeutic effects similar to pharma-
ceutical placebos. Hopeful patients live longer. Hope can lead not 
only to resilience in the face of suffering, but also to amelioration 
of the malady that is causing the suffering. In the field of palliative 
care, where patients are dying without any prospect of cure, hope 
is said to be an essential ingredient in the achievement of a "good 
death': 
Moreover, healthcare workers themselves entertain hopes for 
their patients. But, whereas those hopes are informed by medical 
and therapeutic knowledge and are therefore likely to be realistic, 
the hopes of their patients and clients are motivated by anxieties 
about illness, injury and death and may therefore be inconsistent 
with realistic prognoses. Healthcare workers are taught that hope 
is a positive force that aids patients in their recovery and produces 
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positive health outcomes, and they are enjoined not to take hope 
away from their patients. However, they are also enjoined not to 
give them "false hope': Nurses have been told that "a nurse inspires 
hope more by what she is than what she does" (Vaillot 1970: 272; 
quoted in Herth 2005: 175). Moreover, to put these admonitions 
on a more concrete and scientific footing, nursing and other 
health researchers have devised frameworks for observing hope in 
patients and scales for measuring it, and have developed techniques 
and interventions for maintaining and enhancing such hopes. This 
literature seems to suggest that hope is an entity that can be given 
to people or taken away from them and that can be measured and 
increased. Rather than pursue such scientific approaches, however, 
in this chapter I want to apply the analyses of hope and hopefulness 
developed in the previous two chapters to the clinical setting and 
to offer some reflections on ethical implications that arise in this 
setting. If it can make sense to say that a clinician can give a patient 
hope, it will be because that clinician has addressed one or more 
of the ten features of hope developed in Chapter 1: for example, by 
showing a patient new possibilities, reducing their uncertainty or 
responding to their supplication. 
Illness and death 
If hope and hopefulness are our positive reactions to anxieties 
and fears, then understanding hope and hopefulness in a variety 
of specific domains of human life will require us to understand 
the specific anxieties that motivate our hopes in these domains. I 
am not referring here only to worries and concerns that might be 
uppermost in our minds. As we saw when discussing hopefulness, 
many anxieties affect us on the pre-conscious level of our subjec-
tivity. So which anxieties are especially germane to the domain of 
the healthcare clinic? 
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We live our lives with bodies that are vulnerable to a multitude of 
insults and injuries. From mild events such as stubbing one's toe or 
catching the common cold, to more dramatic events such as being 
badly injured in a car crash or contracting a serious disease, we are 
constantly reminded that our health and well-being are precarious. 
Moreover, we fear the pain and discomforts that often accompany 
injury or malady. We worry about the time lost and the opportu-
nities missed while we are laid up at home or confined in hospital. 
Accordingly, we take precautions, our loved ones look out for us, 
our communities establish healthcare institutions and emergency 
services, and governments set aside huge proportions of their 
budgets for healthcare. And yet, we can never be certain that our 
health will not come under attack from either infection or trauma. 
We remain anxious. And so we entertain a general hopefulness that 
we will stay healthy. And when we are sick or injured, we hope that 
we will recover. Typically anyone who gets sick hopes to get better. 
Whether it is a headache or a serious illness, the condition is unde-
sirable and we want to be rid of it. This leads to hope because we 
cannot completely control the outcomes when we seek treatment; 
even an aspirin is not guaranteed to rid us of a headache. There is 
a gap between what we are able to do and what we would like to 
achieve that generates uncertainty, and so we hope for relief. The 
threats of illness and injury, the fear of pain and suffering and the 
uncertainties of medical treatments are constant sources of anxiety. 
But the deepest anxiety that affects us is the fear of death. I am 
not suggesting that we have this fear in the forefront of our minds as 
we go about our daily business. Indeed, most of us try hard to ignore 
this fear and to obliterate it from our consciousness. But at the level 
of the deeper motivational reaches of our subjectivity we have an 
unarticulated awareness of our deaths and from time to time we 
consciously think about it. Indeed, it has been suggested that we 
are the only worldly beings who think about our deaths. A being 
that only responds to stimuli that are immediately present to it -
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whether it be food, shelter or a mate - can only be aware of those 
stimuli in the immediate time frame in which it is living here and 
now. It eats the food, enjoys the comfort provided by the shelter, or 
mates. Its enjoyment is present to it here and now and ceases when 
the stimulus ceases. Of course it can suffer disappointments and 
pain when its access to food, shelter or a mate is denied, but what 
it cannot do is anticipate such disappointments and enjoyments 
or regret their passing. The stimuli are either present to it or they 
are not. If it feels fear it is in the form of an inclination to flee from 
a present threat, and if it feels hope it is in the inclination to eat, 
rest or mate with a present stimulus. The stimulus must be present 
to it both in the sense that it is there in proximity to the organism 
and in the sense that it is in the same time frame as the organism. 
We are talking about an organism that cannot remember its past 
(although it can acquire behavioural traits from previous experi-
ences) or anticipate its future (although instinct will cause it to flee 
from present dangers). Human beings are not such organisms. We 
have a sense of time. We can recall the past and we can anticipate 
the future and plan for it. All of our examples of hope in Chapter 1 
have been cases in which the person who hopes is focusing on the 
future and the possibilities or challenges that it contains. 
But we need to acknowledge that the one huge and inescapable 
possibility that our futures contain is our death. We are all going to 
die and we know it. Our futures also contain the possible deaths of 
loved ones and of strangers we might care about in a general way. 
These deaths will grieve us when they occur and so we fear them 
now when they are still in the future. But our own death is of an exis-
tentially different kind. It is the very cessation of our existence. At 
death all hope stops. While we do not normally hope for anything 
unpleasant in our futures, we can at least hope that when they occur 
we will bear them with fortitude or that we will learn from them and 
grow in wisdom. We can even hope that the deaths of others will 
have such positive effects on us, even while we do not hope they will 
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occur. But our own deaths cannot be born with fortitude or be learnt 
from. While our process of dying could indeed be born with forti-
tude, death is the moment at which our life ends and our subjectivity 
ceases to exist. Leaving aside for the moment beliefs about a possible 
life after death, death itself must be thought of, not as a beginning 
or an opportunity, but as the end of being. This is not something to 
be hoped for. There may be people who are suffering terrible pain 
or distress who hope for death, but it is not the state of being dead 
that they hope for; it is the cessation of their suffering. 
For many people death is something to be feared and this fear 
has the potential to cast a pall over life. There are people who think 
that, because their projects could be interrupted by death at any 
time, such projects are not worth committing to. On this view, 
death negates the value of anything we do because it makes the 
achievement of our goals and our enjoyment of it uncertain. In this 
way the thought of death can prevent our goals from being valued 
or enjoyed. And so we don't think about it. We ignore it and get on 
with our lives. Deep down, however, we know that we are temporal 
beings and that our time is short. We live our lives as directed 
towards a future that contains the fulfilment of our hopes and the 
realization of our goals and yet we also know that this future can 
be denied us at any time. On his way to the university, hoping that 
it does not rain and that he will do well in his studies, John could 
be struck by a car and killed. What good would his hopes be to him 
then? It would all be for nothing. This constant future possibility-
that of our own deaths - casts us into anxiety and fear, albeit this 
is an anxiety and fear that is most often lived at that level of our 
subjectivity of which we are not fully aware. Death appears to us 
like a horizon of our life beyond which there is nothing to hope for. 
It is the end and culmination of all our hopes without being the 
object of any of them. 
Many religious people do have hopes relating to their deaths, 
however. It is not that they hope to die, but rather that they hope 
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for a new kind of life after their deaths. In this way death is seen as 
a gateway and becomes a kind of object of hope. But it remains true 
that hoping stops when death comes. Even if there were life after 
death, it is believed to be a life of perfect bliss and beatific vision 
and so there would be nothing in it to hope for. It could not get any 
better. And if it was a state of "nirvana" understood as peace and 
non-suffering then, again, there would be nothing to hope for. And 
a life of eternal perdition in hell would also leave us with nothing to 
hope for. So death is the end of hope even if there is life after death. 
If there is life after death it would be a life radically different from a 
human life. It would be a life without hope or hopefulness. 
Bioethical issues 
One of the most significant and widespread effects of being ill -
aside from the pain and suffering that it brings with it - is that it 
makes one dependent on others. Whether it be family, friends or 
clinicians, one is inclined to give oneself over to the care of others. 
In the terms of our analysis of hope, this highlights the feature of 
supplication. As one hopes to get well, one sends out an appeal 
to others for help. But this stance of supplication can encourage 
dependency in the patient and paternalism on the part of the clini-
cian. Paternalism in healthcare is the tendency of healthcare workers 
to make decisions on behalf of their patients on the grounds that 
they know best and are acting in the patients' best interests. If the 
patient adopts the role of a supplicant and relinquishes responsi-
bility for their treatment to the doctor, then a paternalistic relation-
ship can more readily develop between them. In the past doctors 
felt that it was so important not to destroy the hope of their seri-
ously ill patients that they would avoid telling them just how bad 
their prognoses were. They would withhold bad news from their 
patients on the grounds that, if those patients did not know that 
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their deaths were relatively imminent, they would continue to hope 
and "fight" for life. It was believed that patients without hope would 
often not cooperate with, or participate fully in, their treatments. 
In more recent times, this policy has been deemed a denial of the 
autonomy and even dignity of the patient. It is now felt that patients 
have a right to know their prognoses and that healthcare workers 
should have sufficient respect for them and confidence in them to 
suppose that they can handle knowledge of their dire condition. 
Moreover, whereas it had been assumed that knowledge of 
impending death leads to hopelessness, it is now accepted that a 
dying person still has much to hope for aside from their survival. 
In a situation where a patient is ill, the future state that is most 
hoped for is a cure. Happily, most medical situations are of this kind 
and the relevant healthcare workers will focus on achieving that 
cure. But in cases of chronic illness or terminal illness, where no 
cure can be realistically offered, hope can still be encouraged. This 
does not mean that a physician should suggest a visit to Lourdes in 
order to seek a miraculous cure. Even if hope for a cure would not 
be realistic, the patient can be offered hope for relief from pain or 
discomfort. A person suffering chronic pain can hope for the caring 
attentions of others. A person facing death can hope to part from 
their loved ones without leaving any "unfinished business" in their 
relationships. They can hope to complete their projects or leave an 
inspiring legacy to their children. They can hope to stay alive long 
enough for a distant relative to visit them in time. Patients can be 
given something other than survival to hope for. There are many 
other matters that a patient may be uncertain or anxious about. 
Will their financial affairs be put in order? Will their loved ones be 
provided for? Will their achievements be remembered? These and 
many other concerns are issues about which the patient can enter-
tain hopes and these hopes may well have the same therapeutic 
benefits as hope for a cure. While healthcare workers rightly focus 
on cure when it is possible and palliation when it is not, the needs 
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and hopes of their patients extend well beyond these merely biolog-
ical goals. Sensitive and caring healthcare workers will facilitate the 
achievement of this large range of hopes. 
One of the stages that dying patients often go through is denial 
of their fates. They will refuse to believe that their deaths are immi-
nent and hope for a complete cure. This would be a failure on their 
part to entertain hopes that are realistic. It would be the vice of 
presumption, which in this case consists in believing that, because 
they do not deserve to die, some powerful agency will intervene to 
prevent it. Acceptance is both a more virtuous and a more peaceful 
stance. But acceptance of death need not entail the absence of hope. 
One can hope for a peaceful death and for a good ending to one's 
life. And healthcare workers can contribute to the fulfilment of 
these hopes. 
An example 
That the role of hope in the face of illness and death is very complex 
is shown in a profound book entitled How we Die by the American 
physician, Sherwin B. Nuland. Nuland begins his discussion of 
hope in the clinic by reminding his readers that it is one of the 
most widespread tenets of the ethos of medicine that patients 
suffering from severe and incurable maladies must not be allowed 
to lose hope. Moreover, he says, the whole institution of medicine, 
with its hospitals, clinics, emergency services, high technology 
and medical, nursing and ancillary staff has the effect of assuring 
patients that they can place their hope in the doctors and health 
professionals who tend to their needs. The unfortunate result is 
that dying patients often "hope against hope" in the sense that they 
continue to hope for a cure even when every rational considera-
tion indicates that none is available. It is even worse, says Nuland, 
when a clinician encourages such hope even though there is no 
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basis for it in medical science or technology. It is almost inevitable 
that a patient, fearing the end of their future and thus of any hope, 
will seize on the possibilities that medical expertise offers even if, 
objectively, the chances of cure are very slim. 
Some commentators on modern medicine speak of "techno-
logical brinkmanship': in which doctors are tempted to try every 
new and even untested therapy or treatment in order to prolong 
the life of a patient. Doctors seem to need to feel that they are 
doing something, even if what they are doing holds little promise 
of improvement in the patient's condition or even relief from 
their pain and suffering. Even when a patient is in an irreversible 
coma and would die without artificial life support, there is a felt 
need to maintain that life support so as to maintain the last flick-
ering embers of hope. Indeed, patients themselves, or their fami-
lies, often demand this burdensome and often futile treatment 
because they do not want to give up hope or be seen to be doing 
so. Nuland warns against this approach and urges both patients 
and doctors to accept the inevitability of death when it comes. 
Even though modern society finds it difficult to accept death as 
an existential part of life, and even though it is one of the core 
objectives of the profession of medicine to preserve life and to find 
cures for disease, it must also be possible to accept death when it 
can no longer be postponed without causing greater suffering and 
hardship for all those involved: the patient, their family and the 
clinic itself. 
And yet, on one occasion Nuland himself failed to heed this 
advice. He describes the terminal suffering of his brother, Harvey, 
who was dying of incurable bowel cancer. Harvey was undergoing 
terrible pain and his disease had made his body a source of horror 
to him. Nuland told him about some experimental chemotherapy 
procedures that might just help to relieve his symptoms and delay 
his death. He offered him hope. He admits that he made a terrible 
mistake. He knew that his brother was dying and yet he felt he could 
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not take away his only hope. Nuland knew that he was acting in 
denial of the facts, but just as he wanted to give his brother hope 
so he was himself driven by a hope that a miracle might yet occur. 
It is not only patients who use the psychological strategy of denial 
to prevent their seeing that the end of their life is inevitable. Family 
members and some clinicians do the same. For them the most 
important thing is to keep hope alive, even in the face of undeni-
able facts. 
Nuland also reports that many severely ill patients tend to give 
over their responsibility for their own lives to others. They feel the 
need to be cared for and to allow others to make crucial decisions 
for them. In the face of death, they are already withdrawing from 
life even as they hope for its continuation. And so Nuland found 
himself depended on by his brother and found himself making deci-
sions on his behalf that, if his brother had taken a more autono-
mous role, he might not have concurred with. The experimental 
treatment was tried. It resulted in nothing more than greater misery 
and suffering, and a useless and painful prolongation of Harvey's 
dying agony. Nuland sums up his reflections on this story: 
In this high-tech biomedical era, when the tantalizing possi-
bility of miraculous new cures is daily dangled before our eyes, 
the temptation to see therapeutic hope is great, even in those 
situations when common sense would demand otherwise. To 
hold out this kind of hope is too frequently a deception, which 
in the long run proves far more often to be a disservice than 
the promised victory it seems at first. (1993: 233) 
In order to explore the implications of this story for our under-
standing of hope as evinced both by patients and clinicians, let 
us reflect on it using the features of hope that I listed at the end 




First, hope is motivated by felt needs or some degree of anxiety 
or concern, as opposed to fantasy or desire. In this case, the anxiety 
is all too clear. It is the anxiety evoked by impending death. Most 
people of sound mind do not want to die and in the face of death 
will cling tenaciously to life and to any means of preserving it. The 
deepest anxiety from which human beings suffer is the anticipation 
of death. As I noted in the previous section, even people in the best 
of health and at the peak of their powers cannot escape the occa-
sional gnawing realization that death can come at any moment. 
Hope responds to this anxiety by clinging to life and hoping for its 
indefinite continuation. Or so it did for Harvey. For Nuland himself, 
the hope was that he could save his brother. Perhaps the anxiety 
that motivated this, apart from brotherly love, was the desire not 
to allow the science of medicine to be seen as inadequate to the 
task of saving life. 
Second, hope implies a judgement that what is hoped for is 
something good. Whether what was hoped for in this case was 
judged to be something good will depend on whether we consider 
the matter from the point of view of Harvey or ofNuland. It is clear 
enough that Nuland, the physician, thought that the continued life 
of his brother would be a good, even if the duration of his continued 
existence would be short and the quality of it highly compromised 
and with no escape from suffering. For him the issue was that he 
wanted to give his brother hope. It is not so clear what Harvey 
thought. He might well have thought that a continuation of his 
suffering was not worth the effort and he might have hoped for its 
end. While Nuland did not do so himself, we could also imagine a 
healthcare worker thinking that a continuation of life was always 
a good thing irrespective of the quality of that life. The doctrine of 
the sanctity of life holds that life is always a good in and of itself, and 
that, therefore, doctors and patients have an obligation to prolong 
life or, at least, not to shorten it by any medical means. Moreover, 
given the professional commitment of healthcare workers to saving 
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and prolonging lives, it is natural that such workers will be inclined 
to see saving and prolonging lives as a good thing. However, there 
is judgement required here and no overarching doctrine, such as 
that of the sanctity of life, should override such judgements. There 
are a number of goods that can be hoped for that we could sum up 
with the phrase "a peaceful death': 
Third, hope's object is an occurrence that is considered to be 
possible. Harvey is made to believe - and indeed, wants to believe 
- that a cure is possible. All the indications are that it is all but 
impossible. However, it is the "all but" that is most important here. 
It provides the slight glimpse of a possibility that allows Nuland and 
his brother to still hope for what would be regarded as a miracle. 
However slight the chance, the depth of the fear of death turns that 
slight chance into a glowing light of possibility on which all the 
hope and longing of the dying patient is concentrated. It therefore 
becomes the clinician's task to be clear and honest about what is 
possible and what is not. While clinicians themselves can often not 
know with certainty what the prognosis of an illness might be, their 
professional knowledge can be of immeasurable help to the patient 
in shaping a realistic hope. Moreover, patients - perhaps helped 
by family, friends or clinicians - can explore the many other goals 
aside from survival that are still possible for them in their reduced 
state. 
Fourth, hope's object is an occurrence that is considered to be 
not inevitable. In this story, the object of hope is the cure of Harvey's 
bowel cancer. Clearly such a cure is not inevitable. Despite all the 
expertise of the medical staff and the progress in medical research 
into cancer, the cure of Harvey's disease is, in fact, extremely 
unlikely. His chances of survival are vanishingly small. It is the huge 
gap between what Harvey and his brother want and the likelihood 
of its coming about that creates the space that hope seeks to fill. 
Fifth, hope is directed towards the future as conceived by the 
person who hopes. This would seem an obvious point: the death 
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that is feared and the cure or remission that is hoped for lie in the 
future. But there is a further significant point to be made here. When 
a patient is approaching death, it might be better to dwell on the past 
than on the future. It is the past that now holds the key to happiness. 
If the future holds little promise except suffering, it is time to reflect 
on the past: on the achievements that might lie there; on the loves 
and relationships that have enhanced it; and on the future legacy 
that will have been created. It is here that the clinician must concen-
trate less on survival and help the patient to come to terms with 
what needs to be done in order to secure a peaceful death. 
Sixth, the person hoping is uncertain as to whether what is hoped 
for will happen. It is clear that uncertainty about whether or when 
a cure will come about is a condition for an ill person's hoping for 
that cure. If such a cure were certain all one would have to do would 
be to wait. In mild and non-terminal cases one might hope for an 
infection to go away or for an injury to heal sooner rather than later, 
but one knows that they eventually will. But this uncertainty condi-
tion is a source of difficulty for Nuland and other doctors. If they tell 
their patients that they will certainly die relatively soon as a result of 
their terminal illness they are said to be removing hope. And yet, if 
they do not tell them or if they offer them possibly futile treatments, 
they are said to be giving them "false hope': It seems that patients 
need some degree of uncertainty to leave room for hope but that 
this room must not be filled with unrealistic expectations. This is a 
quandary that all healthcare workers face. 
Seventh, hope is directed to circumstances over which the 
person hoping does not have complete control. The most obvious 
element over which both Harvey and Nuland have no control is the 
progress of Harvey's disease. Despite the best efforts of the doctors, 
his cancer has spread to all parts of his body and has become incur-
able. He still has some control of the treatment regimen to which 
he is being subjected, but even here his hope is leading him to 
relinquish that to his brother and to his doctors. It is his lack of 
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control over his own body and his health that is the most frustrating 
experience for him. Despite his hope for extended and healthy life, 
the disease is destroying him and his control over his own exist-
ence. And clinicians are also - despite the most sophisticated tech-
nological developments in medical science - unable to control all 
the permutations of the disease that is ravaging the patient. Even 
they often reach a point where all that is left to them to do is hope. 
Eighth, hope ought to lead to appropriate action on the part of 
the person who hopes when such action is available. The urgent 
issue for Harvey is what action it is appropriate for him to take. 
Should he pursue the untested therapy or should he accept the 
inevitability of his death as peacefully as he can? His brother the 
doctor has suggested the new therapy. He himself has given over 
some of his responsibility for himself to his brother. As a result his 
ability to decide what action should be taken is severely compro-
mised. The case also highlights how difficult it is for the clinician to 
know what would be the appropriate action to take. 
Ninth, hope has the psychological structure of supplication. It 
is this point that throws the most interesting light on the story. 
Harvey, in his suffering and despair, had nowhere to turn but to 
his doctors and his brother. He was desperate for help. He hoped 
against hope that he would be cured or that his life would at least go 
on for somewhat longer without the terrible pain he was suffering. 
He appealed to his brother. It is not recorded whether he prayed 
to his god or sought help from any other agency. But his appeal to 
his brother was a palpable expression of his hope. It was because 
of this appeal and because of its intensity that his brother forgot 
the advice he had given to other doctors and offered a ground-
less hope. Harvey probably knew deep down within himself that 
his time was up but he hoped against hope and issued a suppli-
cation. He wanted some powerful agency to intervene in his life 
and perform a miracle. He gave up his responsibility for himself 
and gave himself over to his medically trained brother, whom he 
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trusted to help him and even, miraculously, cure him. It is because 
clinicians are cast into the role of being the object of supplication 
that they carry such a heavy burden of responsibility. 
And finally, hope ought to be rational and realistic. This is the 
crucial condition that would make Harvey's hope for a prolongation 
of his life legitimate. But we have seen that he was not being rational 
and realistic. He was seizing on an unlikely cure and a useless treat-
ment in the vain hope that his life would be improved and length-
ened. Of course, it must be admitted that his capacity for making 
a sound judgement in the situation that he was in was severely 
reduced. This is the reason why his physician brother accepted the 
responsibility and the blame for recommending a treatment that 
had no purpose except to maintain hope. 
Conclusion 
This story and the lessons I have drawn from it illustrate how hope 
might have both positive and negative consequences in cases where 
a patient is dying from an incurable disease or from severe inju-
ries. However, for most people the medical clinic is a place where 
genuine and effective help can be obtained for a vast range of 
ailments ranging from the relatively trivial to the more severe and 
life-threatening. In such cases hope has a less problematic role to 
play. The patient hopes for relief from certain symptoms and the 
clinician provides the means in accordance with the best knowl-
edge available. There is not as much room for drama where life is not 
under threat. Nevertheless, the structure of hope that I have identi-
fied in the case of terminal illness applies to less critical cases as well, 
especially the stance of supplication that the patient extends towards 
the clinician. Hope is an inescapable and problematic aspect of the 
experience of illness for patients, and also the source of many of the 
ethical dilemmas that healthcare workers face in the clinic. 
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Politics is the social and institutional attempt on the part of a 
community to formulate, agree on and implement policies for the 
common good. Whatever corruptions it might be subject to - and 
there are many - its primary focus is on good governance and the 
maintenance of cultural, social and economic conditions that will 
allow people to live full and happy lives in accordance with the 
values they and their communities hold dear. Whether the struc-
tures through which decisions are arrived at and put into effect 
are democratic or autocratic, participatory or hierarchical, liberal 
or authoritarian, the professed aim of political processes is the 
improvement of the lives of those who are encompassed by that 
political system. Given this focus on the future, on amelioration and 
on corruptible structures of power and control, it is not surprising 
that hope should be a central element in politics. To adapt Ricoeur's 
thesis about the goals of our innate hopefulness to the political 
sphere, people engage in politics because they hope for improve-
ments in their lives, for cooperative relations with others, and for 
stable and just social structures in which to live. 
Barack Obama 
Perhaps the most resounding statement of this role of hope has 
come from US President Barack Obama. In the Democratic 
National Convention keynote address that he delivered on 27 July 
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2004, at the Fleet Center in Boston, then Illinois senator Obama 
endorsed John Kerry and John Edwards as Democratic Party candi-
dates for the presidency and vice-presidency of the United States, 
respectively. Towards the end of the speech he said: 
In the end, that's what this election is about. Do we partici-
pate in a politics of cynicism or do we participate in a politics 
of hope? John Kerry calls on us to hope. John Edwards calls 
on us to hope. I'm not talking about blind optimism here: the 
almost willful ignorance that thinks unemployment will go 
away if we just don't think about it, or that the health care 
crisis will solve itself if we just ignore it. That's not what I'm 
talking about. I'm talking about something more substantial. 
It's the hope of slaves sitting around a fire singing freedom 
songs; the hope of immigrants setting out for distant shores; 
the hope of a young naval lieutenant bravely patrolling the 
Mekong Delta; the hope of a millworker's son who dares to 
defy the odds; the hope of a skinny kid with a funny name 
who believes that America has a place for him, too. Hope 
in the face of difficulty. Hope in the face of uncertainty. The 
audacity of hope! In the end, that is God's greatest gift to us, 
the bedrock of this nation. A belief in things not seen. A belief 
that there are better days ahead. 
The phrase "the audacity of hope" went on to become the title of 
Obama's book-length political manifesto. 
There are many interesting points to notice about this speech. 
First, Obama is contrasting hope and cynicism in the way that, 
at the end of Chapter 2, I suggested Aristotle would have done. 
Political engagement is motivated by hope, which involves the 
belief not only that things can be better if action is taken, but that 
it is worth taking such action. The outcomes that political engage-
ment seeks are worthwhile and important outcomes: the pursuit 
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of justice in the distribution of social goods, economic prosperity, 
peace and security, the protection of the environment, and the alle-
viation of needless suffering both at home and abroad. These and 
the many other issues with which politics concerns itself are impor-
tant and valuable goals. Hope not only pursues them with confi-
dence but also believes in their importance. In is in this sense that 
cynicism - the feeling that nothing is important - is the opposite 
of political hope. 
Political anxieties 
Once again I can explicate what is involved in political hope by 
using my ten-point analysis from Chapter 1. First, political hope 
is motivated by felt needs or some degree of anxiety or concern, 
as opposed to fantasy or desire. The notable English philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) created a myth to account for the 
origin of politics. He envisages pre-political human beings living on 
their own or in family groups eking out a living in a context of scar-
city and therefore forced to both steal the necessities of life from 
others and to defend their possessions from the predations of their 
fellow human beings. Everyone has a right to survive and there-
fore to do whatever is necessary to do so. However, in this lawless, 
dog-eat-dog world, life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" 
(Leviathan, ch. 13, para. 9), so the people decide to give up their 
right to look after themselves on their own and vest it in a ruler who 
will enforce cooperation between his subjects by force of arms and 
secure peace by the imposition of absolute power. Whether any 
such "social contract" was ever entered into as a historical event is 
doubtful, but the myth nicely captures the paradoxes and anxieties 
that infect politics. On the one hand, human beings are portrayed 
as self-seeking and violent. Leaving them to themselves to live in 
total freedom will lead to murderous anarchy. But on the other 
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hand, political authority is portrayed as oppressive and coercive. 
Organizing people into a cooperative society with a ruler requires 
tyranny and despotism. These two extremes, anarchy and tyranny, 
are the objects of the political anxieties that inspire our political 
hopes and which have led some to describe Western political 
ideology as a "liberalism of fear': 
The first such anxiety centres on freedom. We want to pursue 
our life's goals without undue interference from others and yet 
we also need government to maintain the law and exercise power 
on our behalf. Indeed, we need government for a host of reasons: 
to protect the borders, police the laws, establish the material and 
legal infrastructures for the pursuit of commerce, provide welfare 
support for those in need, ensure that there is education for all 
and healthcare for those who need it, regulate the financial system, 
protect the environment, support the arts, provide public amenities 
for sport and recreation, provide for transport, mail and electronic 
communications. The list goes on. But each of these functions 
requires institutions with rules and regulations that require coop-
eration from citizens, most obviously in the form of taxation, but 
as often as not in the form of having one's activities curtailed for 
the sake of the common good. If a modern nation state is a system 
of cooperation in order to allow people to secure common objec-
tives and goods, it is also a system of coercion to secure that coop-
eration from everyone. In this way a reduction of our freedom is a 
price that has to be paid for the goods that governments provide. 
Our concern to protect our freedom is an anxiety generated by the 
institutions of politics themselves. 
And there are other fears, anxieties and concerns for the reso-
lution of which we look to politics. We want to be protected from 
foreign invasion, from crime and from terrorism. We want to be 
provided with the means to live and be helped when we are in need. 
We want opportunities to better ourselves. We want the wealth and 
goods that a society produces to be distributed fairly. We want to 
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be recognized as having dignity and rights irrespective of which 
ethnicity, religion, language or gender our identity is based on. We 
want to feel that our identity is acknowledged and that the society 
in which we live embraces the cultures of all. We want to feel part 
of a community, its traditions and its aspirations, and to feel that 
the community we are a part of is respected by others. We want 
to feel that we are not powerless and that we can participate in 
the decision-making that affects our lives. We want our leaders 
to pursue our ethical goals - such as caring for the environment, 
providing for the global poor and maintaining world peace - on 
our behalf. We want our leaders to be able to secure this long list of 
goals and not to be hampered by special interest groups or political 
elites with vested interests. It is these and many other concerns and 
anxieties that lead people to look to politics and to politicians for 
solutions and for leadership. They lead people to entertain political 
hope. 
I should add that the scope of government, and hence of politics, 
is subject to constant debate. Neoliberal ideologues would have 
governments withdraw from economic oversight, while religious 
fundamentalists would have governments legislate their moral 
preferences into law. However such debates play out, it is clear that 
what is at issue in politics is of concern to all those who are affected 
by the decisions that are taken. These matters are not just fantasies 
or idle desires that we might fulfil in private recreations or domestic 
life. We are concerned for others as well as ourselves. We all have 
an interest in what our governments do and we all feel some degree 
of concern or even anxiety about the policy issues that are debated 
and decided by those who hold political power. 
The second feature of political hope is that we all hope that polit-
ical decisions will be for the good as we see it. But it is important 
to notice that the judgement as to what political policies are good 
should not be made in the light only of self-interest. The person 
who votes for a particular political party because that party prom-
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ises tax breaks that will be of private benefit to him does not under-
stand that responsible politics is aimed at the common good. It may 
be necessary to sacrifice some private advantage in order to secure 
a public good. The judgement that what we hope for is something 
good should be an exercise of such political responsibility. It is a 
corruption of politics to see it as a competition between competing 
private interests rather than as a cooperative discourse aimed at a 
collective good. This is one reason why subsuming political goals 
and aspirations to the management of the economy - the sphere of 
competing private interests par excellence - constitutes a misun-
derstanding of the nature of politics. It is not a function of govern-
ment to ensure that wealth flows only to those who contribute to 
the economy. 
Third, political hope's object is an occurrence or a policy outcome 
that is considered to be possible. If we need to hope because social 
progress is not guaranteed, we are also led to hope by the belief 
that it is possible. But it is precisely at this point that the deepest 
quandaries of political hope arise. To the ordinary citizen and to 
the powerful politician alike, change for the better seems all but 
impossible. In the distant past a man's political and moral respon-
sibilities might be confined to the village and his political action 
centred on local concerns. Provided he kept the peace, assured 
the harvest and harmed none of his neighbours, his political deci-
sions could fulfil his every social hope and moral responsibility. 
Today, in contrast, we are aware that our actions and social policies 
have global irr1pacts. We know that when we buy consumer goods 
we are complicit in the exploitation of millions of impoverished 
workers in the developing world. We know that when we eat we are 
encouraging distortions in global food production and trade that 
are causing starvation and environmental degradation in poorer 
countries. We know that whenever we travel, unless it is by foot or 
bicycle, we leave a carbon footprint that will endanger future gener-
ations through global warming. We know that when we pursue 
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our national interests, we often generate global conflicts that have 
the potential to unleash wars of unimaginable destructiveness. We 
know that when we espouse the traditional or religious beliefs of 
our communities or our nations, we might encourage the ethno-
centrism, intolerance and xenophobia that lead to a "clash of civili-
zations" and even terrorism. We know that the global political and 
economic institutions we have created to confront these problems, 
such as the United Nations and the World Bank, are compromised 
by national political interests and the greed of powerful elites. In 
the face of all this, what can an ordinary person do? What amelio-
ration is possible? How can we avoid the vice of resignation? What 
scope is there for hope? 
It is striking that in his speech accepting victory in the presi-
dential election of 2008, Obama recited a litany of difficult political 
tasks and reforms and repeated after each one the refrain "Yes, we 
can!" This inspires hope. If he had identified cynicism as the oppo-
site of hope in his earlier speech, he is now identifying despair as 
its opposite. Despair is the feeling that the task is too great and that 
success is too far out of reach. Such a feeling would lead to resig-
nation: the belief that I am too weak and insignificant to achieve 
the goal. Obama's litany is an attempt to say otherwise. Change is 
possible, and hope for such change is therefore legitimate. 
Fourth, political hope's object is an occurrence or a policy 
outcome that is considered to be not inevitable. What this means 
is that the future goods that politics aims for should not be consid-
ered to be decreed by fate, as it were. They should not be seen as 
the result of some historical process that no one can stop or influ-
ence in any way. To think this way would be presumption. Political 
goals have to be striven for. It is part of the structure of demo-
cratic politics that political decision-making is subject to many 
and competing influences. No matter how obviously good political 
goals may seem to their proponents, there will always be opposition 
from opponents who will be equally convinced of the justifiability of 
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their position. Various points of view have to be taken into consid-
eration and compromises have to be struck. When I participate 
actively in the political process by advocating particular policies, 
writing to newspapers, joining lobby groups and, of course, voting 
in elections, the outcome of my efforts is by no means guaranteed. 
Even an obviously good outcome is not inevitable. This is why polit-
ical action needs to be motivated by a hope that acknowledges this 
contingency. 
And yet political hope also seeks to overcome this contingency. 
Political rhetoric often seeks to hide it by appealing to overarching 
values and abstract concepts that have universal appeal but little 
specific meaning and that make the outcome seem inevitable. For 
example, politicians will advocate policies by claiming that they 
are consistent with the nation's destiny, or that they conduce to 
such grand goals as freedom, justice, economic growth or historical 
progress. They will say that their nation's endeavours must succeed 
because it has God on its side. But while all of these vague and 
romantic concepts obtain their rhetorical power from the hope 
that underlies them, they are a presumptuous distortion of genuine 
hope. 
The idea of progress 
Let us explore this claim with reference to belief in the inevita-
bility of progress. In the distant past people thought that events 
occurred in historical cycles. In ancient agrarian societies, people 
were impressed by the regularity of the seasons. Just as day followed 
night so summer followed spring, which, in turn, followed winter 
and autumn. The seasons were especially important because the 
sowing and harvesting of crops, and thus the fruitfulness of the 
earth, were bound up with them. Thoughtful people discovered 
other cyclic regularities as well. The movements of the heavenly 
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bodies were regular and cyclical and marked out the months and 
years. Historical epochs also came and went and the powers of 
kings and emperors waxed and waned in accordance with cycles 
deemed to have been laid out by heavenly powers. What all this 
amounted to was a conception of time and of history as cyclical. 
1here was nothing new under the sun and human life proceeded 
along predetermined recurrent paths laid out by the gods. 
But then in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
under the influence of the newly emerging sciences, the idea came 
to take hold that human beings might change the way they live 
for the better. They might harness the forces of nature that they 
had begun to understand scientifically by developing technologies. 
They might learn from the ancients, and from their own creative 
speculations, how to order the social and political lives of people 
in ways better than the mere use of force and coercion. In short, 
a new idea was emerging: the idea of "progress': No longer were 
human beings seen as confined to a temporal cycle in which they 
always did what had already been done. Human beings could invent 
new ways of doing things, new forms of political organization, new 
conceptions of the heavens and of supernatural entities, new bodies 
of scientific knowledge and new forms of artistic creation. Once 
this genie was out of the bottle there was no stopping it. Change in 
the name of progress became the central commitment of civilized 
people and their source of power and wealth over the whole of crea-
tion, including subjugated peoples who were deemed to be unable 
to benefit from this progress. And the most important attitude that 
accompanied this new conception of progress was hope. 
This period of European history is now known as the Enlighten-
ment. It is the period in which human beings learnt to think for 
themselves. Rather than being caught up in traditional beliefs and 
practices, they considered themselves able to devise new ways of 
understanding the world and human history and to develop new 
conceptions of what a good life might consist in. In short, human 
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beings became modern. Instead of conforming to traditions, reli-
gious norms or the ways of the ancestors, we became individual-
ists convinced that we could choose our own ways of life and our 
own values. Instead of science having to conform to metaphysical 
beliefs inherited from religion, instead of social mores having to be 
sanctified by the Church and by theocratic tradition, instead of art 
being subject to the tastes of aristocratic patrons, instead of polit-
ical life being subject to the hereditary power of kings and princes, 
human life would be progressive and free. What a glorious hope 
the Enlightenment gave to European civilization in the eighteenth 
century. Human kind was at last set free to pursue creativity, change 
and progress in every human endeavour. 
Indeed, if we think of the changes we experience in our own lives 
today it is hard to escape the idea that progress is inherent in human 
history. Many of us can remember when flying in aeroplanes was 
an activity for daredevils or for an extremely rich minority. We can 
remember writing on typewriters and having to crank up our cars 
to start them. We wrote letters rather than sending SMS messages 
or talking on Skype. While progress is less obvious in spheres other 
than technology, there are many who assume that science is giving 
us ever-better knowledge and that political change is leading to 
evermore just and free societies. 
But the idea of progress gives rise to a further thought. If there is 
progress, what are we progressing towards? If history is not cyclic 
but directional, then what is its goal? In the nineteenth century 
there were a number of important thinkers who suggested that the 
direction of history was predetermined by inherent influences and 
could be discovered by suitable social enquiry. Some argued that 
we were headed towards an inevitable rule of enlightened polit-
ical leaders, others that Reason itself (spelt with a capital "R") was 
working itself out so as to create an enlightened society. Others 
again claimed that the political dominance of capitalism would 
be overcome by the working classes so as to usher in a new era 
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of distributive justice in which the state would wither away. More 
recently it was suggested that biological and social evolution was 
tending to an "omega point" in which all the religious aspirations 
of humankind would be realized. Political liberals are inclined to 
think that, because their political philosophy is based on a univer-
sally valid conception of human dignity and reason, it will inevitably 
extend itself to the whole of humankind despite the strength of 
autocratic and theocratic governments in the world. What all these 
views have in common is that they take the element of contingency 
out of the concept of progress. They suggest that history is fulfilling 
a destiny. They deny the contingency of politics. 
However, the idea of progress may be an illusion that hides 
the attempts of powerful elites to direct historical events in their 
favour. Nationalism, with its appeals to the destiny of a people and 
its justifications of war, colonialism, with its promise of spreading 
the purported benefits of civilization to allegedly primitive peoples, 
industrialization, with its exploitation of the working class and of 
natural resources, capitalism, with its enrichment of a few at the cost 
of the exploitation of millions, and consumerism, with its new forms 
of cultural emptiness, have all come to us in the name of progress. 
The world is marked by extreme differentials in wealth and millions 
are living below the poverty line and dying premature and avoidable 
deaths. The global conflicts of the twentieth century, along with the 
Holocaust and other instances of genocide, are also arguably prod-
ucts of the dreams that the Enlightenment gave rise to. 
We should acknowledge that if there has been progress in human 
history then it is at least partly due to luck. It is not because of the 
working out of some cosmic, theological or metaphysical inevita-
bility. Things just happen. If those things are positive in some way 
we seize on them and build on them. Some of these efforts succeed 
and others fail. We go on to develop the successes. And so it goes, 
ever onwards. But we could be building on failures as well, and our 
efforts could come to nothing. If the sum of all that we do turns out 
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to be progressive then good luck will have played a considerable 
part. Liberal democracy is both a recent and vulnerable political 
form. Progress is not inevitable. It is because history is contingent 
in this way that we need to hope. If progress and improvement were 
inevitable or fated, we would only need to wait for things to get 
better. We might need to play our part, but we could be confident 
that the goods that politics promises would emerge in the fullness 
of time. Genuine hope does not think that way. It recognizes the 
contingency of history and the precariousness of the outcomes it 
produces: that we produce. That is why we need genuine hope: so 
that we can see through the rhetoric of politics and recognize that 
we need to act in order to reach the goals we aspire to. 
The practice of politics 
Returning to our list of features of hope, the fifth such feature is that 
political hope is directed towards the future as conceived by the 
person who hopes. This would seem obvious from what I have said 
so far and from Obama's reference to "a belief that there are better 
days ahead''. The key political issues relate to policies and reforms 
that are oriented towards the future. 
However, the past is also important in politics. The way in which 
citizens feel themselves to be members of the political community 
depends on their identification with the traditions and heritage of 
their nation state. Whether it is a society with a long ethnic and 
religious tradition or a settler society embracing peoples from 
many cultures, whether it a society that has won its independence 
in struggles for liberation against oppression or colonial rule, or 
whether it is a country of immense military and economic power 
that has defended democratic values in the face of totalitarianism, 
these are all aspects of a nation's past that affect the way people 
think about the present and the future. Accordingly, politicians 
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have to deal with the past as well as the future. In Australia in 
2008, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd offered an apology to those 
aboriginal Australians who had been forcibly removed from their 
families in times past in order to hasten their assimilation into the 
white community. This policy had come to be seen as a grave moral 
wrong~ It was appropriate for this gesture of reconciliation to be 
made in the political sphere even though it related to the past. We 
could also point to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
post-apartheid South Africa chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
as a relevant example. Post-genocide criminal trials conducted by 
the United Nations are a further example. Although such gestures 
and institutions . predominantly refer to the past, part of their 
importance lies in the future. They allow previously estranged and 
oppressed peoples to live together and to develop a common social 
life with those who had oppressed them. 
It is striking that Obama refers to the past in his speech. His 
examples, although homely, remind his audience of the stories that 
- multiplied many times over - constitute the shared history of 
his people and thus the basis of their common hope for the future. 
Sixth, it follows from everything I have been saying that partici-
pants in politics will feel that political outcomes are uncertain. Not 
only are many of the goals difficult to achieve, but the volatility 
of politics often means that when governments change, policies 
change with them and previous decisions are overturned. What 
is gained one year can be lost the next. Indeed, political decisions 
never seem to reach finality. To think otherwise would be presump-
tion. As circumstances change adjustments need to be made and 
as ideas and ideals change, new policies are introduced. Nothing 
is ever settled. There is always a need for review. Moreover, the 
efforts of political actors can be easily negated as populist senti-
ment or vested interests achieve more or less influence over 
decision-making. Discouragement is the lot of the politically active. 
And yet, one must not succumb to resignation. Because the issues 
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are so consequential, the effort must be made and determination 
shown. 
Seventh, political hope is directed to circumstances over which 
the person hoping does not have complete control. Once again, 
it seems obvious that ordinary people, at least, have very little 
control over political outcomes. Even in revolutionary moments 
when people rise up against despotic rule, the outcome of the 
revolutionary movement is far from predictable or controllable 
and reactionary elites are quite capable of seizing their opportu-
nity to introduce new forms of oppression and exploitation. But 
even the political elites themselves do not have complete control 
over the states in which they exercise power. Even the apparently 
most powerful man in the world, the President of the United States 
of America, is subject to a great many pressures and influences 
that curtail his freedom to introduce new policies. Congress can 
frustrate his every plan. Indeed, some degree of frustration is built 
into the system. The division of powers between executive, legis-
lature and judiciary creates a safeguard against autocratic or illib-
eral rule. As well, the many powerful lobby groups, media moguls 
and vested interests that influence government policy through the 
power of money tend to corrupt even the most legitimate political 
processes. In the face of this, ordinary citizens can readily come 
to feel powerless in the face of political institutions despite their 
having, in democratic societies at least, guaranteed rights of polit-
ical participation. But this sense of powerlessness should not lead 
to despair or resignation. Rather, it necessitates hope. Even if no 
one person can control political events, collective movements can 
have a considerable influence. Recognizing such limited but real 
power should be a strong stimulant-for hope. I do not mean only 
that it can provide encouragement. I mean that because our polit-
ical power is so modest, we need hope to fill the inevitable gap 
between what we are committed to achieving and what we can 
realistically achieve. 
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Eighth, political hope ought to lead to appropriate action on 
the part of the person who hopes, when such action is available. 
This thought leads to the advocacy of political participation. The 
minimal but necessary form of such participation is voting in elec-
tions. But a politically active citizen ought to do a lot more besides. 
She ought to inform herself of political debates so that her vote is 
cast responsibly. She ought to participate in political activities that 
fall outside the electoral process, such as writing to newspapers, 
joining advocacy groups or engaging in other legitimate ways of 
influencing government policy. What political scientists call "public 
discourse" is essential to political processes and everyone should 
find a way of participating in it either actively or receptively. It is 
an essential feature of democratic societies that they provide their 
citizens with opportunities to take actions of this kind, to express 
their political views, and to have a real and effective influence on 
the development of public policy by doing so. 
The ninth point is that political hope has the psychological struc-
ture of supplication. This is clearly illustrated by the overwhelming 
excitement and joy that greeted the election of Barack Obama as 
US President in 2008. Many progressive and liberal voters would 
have seen the preceding presidency as fraught with political nega-
tives and this would explain an element of relief at the election 
outcome. But the degree of expectation that the new president gave 
rise to was truly unprecedented. The words "hope" and "change" 
were bandied about in election slogans and the belief was encour-
aged that the new president could solve all the problems, both 
domestic and global, that had bedevilled the American republic in 
previous presidential terms. Obama became the object of supplica-
tion of a whole generation and of the African-American commu-
nity. But as great a political breakthrough as Obama's success was, 
there was a significant lack of realism in the hopes that it inspired. 
There was a messianic element to it. Two years into his term, at 
the time of writing this book, the difficulties of the changes that 
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Obama promised have become all too plain. Nevertheless, it is to 
be expected that great expectations and high hopes will be placed 
in anyone who seems capable of delivering the kinds of social and 
political reform that many people crave. This is a quite understand-
able expression of that element of supplication that is present in 
hope. 
However, there can be a dark side to this frame of mind. Many 
of the great demagogues and populist leaders of the past depended 
on this element of supplication in the hopes that people placed in 
them. Promising to save their people from oppression and exploi-
tation, to bring an end to their humiliation and defeats, to restore 
the dignity and power of their race, to bring about the triumph 
of their religions and their morals, or to usher in a new millen-
nium of justice and peace - albeit over the broken bodies of their 
enemies - has always been the modus operandi of fascist dema-
gogues and populist rabble-rousers. If hope has as one of its 
constituent psychological elements the appeal to a higher power 
for secular salvation, then the influence of such leaders will be ever 
sustained. Hitler was seen by his supporters as the saviour of his 
people. The power of ruthless tyrants everywhere has been main-
tained, not only by terror and the suppression of dissent, but also 
by the trust and subservience of loyal followers who believed that 
their hopes for national glory or earthly paradise could be fulfilled 
by the actions of such leaders. 
Even in more liberal societies, political rhetoric cannot avoid 
appealing to the hopes of the populace in similar ways. Political 
leaders seek to make themselves the object of the hope, supplica-
tion and trust of their followers in order to gain their allegiance 
and electoral support. A cynical or despairing reaction to political 
hope may well be a way of avoiding this problem, but it stymies 
action and commitment. Obama's rhetoric of hope illustrates this 
dynamic very well. By saying in his 2004 speech ''As we breathe, we 
hope': he implies that it is a fundamental aspect of human nature to 
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hope: an aspect that is expressed in the political process itself. For 
all its dangers, such political rhetoric is a call to action and encour-
ages people to renewed efforts to change society for the better. 
Accordingly, while we should acknowledge the political dangers 
posed by hopes that place too much trust and faith in popular 
leaders, we cannot avoid accepting hope as an essential constituent 
of the modern political process. 
The tenth and last point is that political hope ought to be rational 
and realistic. This means not only that goals should be realistic 
and achievable but also that citizens are required to contribute to 
political debates in terms that others can understand as relevant. 
It would be ineffective to argue for environmental controls, for 
example, on the grounds that the "Great Earth Spirit" commands 
it of us. These are not terms that are suitable to political debates in 
modern societies. Such an argument would not be deemed rational. 
Again, it is no good joining a debate on the high level of execu-
tive salaries, for example, by claiming that private property is theft 
and that we should all revert to a communal form of life in which 
everything is shared equally. In the context of modern society, such 
claims would be irrational and unrealistic. 
However, this is a difficult norm to specify completely. Political 
action, especially when it is directed against entrenched interests or 
policies, ought to be bold and imaginative. When the vast majority 
of a political community agrees on a particular policy, those few 
who raise their voices against it - even on reasonable grounds - will 
often be deemed irrational and unrealistic. Opposition to the war 
in Vietnam, for example, was at first confined to a small minority 
who were deemed to be out of touch with geopolitical realities. 
Yet the movement they started grew in strength and eventually 
prevailed. No leader today wants to repeat that kind of military 
commitment. Was that anonymous man who stood firm against the 
tanks during the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989 failing 
in the virtue of hope because he was not being realistic? Was he 
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being presumptuous or overly naive? To go further back in history, 
those few concerned citizens of Great Britain who began to oppose 
the international slave trade in the eighteenth century were seen as 
hopelessly irrational and unrealistic. Slavery was too much a part of 
the economic arrangements on which the wealth of many nations 
depended. And yet their struggle was eventually successful. No one 
today would even consider making slavery legal again. Indeed, the 
anti-slavery campaigners invented new ways of engaging in poli-
tics. Action committees, letters and submissions to parliament, 
boycotts, pamphleteering, and public agitation and demonstra-
tions were all methods pioneered by this movement. Accordingly, 
we must not allow the requirement that we should be "realistic" to 
derail our legitimate commitments. 
And yet there is a danger in this espousal of vision, imagination 
and boldness in pursuing a political cause. It becomes easy to fill 
one's head with grand visions of social change. It is easy to become 
"utopian" in one's thinking, especially if one has adopted the idea of 
progress and its corollary, the idea of a goal in history. In its earliest 
forms, utopian thinking consisted in imagining a society in which 
all social divisions and dissensions were absent. It took consider-
able imagination and literary skill to devise descriptions of such 
forms of life that could be believable, but a small literary genre 
was created that had some influence on political thought. Such 
utopian thinking is an expression of hope. However, it can happen 
that political activists are so fired up by their utopian visions of a 
future society in which all social ills are overcome that they are 
prepared to take extreme steps in bringing such a society about. 
Revolutionary movements are especially prone to such excesses. 
While revolutions are often justified by the oppression and exploi-
tation to which they are a response, it can also happen that the 
fervour of the revolutionaries is fed not only by their resentment 
against oppression but also by their adherence to utopian ideolo-
gies in which new societies are imagined of such happiness and 
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grandeur that no sacrifice is deemed too great to bring them about. 
Added to this it might be thought that such a future glorious society 
is guaranteed by destiny and that it is the historical task of the revo-
lutionary vanguard to act boldly to bring it about. The Terror that 
followed the French Revolution and the victory of the Bolsheviks 
in the Russian Revolution are but the most dramatic examples of 
this tendency. During the height of the Stalinist period in the Soviet 
Union, millions of peasants and others who were deemed enemies 
of the revolution were sacrificed in the name of the communist 
ideal of a society of equality in which the state will have withered 
away. Nor is this tendency confined to examples from the past. The 
military and diplomatic actions of Western powers in the world 
today are often motivated by the hope of bringing democracy and 
liberal political rights to nations that currently do not enjoy such 
social conditions. This too would be an example of sacrificing the 
lives of some in order to pursue utopian hopes. Of course, it is 
true that many of these policies are motivated by a complex array 
of political and economic anxieties, including, for example, the 
need for secure access to highly prized natural resources. But such 
complexities only show that the deep strands of hope in utopian 
ways of thinking are not only dangerous but can also be misleading. 
Some utopians can sustain their hope only by turning away from 
the evils of this world in disappointment, and pursuing a vision 
of radical change. The temptation is to want to sweep everything 
aside. Let's have revolution! Let's do away with the state! Let's 
overthrow the system! Let's bomb the oppressors out of existence 
even at the cost of our own lives! Let's create a truly murderous 
gesture! This way of thinking has spawned many radical move-
ments throughout history and may be an inspiration for some 
acts of terrorism today. Prophets and preachers have promulgated 
apocalyptic or messianic ideas since time immemorial. Apocalyptic 
visions involve the destruction of the world as we know it and its 
replacement - usually at the hand of a supernatural force accom-
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panied by cataclysmic events - with a new world in which the 
elect who are saved will live on in glory into the future. This way 
of thinking is also central to messianism, which is the belief shared 
by many world religions, including Judaism, Christianity and some 
branches of Islam, that a saviour will come and raise imperfect crea-
tion to a new level of spiritual and material development. Although 
we tend to think of salvation today as a personal destiny for each 
individual, it has often been thought of in the past in collective 
terms so that a whole people is saved because of its righteousness, 
while the communities of evil and unbelieving ones are swept away 
into eternal perdition. Millenarianism is the view that at "the end of 
days" evil will be swept aside and the reign of a new order lasting for 
a thousand years will be inaugurated. Some believe in the coming 
of the "Rapture'; when the world will be destroyed, the good saved 
and infidels condemned. Even today there are religious fanatics in 
many faiths who hope for a second coming of some kind or who are 
preparing to build a new temple to their returning gods. Bizarre as 
some of these views may seem today, political ideologies can some-
times share such messianic visions. Political thinkers have dreamt 
of the perfect society and have been prepared to pursue their own 
versions of Armageddon in order to bring about this secular form 
of salvation on earth. 
Conclusion 
So what role can there be for a more rational and realistic hope? 
There can be no generalizable rules or principles on this issue. 
Sensitive and courageous judgements have to be made on the 
specifics of each situation. Sometimes a grand and heroic gesture 
is what is needed, but in most contexts, to be realistic is to acknowl-
edge uncertainty and to work for achievable change. This may be 
less dramatic and the outcome might be less than the rule of the 
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righteous over the whole of creation, but a slight improvement 
in even one life or a new possibility developed and achieved in 
even a srriall part of the world is still worthwhile. It is not accept-
able to sacrifice achievable goals on the altar of grand visions. Of 
course, the judgement as to what is achievable has to be made in the 
context of difficult and complex situations and it has to be sensitive 
to deep human values. Perhaps when the history of Obama's presi-
dency is written, it will be seen to have illustrated this point even 
if the sometimes messianic hopes he inspired remain unfulfilled. 
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I have argued that hopefulness is a fundamental existential struc-
ture of human existence and that specific and episodic hopes 
are expressions of this primordial hopefulness. Perhaps the 
most obvious evidence for this claim is the phenomenon of reli-
gion. Statistics gathered in 2005 indicate that there are 2.1 billion 
Christians in the world (33 per cent of the world's population), 1.5 
billion Muslims (21 per cent), 900 million Hindus (14 per cent), 394 
million adherents of Chinese traditional religions (6 per cent), 376 
million Buddhists (6 per cent), and many other religious adherents 
besides. Those who describe themselves as non-religious consti-
tute just 16 per cent of the world population and almost half of 
these still describe themselves as "theistic': I regard these statistics 
as evidence for our primordial hopefulness because I consider reli-
gion to be an expression of that hopefulness. In this chapter I hope 
to justify this conviction and spell out its implications. 
Spiritual anxieties 
Like hope in other domains, religious hope is motivated by various 
needs, anxieties and concerns rather than mere fantasies or desires. 
Our lives are fragile, vulnerable, fallible and mortal. These and 
many other features of the human condition generate deep anxi-
eties and concerns at the core of our being. As I noted in Chapter 
3, it is our mortality that is the most pervasive source of dread and 
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anxiety in our lives. We shall explore presently how religion has 
helped us face that dread, but outside a religious context we can 
only think that death will bring us oblivion. It is the end of our 
existence. For all we know the state of being dead is exactly like the 
state of not-yet-being-born. It is a state of non-existence that we 
can neither imagine nor remember. The total absence of conscious-
ness makes such a state a complete nothingness. And this fills us 
with dread. Moreover, death can threaten the meaningfulness of 
our lives. Any project that I engage in can be frustrated by death 
at any time. The more worthy and the more difficult a project is, 
whether it be the creation of a fine work of art or the completion of 
important scientific research, my involvement in it can be snuffed 
out at any moment by untimely death. How, then, can this project 
be held to be so important? In the face of death it becomes difficult 
to be committed to any significant project. This thought threatens 
to make our lives meaningless. 
Indeed, the quest for meaning in our lives can be a further spir-
itual anxiety from which we all suffer. As we contemplate the vast-
ness of the universe and the apparent limitlessness of time, we can 
consider our own existence to be puny and insignificant. Moreover, 
the world we live in is full of change, uncertainty and danger. Things 
can go wrong. We can be injured or frustrated in many ways. We 
have to wrest a living from this earth by the sweat of our brows. Can 
we feel at home in such a world? Is it a vale of tears in which we are 
tested for our worthiness of being happy, or is it the place where 
we belong and beyond which we have nothing to hope for? As we 
ask ourselves why we make the efforts we do and wonder whether 
it is all just a matter of eating, working, sleeping and defecating and 
then doing it all again day after day - even if it is enlivened by joy 
and love from time to time - we can easily be led to the thought 
that it is all meaningless. Albert Camus' (1913-60) famous image 
of the ancient Greek mythical figure Sisyphus comes to mind here. 
For offending the gods, Sisyphus was condemned for all eternity 
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to the task of pushing a large boulder up a hill, only to have it roll 
down again so that he has to push it back up, and so on indefinitely. 
Camus presents this as an ultimately meaningless existence and as a 
metaphor for modern human life. In the face of such meaningless-
ness we have to create our own purpose in life. Although Camus did 
not advocate this, many of us hope to be part of something more 
significant than everyday life. 
We also want to believe in morality. What bad people do -
whether it be robbing, killing or raping other people - fills us with 
dread and loathing and so we condemn it as morally bad. But is 
this just an expression of our fear and loathing, or is it a judge-
ment based on some rational moral reality? Is it just that ·we disap-
prove of them, or are such actions really wrong in themselves? That 
we might not have an answer to these questions also fills us with 
anxiety. We want our moral beliefs to be soundly based so that they 
can be enforceable and provide the touchstone against which the 
moral quality of a human life can be measured. 
We are curious but fallible beings. We engage in the pursuit of 
knowledge and understanding not just in order to give ourselves 
technological control over nature but also to answer deep questions 
about the very nature of reality. Why is there something rather than 
nothing? What is the origin of the universe? What, if anything, lies 
beyond it? Does time have a beginning or an end? Because we are 
beings who can reflect on being, we cannot avoid thinking about 
the very origins of being. (The word "being" should be read as a verb 
in these last two iterations.) 
We wonder too about beauty. The transformation of our envi-
ronment through technology, and our mundane everyday lives 
with our regimens of work, rest and pragmatic concerns, seems 
to leave little room for beauty. And yet we crave it. Whether in 
the form of wild nature or in the form of art, we need the enrich-
ment that beauty can bring. Even our popular entertainments take 
us into a realm of the imagination, mythology and meaning that 
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enriches our lives and Without which we would suffer cultural 
impoverishment. 
And we are also anxious about our identities. I do not mean 
that we have doubts about the name and other details that appear 
on our passports or driving licences. I mean that we need a sense 
of belonging in _our communities. We need to know who we are 
in terms of our ethnicity, religious affiliation, nationality, language 
group or gender. We need to know that our identity is respected by 
others. I have already mentioned this· in the context of our po lit-
-ical anxieties, but this is also a spiritual anxiety in the sense that 
it strikes at the very depths of our being. Our belonging to the 
community in which we live is not just a matter of being accepted 
as a functional contributor to that community or of being loved by 
other members of it - especially our families. It is also a matter of 
our feeling an identification with the stories and traditions of that 
community, with its beliefs, rituals and practices, with its language 
and customs. Our communities define who we are. 
Because we are fragile and vulnerable we also need healing. By 
"healing" I don't just mean health and the healthcare services that 
would maintain it. I have discussed these in Chapter 3. I now allude 
to a deeper notion of healing or health captured by the, admittedly 
vague, notion of "wholeness': It is not insignificant that the words 
"health': "healing" and "wholeness" have the same etymology. We 
are not only anxious about our physical health and wellbeing in 
the sense of the absence of disease or injury; we also want to be 
strong and capable. Again, there is more to this than just the phys-
ical dimension. We want to be internally strong. We don't want to 
be in conflict with ourselves and be controlled by unruly appetites. 
We are anxious about our spiritual health and wellbeing. This might 
take the moral form of being ~oncerned about not being guilty of 
any moral failures or of being virtuous in the ways that our commu-
nities admire, or it might take the aesthetic form of being at peace 
with oneself and noble in the way one presents oneself to the world. 
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We are anxious to be free of such spiritual ailments as vices, fears, 
hatreds and resentments: a form of freedom that, once again, takes 
us beyond the political sphere. 
We are also anxious not to be alone. I do not mean just that we 
do not want to be isolated and that we want to have the company 
of others around us. It is possible to be spiritually alone even in a 
crowded room. We need connection with others. We need accept-
ance and love. We need to feel understood in what we think and 
even admired in what we do. Most of all we need someone to be 
the object of the supplication that I have argued is implicit in hope. 
It is when others meet these needs and respond to our anxieties in 
this way that we can be said to be truly happy. 
Last, we are anxious about justice. I suggested in Chapter 2 that 
our fundamental quest in life was to live well, with and for others, 
in a society marked by justice. If this is right then justice is a deeply 
held value, the possible denial of which, either for ourselves or for 
others, fills us with dread. We don't want to be treated unfairly. The 
idea of justice here connects with that of morality. We think it just 
if good people prosper and bad people do not. If we see bad people 
flourishing we are inclined to think that things are not ordered as 
they should be. Somehow those bad people must get their comeup-
pance. The quest for justice is also a response to human suffering. 
We find it hard to accept the thought that suffering can be unde-
served or that it cannot help us attain a just reward. Suffering would 
seem to be without purpose and it strikes anyone as if by chance. 
Surely it must be part of a system in which those who suffer without 
apparent reason are recompensed. 
The central characteristic of these anxieties - and the reason 
I call them spiritual anxieties - is that they take us beyond our 
everyday practical existence. They take us beyond our pursuit of 
everyday needs and projects: our jobs, families and friends. We are 
not now concerned with earning a living or cleaning leaves out of 
our gutters but with finding meaning and depth in our lives. In this 
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sense, what we are focused on is transcendence: the overcor:ning of 
the everyday. The notion of "transcendence" can be used to describe 
the objects of our innate and pre-conscious hopefulness. But in so 
far as our hopefulness is pre-conscious and pre-intentional - in so 
far as we are not fully aware of the objects it is directed upon or the 
goals it pursues - we can only use this term as a vague signifier to 
gesture towards the inchoate objects of our spiritual quest. 
Metaphysical hope 
However, many people and many cultural traditions are not satis-
fied with this vagueness. They want to give specificity, concreteness 
and a firm reality to these objects. And so they create metaphysics. 
The word "metaphysics" comes from the ancient Greek terms 
"meta': meaning "beyond': and "physis': meaning "matter': So the 
term refers to any object of thought or emotion that is taken to be 
beyond this physical and material world in some way. Philosophers 
use the term in a variety of technical ways, but I use it to refer to 
entities whose existence cannot be apprehended with our ordinary 
senses or by our rational understanding. Such entities might include 
ghosts, angels, souls and fairies, as well as non-personal entities or 
forces such as the influence that astrology claims the stars have on 
human personality. In his 2004 speech, Obama referred to "a belief 
in things not seen': He did not say what he meant but, given the 
depth of religious faith present in much of American society, we 
can assume he was referring to events produced by the providence 
of God. In speaking of metaphysical hope, therefore, I am seeking to 
understand the kind of hope that many people place in such super-
natural entities as God, or angels, or a life after death. 
Once again it will help to refer to a specific example. It concerns 
that great philosopher of ancient Athens Socrates (469-399 BCE). 
He has been condemned to death on a charge of trying to disa-
107 
Hope 
buse young people of their traditional beliefs in the gods. He is 
in prison and will soon be given hemlock to drink, a potion that 
will kill him. He is surrounded by a number of friends,_ including 
Cebes and Simmias, whom he has been trying to comfort with 
rational arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. As well 
he has tried to reassure them that, despite the condemnation it has 
brought him, the life of philosophy is a noble and worthy one. And 
then this highly rational man, who has indeed used reason to cast 
doubt on the ancient mythologies of Athens, engages in a most 
remarkable speculation about the destiny of his soul after death. 
He describes a wondrous world in which the air is pure, the forests 
glorious and the waters clean. There are rivers of fire, water and 
-mud and the souls of the departed are ushered by guardian spirits 
to those waters and lakes that they deserve as reward or punish-
ment for the way they have lived their lives. The souls of those 
who have made wisdom their goal will live in beautiful mansions 
and will commune with others of similar spirit, unconfined and 
elevated. And then he says something so important as to be worth 
quoting in full: 
The reasons which we already described provide ground 
enough, as you can see, Simmias, for leaving nothing undone 
to attain during life some measure of goodness and wisdom; 
for the prize is glorious and the hope great. ... Of course, no 
reasonable man ought to insist that the facts are exactly as I 
have described them. But that either this or something very 
like it is a true account of our souls and their future habita-
tions - since we have clear evidence that the soul is immortal 
- this, I think, is both a reasonable contention and a belief 
worth risking; for the risk is a noble one. We should use such 
accounts to inspire ourselves with confidence; and that is why 
I have already drawn out my tale so long. 
(Phaedo 114b-115c) 
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Soon after this, Socrates bathes, drinks the poison and dies. 
What are we to make of this story? Some elements of it are 
familiar. The idea that good souls are rewarded after death and that 
bad souls are punished in ways commensurate with their faults is an 
idea taught by most of the world's great religions. Socrates uses this 
thought to justify the love of goodness and wisdom that marks the 
life of a philosopher. Moreover, the hope that Socrates entertains is 
given a specific and concrete object; namely, continuing existence 
in a beautiful place reserved for those who have attained wisdom. 
But what I am most struck by is the way that Socrates openly admits 
that he holds such beliefs in order to give himself confidence. He is 
sustained by his hope that his life of seeking wisdom will not now 
be negated by death but will rather be rewarded in a new form of 
life. There is no worldly evidence to support this hope. He is aware 
that his story is just that: a story. He has no empirical evidence 
or rational warrant for its truth and he knows that the accounts 
given by the ancient poets and oracles are no more reliable than 
his own. And yet he tells his friends this story in order to comfort 
them and to reassure himself. He holds that such beliefs are true 
because he hopes they are true. However, he is not lying. He does 
not consciously assume that the stories are false. He genuinely takes 
them to be true. But he also knows that it is his hope that makes 
them seem true to him. He knows that he is taking them to be 
true because to do so is a risk worth taking. Without evidence to 
support the story - or to deny it - he finds a reason to believe it in 
the thought that it is a good belief to have. It encourages people to 
live well and it provides comfort as they face their deaths. So it is 
reasonable to take it to be true. This is hope rather than evidence 
providing a foundation for belief. 
Socrates is not the only philosopher to have based his faith 
on hope. Blaise Pascal (1623-62) considered that the question of 
whether God exists was not amenable to rational proof. Accordingly, 
he asks not whether it is true that God exists, but what is at stake in 
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holding such a belief. What is at stake, he says, is our eternal life in 
heaven. If we believe in God and live morally, we will be rewarded, 
whereas if we do not believe - even if we live well - we will earn 
eternal damnation. It is, therefore, best to wager on the belief that 
God does exist. If God does indeed exist, eternal life will be avail-
able to us while, if we do not believe, it will be denied us. And if God 
does not exist there will be no eternal life in his presence no matter 
what we believe or how virtuously we live our lives. So nothing will 
be lost if we do believe in him. Accordingly, to secure eternal life, 
the best bet is to believe in God's existence. And so Pascal believes. 
Here once again we can see that it is his hope for eternal life that 
drives his decision to believe. 
Kant also argued for the existence of God on the basis of hope. 
Having established what morality requires of us on the basis of pure 
reason and rationality, Kant then wonders what point there is in 
obeying the moral law. While we can know what the law requires 
of us on the basis of our own human reason, we also need some 
motivation to obey that law. This motivation can come, says Kant, 
from the thought that God will reward those who are good and 
punish those who are bad. Unless we have this thought there would 
be no point in being moral and our hopes for just rewards and 
punishments would be futile. Accordingly, Kant concludes that it 
is rational to believe in a God who is a just judge. Kant's hope for 
moral justice leads him to faith in God. 
Another philosopher to have raised such issues is S0ren 
Kierkegaard (1813-55). He too was troubled by the question of faith. 
Could it be based on either rational considerations or empirical 
evidence? Whenever he considered the teachings of the Christian 
religion, its doctrine of the incarnation and its narrative of the life of 
Jesus, he could see nothing but absurdity and contradiction. It made 
no sense to him and yet he wanted to commit himself to belief in it. 
Accordingly, he argued that such belief was based on a sheer leap of 
faith: a blind commitment that was not driven by any argument or 
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proof. It was simply a step that one took out of the depth, longing 
and hope in one's own being: out of one's subjectivity. And it was 
a step that needed to be constantly repeated so as to avoid despair. 
For Kierkegaard, hope, as the opposite of despair, drives and creates 
faith. For him, too, hope is a basic existential structure of our being 
on which our faith is based. 
One might object that there is something dishonest about these 
ways of thinking. If there is no evidence or rational argument for 
God's existence, then to decide to believe because one hopes that 
he exists is irrational. And if one's decision is motivated by hope for 
eternal reward, it is selfish and inauthentic. We shall come back to 
this complaint. 
Hopefulness as a basis for faith 
What I am suggesting is that metaphysical beliefs in supernatural 
entities such as God, life after death and eternal salvation are the 
products of our hopefulness. This is highly relevant to the under-
standing of religion. Because of our spiritual anxieties we all yearn 
for transcendence and meaning. But religion comes into being only 
when this transcendence is transformed into metaphysical entities. 
In response to our anxieties about death, for example, knowing 
that we cannot live in the biological sense for ever, we come to 
believe that there is a metaphysical life after death. It might be an 
individual existence of spiritual rapport with God, or it might be 
a bodily resurrection into a new form of collective life. It might be 
reincarnation into a form of life commensurate with the amount 
of merit we have acquired in a previous life. It might involve many 
mansions and the enjoyment of unimaginable sensual delights. But 
it will not be the end. And that is the key point. We cannot face 
the thought that death is the termination of our existence in any 
form. So we hope for something more and that hope allows us to 
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interpret the legends and myths of the past as assurances that we 
will live on. 
In response to our anxiety about Sisyphian meaninglessness, we 
posit a God who gives us a purpose and a destiny in life. Being told 
that we are made in the image of God and have a glorious destiny 
with him in heaven can make even the most humble worldly exist-
ence seem worthwhile. In the context of political ideology rather 
than religion we might posit a purpose to history or to our nation, 
class, or race so that we can feel ourselves part of something more 
grand and noble than our puny, everyday existence. I had already 
begun to explore such metaphysical hope in some of the remarks I 
made about political hope in Chapter 4. In so far as political hope 
can take messianic and millenarian forms, it is well on the way to 
becoming metaphysical and religious in nature. Such hopes can 
also be a response to our quest for meaningfulness in our lives. In 
either a political form or a religious form, we come to see our lives 
- with all their apparently trivial concerns - as the fulfilment of a 
historical or divine destiny. Those of us who are religious might 
think that we are sent to this vale of tears in order to try us, and for 
us to earn our eternal reward in heaven. Or we feel we are adding 
to the glory of God through our good deeds or by accepting his will. 
Or we are fulfilling the law of karma, or achieving our release from 
the cycle of suffering through spiritual enlightenment. Whatever 
theology we believe in, the upshot is that our lives become mean-
ingful. Moreover, we begin to see the world as where we ought to 
be. We do not quite see ourselves at home in the world with all its 
changeableness and uncertainty, but we do understand it as the 
anteroom to salvation in which we have a part to play and a destiny 
to fulfil. 
In response to our need for an objective and enforceable morality, 
thinkers have been led to hope for a universal, objective and abso-
lute set of moral norms. We have edifying stories such as that of 
God handing down the Ten Commandments to Moses. Socrates' 
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pupil Plato posits a metaphysical order of Absolute Goodness, 
which we must all participate in to be virtuous. Kant argues that 
our pure reason ca~not but disclose to us what we are commanded 
to do by the .moral law. In these and many other ways we have tried 
to allay our anxiety that anything might be permitted or that what 
the powerful can get away with will have to be deemed acceptable 
by the rest of us. 
In response to our fallibility and our quest for understanding, 
we hope for an objective and unassailable realm of truth. This hope 
led Plato to interpret the world of change and uncertainty as a pale 
copy of a more perfect world in which everything conformed to 
its essence and remained unchanging and clear for all time. The 
task of philosophy was to liberate the mind from this changeable 
and misleading world so as to see reality in the light of Truth (spelt 
with a capital "T"). It led Christian philosophers and theologians 
to interpret sacred scripture as the unerring word of God, giving 
us infallible revelation about himself and even about the natural 
world. Scientists such as Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), who dared 
to think for themselves and challenge the orthodoxy taught by the 
Church, were forced to recant under threat of torture. It led modern 
philosophers such as Rene Descartes (1596-1650) to posit a single 
indubitable proposition - "I think therefore I am" - from which all 
further certain knowledge, including of the existence of God, could 
be deduced. It led Kant to interpret knowledge as based not on 
our fallible senses alone, but on the operation of rational faculties 
that could guarantee the reliability of that knowledge. And today 
we still look to science to give us indubitable knowledge. However, 
science only ever gives us the empirically best explanation that is 
available in the context of current methodological best practice 
and of the most advanced experimental equipment. For technical, 
logical reasons, this does not amount to proof. And so, even today, 
many of us are driven to metaphysics in order to attain certainty. 
An example of this would be the idea that the universe was created 
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by an intelligent designer such as God. Because we find it hard to 
accept the uncertainty that is endemic in scientific theorizing, and 
because we want to feel at home in this world, and because we find 
it so difficult to conceive of an infinity of time, we posit a creator 
who brings the universe into being and creates everything in it, 
including intelligent life. 
Religion has always been a very effective response to our need 
for beauty. Some of the greatest architectural wonders of the 
world have been temples, mosques, cathedrals or other places of 
worship. Tombs such as the pyramids of Egypt or the Taj Mahal 
have spoken not only of respect and love for the dead but also of the 
profound religious beliefs of those who built them. Sacred music 
and the choreography of liturgical rites and ceremonies have added 
aesthetic depth to the lives of people of all classes and levels of 
education, and the stories told by religious teachers have elevated 
them above their ordinary concerns and sufferings. While these 
art forms do not contain any metaphysical elements within them-
selves - they are, after all, the product of merely human creativity 
and inspiration - they do point to a transcendent realm of meaning 
and they reinforce belief in the metaphysical entities posited by the 
religious traditions of which they are a part. 
For all the billions of people who are religious, their faith is a 
crucial component of their identities. Their religious community 
is the focus of their sense of belonging. They secure their iden-
tity and sense of belonging by participating in the rituals, prac-
tices and beliefs of their religion. They share the worldview and the 
metaphysical beliefs of their community. They dress in accordance 
with its dress codes and eat in accordance with its dietary rules. 
Priests, gurus and shamans are clothed in ritual vestments and 
wash their hands and feet before engaging in the sacred rites. There 
is much debate these days about how women in Islamic commu-
nities should dress. Questions could be asked also about why Jews 
and Muslims shun pork while Hindus refuse to eat beef. There is 
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no rational reason for these practices. In the case of the dietary 
rules, there are no nutritional or hygienic benefits to be gained. 
So why do people adhere to these practices? My theory is that it is 
a matter of affirming one's identity and sense of belonging to the 
relevant religious community. This is why it matters so much. If it 
were a rational matter, one could make the occasional exception or 
compromise on the issue if something of greater importance was 
at stake. But this does not happen. People would rather die than 
violate the relevant norms. Is this a matter of fanaticism or other 
forms of irrational pathology? No, it is a matter of affirming one's 
identity. Once again, this is not directly a metaphysical issue but, 
given that it is one that goes beyond instrumental reason and prag-
matism, it is not surprising that it is supported by beliefs that also 
go beyond everyday rationality. 
Most people today go to doctors or other suitably qualified prac-
titioners when they suffer ill health. The fact that many people seek 
"alternative medicine': however, indicates that the matter may be 
more complicated than it seems. We seek not only relief and cure, 
but also other kinds of comfort. While it may be just that alter-
native practitioners give us more of their time, we may also seek 
their help because we recognize that healing is more than just a 
physical matter. Indeed, for by far the greatest part of the history 
of humankind, and still in many places today, illness is a spiritual 
matter and what people seek when they are ill is "healing" in the 
fuller sense I have already described. Witch doctors and shamans 
are only the most obvious examples of the combination of religion 
and the healing arts that many people still believe in, and which 
was the norm in most religions in pre-modern times. Jesus was 
known as a healer, and gurus of various traditions have cured phys-
ical ailments by helping patients become one with their feelings 
and emotions. Catholics travel to Lourdes and other shrines and 
pray to their favourite saints in the pursuit of miraculous cures for 
their maladies. These practices are based on metaphysical beliefs 
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in supernatural powers that will intervene in human and physical 
events in order to provide cures. 
But there is more than physical cures at stake here. Our sense 
of being well or whole is also connected to our moral standing in 
relation to God. We want to be forgiven our sins. We want to be in 
a state of grace. We want to advance in the cycle of reincarnations 
towards enlightenment. We want to feel that the spiritual powers 
are on our side. It is clear that metaphysical beliefs are central to 
these anxieties. We even posit supernatural gifts such as "grace" in 
order to articulate our understanding of these matters. In the realm 
of interpersonal and social relations we have such notions as that of 
"fault" or "crime': but the notion of "sin" is one that takes us beyond 
the realm of the everyday. It makes an inescapable reference to the 
gods and seeks, through rituals such as that of the Catholic confes-
sional, a complete and secure solution to our spiritual anxiety to 
be healed. 
Religion also overcomes our loneliness. At a worldly level, it 
provides communities of faith through which we can form friend-
ships and fellowships with like-minded people. Religions are 
communities. But at a more metaphysical level, they provide even 
more. They give us divine friendship. Most major religions teach 
love and compassion and promise the love and compassion of God 
for us. This ensures that the overcoming of our loneliness is not jeop-
ardized by the fickle and changeable nature of human relationships. 
How comforting it is for a Christian to know that "Jesus loves me''. 
In response to the inescapability of our suffering, some religions 
teach that we should seek spiritual enlightenment and an eventual 
escape from mortal existence. Others teach that we will be recom-
pensed in the next life to the extent that our suffering in this life 
was not deserved. The key point here is that the next life - whatever 
form it takes - will be a life without suffering. But there is another 
important point here also. What we are hoping for here is not just 
release from suffering, but also justice. We think it is unfair when 
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we suffer without deserving to and we hope for redress, if not in 
this life, then in the next. 
Justice 
The mention of justice here is very important. When we hope for 
a better society or for a blessed eternal life, what we are hoping for 
deep down is justice. This is a noble hope but it can quickly take 
the excessive forms of being metaphysical or unrealistic. Knowing 
that this world is often not just - that evil people flourish while the 
righteous suffer hardship, and that natural disasters strike at the 
guilty and the innocent alike - we appeal to a metaphysical order 
in which justice can be found. We can discern such an appeal in the 
beliefs of the ancient Greeks, for example. 
Along with thinkers in many traditions around the world, such 
as Buddhism, the ancient Greek thinkers took contingency, change 
and variability to be a sign of mortality, vulnerability and imper-
fection. It was factors such as these that gave rise to suffering, war 
and death. Accordingly, it was thought best if things happen, not 
randomly and destructively, but because they should happen. And 
they should happen as they do because there is an order of necessity 
and justice that embraces and encompasses this realm of worldly 
change. It is not just that things change; it is that a supernatural or 
transcendent order of justice dictates that they change in the way 
that they do. It would be too easy and too unsophisticated to think 
of this order of justice in personal terms, as when we think of it as 
ordained by a providential God. Rather, fate or destiny was thought 
of as an impersonal force directed towards order. Everything in the 
world tends to the way it should be and even when things go wrong, 
there is natural redress and balance or punishment and reward. 
This is not unlike the law of karma of which some Eastern religious 
traditions speak, in which punishments and rewards influence our 
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future lives in a cycle of reincarnation. These beliefs speak of an iron 
law of destiny that humans cannot escape, and which ensures that 
the whole cosmos has the moral quality of justice. 
While this may sound like a very poetic and somewhat enchanted 
way of seeing the world, it is remarkable how tenaciously it is held 
in some form or another even by people in modern times. How 
often have you heard someone say "That was meant to happen"? 
Most often such a statement is made about some unlikely event 
that has proved either fortunate or unfortunate, and the speaker, 
in uttering it, is accepting it into their lives. Whether or not they 
consider themselves to be expressing a highly sophisticated meta-
physical idea, the implication of the statement is that fate, destiny 
or some providential, supernatural power has caused this event to 
happen in a way that is meaningful or beneficial to them. If it was 
meant to happen, then someone or something meant it to happen. 
If this someone was not God, then perhaps it was fate or destiny. 
Either way we cannot but accept it as being for the best. If we see 
the event as the result of a divine ordinance, of providence, or of a 
purposeful destiny, we can find some meaning in it that will help 
us accept it no matter how unfortunate its effects are. When we say 
that it was meant to happen we don't only mean that it could not 
have been prevented, but also that what happened is what should 
have happened. Some metaphysical order ensured and required 
that it should happen and so its happening is good. 
The contrasting position would be that the event happened by 
chance. This might still lead us to accept it. After all, the event 
happened and nothing can be done to undo its effects. But thinking 
of it as the result of pure chance does seem to rob the event of any 
overarching meaning or goodness. Chance is blind and purpose-
less. To see the event as the result of chance - as a genuine accident 
- denies us any easy consolation. 
Another variation of how these ancient beliefs linger even in 
modern life is how we often react to bad luck. If we are the victim 
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of a serious illness, or of an accident that causes us an injury, we 
might say something like "It's just not fair': What we mean by this 
is not only that it should not have happened, but that it offends 
against a standard of what we deserve to have happen to us. It's not 
just unfortunate: it's an offence against justice. But against whom or 
what are we making this complaint? Is there a supernatural power 
that ensures that only those things happen that should happen, or 
that everyone gets only what they deserve? Is this unfortunate acci-
dent a departure from the proper order of things? Is my injury an 
offence against the cosmic order of justice? Do I deserve better? 
Can I claim what I think I deserve from the cosmos itself? It would 
be irrational to say so, and yet we do. When we are struck down we 
ask "Why did this happen to me?" as if we thought that there must 
be a reason or a purpose for everything that happens. But whose 
purpose would this be? Who or what decides what we deserve 
from the natural and unpredictable causality of events? We can 
only hope that these questions have an answer and this hope leads 
us to believe that they do. 
The New Atheists and the validity of faith 
That metaphysical beliefs are an expression of deep hopefulness is 
a point missed by today's so-called "New Atheists': I refer particu-
larly to Richard Dawkins, who argues that belief in God is irrational. 
He also argues that it is socially harmful and has caused great evils 
throughout the history of humankind, but I want to focus on the 
first point. Dawkins argues not only that there is no evidence for the 
existence of God, but also that all the allegedly rational arguments 
for his existence do not work. Moreover, all the ways in which God 
or other supernatural agencies have been used to explain extraordi-
nary events can be shown to be unnecessary, and adequate natural 
explanations can be put in their place. Dawkins is thinking like the 
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scientist he is. A scientist seeks to explain natural phenomena by 
positing explanatory hypotheses and then testing them against the 
facts or against experimental results. Approaching the world in this 
way leads to the inescapable conclusion that positing God as an 
explanatory agency is bad science and has no rational warrant. The 
big bang is a better explanation for the existence of the universe 
than a highly mysterious creation out of nothing on the part of God. 
After all, how can he be there when there is nothing? And evolu-
tion is a better explanation for the existence of humankind than 
God's creation of Adam and Eve. Why, if he created us, did he make 
us such vulnerable, troubled and imperfect beings? Accordingly, 
Dawkins concludes that belief in a creator God is unnecessary and 
irrational. In the realm of belief and reason, then, there is no place 
for metaphysical agencies. In the world constituted by our cognitive 
faculties there is no need for God. 
Dawkins is correct in his argument. If we approach the world 
and our existence in it in the spirit of science we will not find God. 
But this discounts the role of hope. I would argue that faith in God 
is not based on rational argument or evidence. It is not produced 
by our cognitive faculties. It is produced by hope. In order to make 
this plausible l need to revisit the distinction between the cognitive 
faculties and the motivational faculties that I discussed in Chapters 
1 and 2. We saw there that many philosophers group our psycho-
logical states under the two headings of beliefs and desires, and 
argue that our beliefs need to be rational and based on evidence 
while our desires could give expression to our deepest motivations 
and feelings. This distinction between beliefs and desires allows us 
to focus on beliefs as purely cognitive states and then to say that 
there is no evidential or rational ground for belief in God. In their 
various ways, Socrates, Pascal, Kant, Kierkegaard and Dawkins 
all agree with this. But they draw different conclusions. Dawkins 
concludes that there is no God, while Socrates, Pascal, Kant and 
Kierkegaard respond by turning to our motivational faculties and 
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that species of desire and wish that I have called hope. For them 
it is not a purely cognitive or scientific question but an emotional 
and motivational one. They believe in God because they hope, not 
because they are forced to by empirical evidence or rational proofs. 
However, this reintroduces my earlier question. Can this be 
authentic? Isn't this a case of believing something because you want 
to even when there is no reason to? Is it a case of self-deception? 
Is it dishonest? Militant atheists will answer these questions in 
the affirmative and claim that the hopes of religious believers are 
motivated by fantasy or desire. Their faith is mere wishful thinking. 
Belief in God is a delusion created by the fantasy that there is an 
all-powerful and loving creator who will resolve all of our spiritual 
anxieties. But the atheists' claim cannot be justified. It is made by 
someone who does not believe and it emanates from the atheist 
way of interpreting the world and everything that happens in it. 
To justify it would require a proof that God does not exist and this 
would turn the issue into a matter of empirical fact. However, God's 
being is metaphysical and that means it is beyond our cognitive and 
rational grasp. There is no scientific, empirical or rational way of 
deciding either way whether God exists. Accordingly, there is room 
for a hermeneutic al decision as to how one will interpret the world. 
The atheist chooses to understand the world without a metaphys-
ical dimension, while the believer chooses to understand it with 
such a dimension. The atheist assumes there is no God and inter-
prets the world accordingly. As a result, he will interpret the faith 
of religious believers as a delusion. The believer, in the meantime, 
assumes that God does exist and interprets the world in accord-
ance with that belief. For the believer the atheist is the misguided 
one. The atheist, in accusing the believer of being delusional and 
entertaining a fantasy, assumes that the belief in God is false. And 
the believer, in defending his faith with argument and demonstra-
tion, assumes that the atheist's belief is false. But these assump-
tions cannot be justified either way. The physical and social facts 
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are plain for all to see. The world is the way it is. It is the interpre-
tations that differ. 
Take a rainbow. The scientist sees it as the result of light rays 
refracting off moisture particles. The layman sees it as a thing of 
beauty. The believer sees it as a promise from God that he will 
never again punish humanity by drowning. Whatever we make of 
it, however, the rainbow is what it is. All the rest is interpretation. 
Let us use a further example to understand how our hopes influ-
ence our interpretations. You may hope and pray that your football 
team wins a particular match, but if it scores fewer goals than the 
opposing team it will have lost. No amount of hoping and wishing 
on your part is going to change that. The game is over and your 
team lost. It would be irrational and mad to believe that they won 
just because you hoped so fervently that they would have. This is 
true, but it is not an entirely apt analogy for religious faith. In this 
case there is a fact of the matter that we can all apprehend: the score 
at the end of the match. This is an objective fact that resolves any 
disagreement and removes any delusion on the issue. But as regards 
God there is no fact of the matter that we can all apprehend. At the 
factual and empirical level the world of the believer looks exactly 
the same as the world of the non-believer. The sun rises and sets, 
the seasons come and go, people live and die, people help or harm 
each other, and everything that happens simply happens. It is the 
way that this is understood and the way it is felt that differs. The 
believer does not believe something against the evidence in the 
way that the deluded football fan believes his team won when it is 
a clear fact that it lost. The believer believes that God exists, has 
created this world and promises him eternal life by seeing the world 
in that way. In this way of seeing the world, what happens is seen 
as an expression of God's providence or even of his miraculous 
interventions. The believer is making what I called in Chapter 2 a 
"hermeneutic" claim. The believer interprets the world as a God-
created place, history as a God-guided process, and her life as a 
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God-given opportunity to earn an eternal reward. For his part, 
the atheist interprets the world as a natural phenomenon, where 
things simply happen as they do because of the laws of nature or 
the inclinations of human beings, and where we give those events 
the most authentic transcendent-but-secular meanings that we can. 
The facts are not different for either position. It is the ways those 
facts are interpreted that differ. 
The next question, then, is: what drives these various inter-
pretations? Is it reason and empirical evidence or is it hope? My 
response would be to say that this is a false dichotomy. Believing 
that life is a God-given opportunity to earn an eternal reward 
would be an inauthentic and irrational case of believing something 
just because one wants to, if belief and desire were separate facul-
ties able to influence each other motivationally or causally. Then 
it would be a case of desire dictating to belief and urging it to be 
irrational. It would be one part of subjectivity dictating to another 
part of subjectivity in a way that traditional philosophy would find 
objectionable. On the traditional view, it should be reason that 
dictates to desire and hope, rather than the other way round. On 
this view, the cognitive faculties, of which reason is king, should 
rule over our emotional and motivational faculties with all their 
desires, wishes and hopes. But we should think of these facul-
ties differently. Reason and desire are not separate. Belief and 
hopefulness are not sharply distinct. We are unified beings, not 
comprising separate faculties that are in conflict with each other, 
but possessing a unifying integrity. Desire and reason cannot be 
delineated as separate faculties. Our desire is inextricably bound 
up with our reason. My notion of subjectivity captures this unity 
by suggesting that our hidden currents of hopefulness and desire 
come to expression in our thinking and action. Accordingly, faith 
and hope cannot be distinguished by attributing them to reason 
and desire, respectively. They belong together: hopefulness inspires 
faith and faith inspires hope. 
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Certainly the delusional football fan would be wrong to believe 
something only because he wanted it to be true when there is 
evidence against it. But where there is no clear evidence it is the way 
we interpret events that matters, and these interpretations can be 
motivated by our hopefulness. Suppose the umpire awards a free kick 
to an opposing player for a foul against one of our team. Whatever 
happened is what happened, but it can be interpreted in various 
ways. We may interpret it as a bit of staging on the part of the other 
team while the umpire sees it as a foul committed by our player. This 
is not a clear empirical judgement as it would be when the umpire 
judges that the ball is in or out of the field of play. To judge an action 
to be a foul is to attribute an intention to the offending player. But 
who can know his intentions besides himself? Accordingly, for the 
umpire and for the fans, it is a matter of interpretation. If we debated 
the matter with the umpire we might never agree. It is only because 
the rules of the game give the umpire the final say in such matters 
that the game can go on and that a team can lose even as the result 
of what might seem to be an unfair decision. So far as the rules of 
the game are concerned, the only thing that matters is the umpire's 
interpretation. The outrage felt by supporters of the losing team -
based as it is on their interpretation of what happened - makes no 
difference to the outcome. My first point, then, is that an interpre-
tation of the event is a belief that is constructed from what is seen 
to have happened and also from the biases and hopes of the various 
observers. The other team's supporters interpret the incident as a 
foul on the part of our player, we interpret it as a "dive" on the part 
of their player, and the umpire interprets it as an unlawful interfer-
ence with the other team's player. There is no impartial or "scientific" 
court of appeal. Not even a video replay can decide the issue in the 
way it can decide whether a ball is in or out, because whatever the 
video shows would still need to be interpreted. My second point is 
that, in the football example, it is the umpire's authority that decides 
the issue rather than the facts. 
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These two points apply to religious beliefs as well. Against 
Dawkins, I argue that there is no objective and scientific fact of the 
matter that can decide whether God exists or whether our hopes 
for an eternal life and religious meanings are sound. Like one's 
support for a football team, such beliefs are hermeneutic frame-
works through which we interpret the world. Unlike the football 
case, however, we do not have an umpire to decide the issue when 
we are in dispute. Some people believe in God and others do not. It 
is not for science or for the spokespersons of the scientific method 
to decide who is right, and it is not for believers to decide who 
is right. There is no objectively correct view. There are only the 
various views that are motivated by the various spiritual anxieties 
that we all have. Those who hope for eternal life and for religious 
meaning will tend to believe in God and those who do not harbour 
such hopes will not. There is neither a fact nor an umpire to decide 
who is right. And so, from an epistemological point of view, it is 
quite legitimate to hold metaphysical beliefs such as a belief in God. 
There are many other ways in which our hopes and desires 
legitimately influence our beliefs. We pursue knowledge in those 
areas that interest us. Today's scientific achievements are driven by 
curiosity and by the desire for technological progress. Our under-
standing of our cultures and ways of life is driven by our empathy 
with others and by our pursuit of meaning in our lives. In much 
the same way our religious faith is driven by our hope. This is not 
dishonest because it is not one part of the self deceiving another. 
It is not desire manipulating belief into adopting an irrational 
stance. It is a unified and integral stance taken by subjectivity in 
its comportment towards the world. We see the world through 
the eyes of our faith and through the rose-coloured glasses of our 
hopefulness. This is a commitment that can be authentic. As such, 
being told by Dawkins that there is no rational warrant for such 
beliefs is beside the point. The truly religious person knows that 
already. Like Socrates, Pascal, Kant and Kierkegaard, she knows 
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that she does not believe because of evidence, but because seeing 
the world and her own existence through the eyes of faith can be 
the most profound expression of her deepest hopes and of her quest 
for transcendence. 
This point allows me now to explain why Aquinas was only 
partly right when he argued that faith precedes hope. For him, as 
we saw in the Introduction, we must first believe in God so that 
this belief can give us grounds to hope for eternal life with him. But 
this point can be challenged by asking: do we hope because we have 
faith; or do we have faith because we hope? Aquinas answers the 
first of these questions in the affirmative when he says that we can 
hope because we have faith. In contrast, I have argued that we have 
faith because we hope. Our hope for salvation and for transcendent 
meanings leads us to believe in a God who can provide them to us. 
So how could it be said both that faith inspires hope and that 
hope inspires faith? There seems to be a dialectical relation between 
the two. We can make these claims consistent by seeing that this 
dialectic between hope and faith operates on different levels of 
consciousness. I argued in Chapter 2 that, in the form of hopeful-
ness, hope is a pre-conscious, pre-intentional aspect of our subjec-
tivity of which we are not normally aware. Our hopefulness is a 
comportment towards the world that structures the way we see 
that world. My world is always already a lived environment that is 
coloured by my hopefulness. Accordingly, I would suggest that it is 
our hopefulness that inspires faith. However, I am not readily aware 
that my hopefulness motivates my faith. Consequently, I take my 
faith to be the primary phenomenon of which I am aware. This is 
why Aquinas is able to say that my faith comes first and gives me a 
warrant for hoping for salvation. This is the sequence of psycholog-
ical states of which I am aware. My point, however, is that beneath 
the level of my awareness it is an inchoate and pre-conscious form 
of hopefulness in relation to salvation that motivates me to have 
that faith. Accordingly, it is my implicit hopefulness that leads to 
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religious faith and this faith, in turn, inspires such explicit meta-
physical hopes as my hope for salvation. 
An analysis of metaphysical hope 
I can now use my ten-point analysis of hope and hopefulness to 
explicate such metaphysical forms of hope as are illustrated by 
religious beliefs. As to the first of those ten points, I have already 
described the spiritual anxieties and needs, and our quest for a 
meaningful transcendence of everyday life, which constitute our 
hopefulness. And I have suggested that this hopefulness issues 
in metaphysical beliefs and religious faith for most of the world's 
people. 
Second, we judge that what we hope for metaphysically is good. 
It goes without saying that eternal life, the meaningfulness of our 
lives, the firmness of morality, the intelligibility of the universe, 
beauty, our sense of identity and belonging, our sense of wholeness, 
the overcoming of our loneliness and suffering, and the securing of 
justice will be seen as being of positive value. Of course, people from 
other traditions and communities may not agree that the specific 
forms that these values take in our communities are good, and we 
may not agree that their take on these things are as good as ours, 
but we will all feel that the solutions that our religion offers to our 
spiritual anxieties are the best ones. It would seem that conflict can 
arise from these differences of perspective. And the tragedy is that, 
in so far as these conflicts rest on differing metaphysical beliefs, and 
in so far as metaphysical beliefs are not subject to rational appraisal, 
such conflicts between different traditions may be irresolvable. 
Third, metaphysical hope's object is an occurrence that is consid-
ered to be possible. Religions tell different stories about their gods, 
their foundations and their prophets. The details and the names 
may differ from one religious tradition to another, but the central 
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elements seem to be shared by all of the major faiths around the 
world. Believers take these stories to be possible, while atheists do 
not. For believers, the scope of what is possible is wider than it 
is for those who adopt the secular worldview. Central to religious 
faith is belief in miracles. Whether it be the parting of the Red Sea 
to allow the escape of the Hebrews from Egypt, the resurrection of 
Jesus from the dead, the bodily ascension of Mary into heaven, the 
night journey (Isra and Mi'raj) of Muhammad to Jerusalem on the 
wings of an angel, or any of the many miracles ascribed to saints 
and mythical heroes, the religious believer lives in a world that 
contains a vastly expanded range of possibilities. Such a believer 
is therefore able to hope for much more than can a person with a 
secular outlook. 
Fourth, one would expect that metaphysical hope's object would 
be an occurrence that is considered not to be inevitable. Just as 
worldly hope is made feasible by the belief that what is hoped for 
may or may not happen, one would expect that metaphysical hope 
acknowledges that what it hopes for is not inevitable. However, 
this does not seem to be true in the context of metaphysical beliefs. 
I have said that what we hope for is an escape from the fragile, 
vulnerable, fallible and mortal condition of being human. This hope 
leads us to seek safety, security, amelioration of the material condi-
tions of life, cognitive certainty, moral rectitude and life after death. 
But what all this represents is precisely an attempt at escape from 
contingency. Contingency means that nothing is predetermined. 
Nothing is fated or preordained. Nothing is immune to change or 
transformation. Nothing can be absolutely depended on, not even 
the promises of a God. But these contingencies of life are what 
metaphysical hope seeks to overcome. In Chapter 1 I argued that 
we can be genuine in our hope for things only if we take those 
things not to be inevitable. John would not hope that it would 
not rain if he thought either that rain was inevitable or that it was 
completely impossible. He can hope for it not to rain because he 
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knows that the occurrence of rain is contingent: it might or it might 
not happen. But when we move to the realm of metaphysics, we 
are talking about hopes that have a greater dimension of ultimacy. 
What we long for is certainty and absoluteness. We want assurance 
and guarantees. We cannot abide the thought that things might 
happen by chance. Perhaps it is because the world as we know it 
cannot offer us such certainty and such guarantees that our hope 
leads us to believe in a metaphysical realm of reality in which all 
contingency is overcome. 
This is another example of the dialectical relation between hope 
and faith that I mentioned in connection with Aquinas. Our explicit 
hope is for things that we take to be contingent. But our deeper and 
less conscious hopefulness is that things not be contingent. This 
deeper hopefulness gives rise to faith in truths and realities that 
are indubitable, universal, certain and eternal. This faith is, then, 
an attempt to overcome the uncertainties and fallibilities of actual 
human life by appealing to absolute realities in which all contin-
gency is overcome. The real world is full of contingencies. And so 
we conceive of a metaphysical world in which those contingen-
cies are replaced by the unquestionable will of the gods or of fate 
and destiny. We crave a world in which what happens is what was 
meant to happen. 
Fifth, metaphysical hope is directed towards the future as 
conceived by the person who hopes. Once again, this point has 
been implicitly covered already. The point to add is that, at the 
metaphysical level, our hope is that our future is unlimited. We 
want to be immortal. At one level this is a fantasy, but at another 
it is a perfectly natural sentiment. Most people do not want to die. 
The songs of slaves that Obama referred to in his speech include 
hymns about "crossing Jordan" or going to the promised land. They 
express a belief in a blissful life ahead, in which our sufferings will 
be left behind and we will meet our deceased loved ones again in 
heaven. All the metaphysical entities that we conjure into being 
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with our imagination and with our interpretations of worldly events 
speak to us of a glorious future: life after death, angels to lead us 
to the heavenly gates, God with his indubitable promise of eternal 
reward, even hell, that ultimate and inescapable punishment for 
those who are evil. Many religious traditions speak of a last judge-
ment in which God will separate the sheep from the goats and 
reward the former with eternal bliss. These events are all envis-
aged as existing in our futures and in a realm different from our 
current existence in this vale of tears. Even Buddhism, which does 
not believe in God as a supernatural person, includes some tradi-
tions that believe in a future salvation for all. These traditions speak 
of a "Maitreya Buddha': who will come to teach us all enlightenment 
in a distant future. 
Messianism, millenarianism and belief in a second coming are 
further expressions of this future-orientation of metaphysical hope. 
There are many who believe that their god will return to this world 
in order to usher in a new time of glory and peace in which all 
conflicts will be resolved. And it is not only the major world reli-
gions that propagate such beliefs. The Manseren cult, or Koreri 
movement, which flared up from time to time over many years on 
the island of Biak-Numfor on the northern coast of West Papua 
was centred on belief in an ancestor called Manseren Mangundi, 
whose birth was magical and who taught his people their tradi-
tional ways. However, he was disappointed in them and was said to 
have departed to the west whence he would return when the time 
was right. Every now and then, the people of Biak are stirred by 
prophets or konors to believe that the time is indeed right and that 
they should burn their houses and crops and kill their pigs in antici-
pation of the great gifts of cargo and food that Manseren will bring 
on his return. When the Christian missionaries came, this legend 
was assimilated with the story of Jesus and the promise of his return 
after the apocalypse. Moreover, just as konors were believed to 
be able to heal the sick and protect their people from sorcery, so 
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Jesus was accepted as an oracle and healer of great magical power. 
During the Second World War, prophets mixed all these magical 
and messianic beliefs together to encourage the people to rise up 
against the Dutch and then the Japanese in order to reaffirm their 
t~aditional customs, restore their ancient beliefs and usher in the 
return of Manseren. Such prophets taught that their oppressors' 
bullets would turn to water and that their own spears would turn 
into rifles on the appointed day. As a result some five hundred of 
their followers were gunned down by the Japanese. 
Nor were such beliefs unique to West Papua. In the Fifth Xhosa 
War of 1819 in South Africa, a prophet arose named Makana, who 
promised his Xhosa tribal followers that the British bullets fired 
against them would turn to water. The cult of Jon Frum on the 
island of Tanna, in what is today Vanuatu, is but one of many cargo 
cults that exist in the Pacific, which hope for magical gifts of goods 
and wealth that the indigenous peoples have seen arriving from 
overseas for the Europeans. It is frequently believed that this cargo 
comes from the power of the Bible and that the missionaries have 
not given indigenous peoples all of the information that the Bible 
contains in order to withhold the cargo from them. For many years, 
adherents of the Jon Frum cult built airstrips and wooden towers 
in imitation of American practices during the war in order to allow 
the cargo to arrive. They even destroyed their own goods so as to 
make way for the wealth that they believed would come to them if 
they lived in the ways their indigenous prophets preached. 
The role that hope plays in these beliefs and practices will be 
obvious. Their orientation is clearly towards the future, a future 
that is more a construction of hope and faith than it is a predic-
tion based on a sound understanding of the present. These beliefs 
may be rational within the worldview of these traditional commu-
nities but, objectively, the futures that they envisage remain unat-
tainable. Given that these communities were subject to disruption 
of their ways of life owing to colonialism and the new belief systems 
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preached by missionaries, and given that they can see the power 
and affluence of their oppressors, the beliefs that their hopes for 
a better life inspire will seem rational to them. The tragedies that 
their hopes can lead to could be avoided only by adopting an objec-
tive stance that is uninfluenced by the hopes that these communi-
ties reasonably entertain. But if desire and reason together create a 
unified worldview - if hopefulness inspires faith - then members 
of these communities could not readily access a separate, objective, 
critical faculty of reason with which to evaluate their beliefs. 
Seventh, metaphysical hope is directed at circumstances over 
which the person hoping does not have complete control. The 
believer hopes for the blessings of heaven and for eternal salvation. 
Clearly, these are not matters over which the believer can exer-
cise control. It is part of what defines a god that he or she cannot 
be controlled by human beings. Indeed, many theologians warn 
us against the presumption of thinking that we can influence the 
gods to intervene in our lives through our rituals, sacrifices and 
prayers. Nevertheless, there are many believers who do not heed this 
warning. As I noted in Chapter 1, prayer is often seen as an attempt 
to secure favours and help from a god who must then be believed to 
be concerned for us in such mundane ways. If we thought we could 
get what we wanted from the gods just be asking for it, there would 
be no need to hope for those benefits. We could just secure them 
by engaging in the appropriate ritual of supplication. As Aquinas 
reminds us, however, salvation is difficult and arduous to obtain. It is 
for this reason that we must hope for it even as we work towards it. 
Eighth, metaphysical hope ought to lead to appropriate action 
when such action is available on the part of the person who hopes. 
So far as the religious forms of metaphysical hope are concerned, 
this leads us to commit ourselves to the many practices, rituals and 
observances that religion ordains. Whether it is dietary laws, codes 
of dress, attendance at church or the mosque, the giving of alms or 
the observance of holy days, religion is as much about practice as it 
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is about belief. This point is missed by those critics of religion who 
lampoon Jewish and Muslim prohibitions against eating pork, for 
example, on the grounds that any beliefs about health and diet on 
which such rules are based are primitive and unscientific. As I have 
already suggested, this prohibition is not imposed for the sake of 
health and diet. Its purpose is the felt need to express one's religious 
hope and faith and affirm one's identity. Once one is a member of a 
particular religious tradition, the rules laid down by that tradition 
are to be followed so that one can reasonably hope for the meta-
physical rewards that that tradition offers and so that one can iden-
tify oneself with that tradition. It is quite arbitrary what such rules 
might be. For Hindus it is not eating beef, for Jews and Muslims it is 
not eating pork, for Catholics it is fasting in Lent, and so on. There 
is no worldly or scientific rationale for any of these rules, although 
there might be sociological explanations for how they came about. 
They are simply a way of demonstrating a devotee's membership 
and of legitimizing the hopes that adherents can then have for their 
salvation. No such hope would be genuine if one were not prepared 
to do something towards achieving it. But in so far as the hope is 
metaphysical, there is nothing of a purely worldly or rational nature 
that one can do to merit its fulfilment. 
Ninth, metaphysical hope has the psychological structure of 
supplication. This point is the key to everything that has been said 
so far. We hope for an alleviation of the burdens of the human 
condition and so we appeal to a metaphysical power to save us. Our 
hope is a supplication. It then moves on to create an interpretative 
framework that allows us to see the whole of human reality through 
rose-coloured glasses, in which the rose colouring is created by 
religious belief. This then presents us with a world that contains 
just those meanings and reassurances which answer to our spiritual 
anxieties and metaphysical supplications. 
Last, and tenth, metaphysical hope ought to be rational and real-
istic. We can see from everything that has been said so far that 
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there is now considerable pressure on seeing what could be meant 
by "rational and realistic" in the context of metaphysical hope. 
Dawkins doesn't see any of it as rational and realistic. But his defi-
nition of what this means is set by the scientific worldview and its 
methods of enquiry. Will this worldview serve us here? Scientific 
rationality is immensely valuable in the realm of worldly concerns, 
but it may not be appropriate in the realm of metaphysical hope. 
As we noted with reference to the sometimes bizarre beliefs of 
colonized peoples, hope generates beliefs that can seem rational 
to those who hold them even when they are mortally dangerous. 
For a Jewish or Muslim religious believer it makes perfect sense to 
shun pork. For religious believers more generally it makes perfect 
sense to believe in gods, angels and souls. Theology is the academic 
discipline whose task it is to make sense of these things. Despite 
the many contradictions and absurdities that religious dogmas 
seem to present to non-believers, theologians are able to make 
them coherent and plausible. Of course, this only works within the 
framework of an interpretation of reality that sees it as god-created, 
that sees human life as god-directed and that believes that miracles 
are possible. Once such assumptions are made, intellectual skill will 
meet no obstacles in creating a coherent creed. In this way religious 
hope can indeed be made to seem rational and realistic to those for 
whom hopefulness has generated faith. 
Conclusion 
The question that this analysis of religion as an expression of meta-
physical hope raises is not whether religion is true, rationally justi-
fiable from an objective point of view or realistic. I shall not ask the 
questions that the New Atheists have raised. Rather, I shall raise a 
new question: is the religious expression of metaphysical hope a 
humanly valuable or worthwhile response to the fragile, vulnerable, 
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fallible and mortal condition of being human? Socrates claimed 
that the risk of believing was a noble one. But is it? We have seen 
that the differing metaphysical beliefs of various religious traditions 
can lead to conflict between them. They can also lead individuals to 
presumption and a life of fantasy. So can our hopes for transcend-
ence be fulfilled by non-metaphysical objects? Are the world itself 
and the human beings who live in it sufficiently valuable in them-
selves to be, for us, a source of consolation in the face of death, 
meaningfulness in our lives, adherence to morality, experiences of 
understanding and beauty, a sense of identity and belonging, feel-
ings of wholeness, acceptance and solidarity, and the institutions of 
justice that we all hope for? My hope is that they are. 
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Throughout this book, I have used Aristotle's framework for under-
standing virtues to make two suggestions. The first was that hope 
represented a set of attitudes, emotions and motivations that lay 
in a median position between forms of excess and forms of defi-
ciency. The extremes that virtuous hope avoids are the excesses of 
presumption and the deficiencies of despair and resignation, while 
the non-virtuous extremes of hopefulness were naivety and fantasy 
at the excessive end of the spectrum, and cynicism at the deficient 
end. People will fail to display the virtue of hope if they lack the 
confidence and hopefulness to embark on projects whose success 
cannot be guaranteed. This would be resignation and, in even more 
acute cases, despair. And people will fail to display the virtue of 
hopefulness if they lack the conviction that their projects are worth 
the effort and risk involved in being committed to them. The forms 
of excess are somewhat more various and complex. We have seen 
that one form of excess of hope is presumption, which involves 
hoping for more than is possible, expecting others to provide it, and 
making no commitment to the action that hope requires. Similarly, 
the person who is excessive in the sphere of hopefulness trusts in 
others and expects good things in the future to a naive degree. 
Such a person neither sees risks nor anticipates problems. The line 
between such excessive optimism and living a life of fantasy could 
not be easily drawn. 
But having explored hope and hopefulness in the domains of 
the clinic, of politics and of religion, I would now suggest that 
136 
Epilogue: the virtue of hope 
a further form of excess is an excess of supplication. This is the 
frame of mind in which a person places so much trust in natural 
forces, powerful people or metaphysical agencies that they relin-
quish responsibility for their own actions and their rational grasp of 
reality. Presumption, fantasy and the excesses of supplication would 
lead us to think that the universe owes us our well-being; that we 
have a claim on fate; that we deserve the good or ill that befalls us; 
and that the gods or their agents should guarantee justice to us. We 
have seen that the problematic sides of hope and hopefulness stem 
from such forms of excessive supplication. Harvey Nuland appeals 
to his brother and relinquishes responsibility for his treatment deci-
sions to him. As a result he is encouraged to hope against hope 
and his suffering is needlessly extended. In the political sphere, the 
element of supplication can lead ordinary citizens to place exces-
sive trust in charismatic political leaders who promise to realize 
their hopes. It can even facilitate the emergence of demagogues 
and tyrants. Ideological dreams of social progress can cross over 
into the sphere of metaphysical hope and encourage expectations of 
messianic deliverance from troubled times, or apocalyptic changes 
in which cosmic powers deliver the chosen ones from perdition. A 
second coming of the saviour or the restoration of a global caliphate 
would be the ultimate response to the supplication and hopes of 
a suffering people. The element of supplication is most clearly 
present in religion and other forms of metaphysical hope in that 
these are centred on supernatural beings that are believed to be able 
to deliver us from evil and assure us of our eternal salvation. For 
hope to become virtuous, therefore, it must overcome any excess 
of supplication that is inherent in it. 
The virtue of hope involves seeing the world as it is, without 
presumption, naivety, fantasy or despair. In such a world, things 
happen because they are caused to rather than because of some 
metaphysical purpose or destiny. Sometimes they happen to me 
and sometimes they happen to other people. Sometimes they are 
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to my benefit and sometimes they are not. That is just the way 
things are in this changeable world in which chance has as much 
of a role as predictable causality. Admittedly, I have some control 
over my life in that I can plan what I will do next and reduce the 
risks to my well-being. And I can ask others to help me. But my 
control is never complete. I cannot guarantee that my plans will 
come to fruition. The laws of nature are what they are and things 
just happen because of them. The virtue of hope acknowledges this 
and interprets the universe as indifferent to our needs. It refuses 
to wear any excessively rose-coloured metaphysical glasses. It sees 
that hardship, injury, deprivation and even death are simply what 
happens as a result of the laws of physics and biology. And if what 
happens is that I find myself in a situation in which I am starving, 
for example, then, from the point of view of the universe that is 
just bad luck. I do not have a claim on justice simply because I have 
an extreme need or an intense hope. I might have a claim against 
my fellow human beings and the institutions that they have set up, 
but I have no basis for a claim against the universe or the gods. It 
is not virtuous to make a claim on heaven when things go badly 
for us. 
Aristotle's schema would lead us to expect there to be a deficient 
degree of supplication in the sphere of hope as well. One could 
imagine a person who never asks anyone for help and thinks that 
they can fulfil their hopes entirely on their own. Such a person 
would seek to be self-sufficient in all their projects and fail to see 
opportunities for cooperation and solidarity with others. They 
would lack reasons for entering into relationships with others and 
would be deficient in sociability and perhaps even friendship. Hope 
is one of the many bonds that secure our attachment to others. 
Family bonds, sociability and political solidarity are forged by the 
mutuality that the element of supplication in hope produces. And I 
might add that if those attachments fulfil our needs and respond to 
our anxieties, there will be no need to project them into the meta-
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physical realm so as to direct our supplication onto supernatural 
beings. 
My second Aristotelian suggestion was that to be a virtue, a 
character trait or a state of mind must be directed upon a noble 
goal. In the case of hope the most general form of this goal was 
that of living well, with and for others, in a just world. Perhaps 
living this way would resolve the spiritual anxieties that I described 
in Chapter 5. Certainly Aristotle's claim was that living this way 
would make us happy. Pursuing this goal will help us to entertain 
authentic hopes that can be rational, realistic and directed towards 
future goals that we will judge to be good. But does this mean that 
we cannot be happy unless we achieve a life that is totally fulfilled, 
relationships that are deep, lasting and without disappointments, 
and a global society in which no injustice could ever occur? No, not 
only are such grand goals unattainable, but in a multicultural world 
there will be disagreements as to what they could mean in concrete 
terms. Even our own reflection will often fail to yield a precise 
understanding of what those goals require of us. Uncertainty and 
contingency are endemic in the human condition. We cannot be 
given any guarantees. Our actions are faulty, fallible and fragile. 
Nevertheless, we must continue to hope that we can live well, with 
and for others, in a just world. Appropriate and committed action 
towards such goals will make them more attainable than we might 
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(2009). 
Epilogue 
The idea that hope should be realistic rather than utopian is discussed at length, 
with reference to such writers as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Cervantes and Camus, 
in Joshua Foa Dienstag's Pessimism (2006). 
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